

CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya intel

I just received this, more to come:

This is just in from Italian intel.

Just in, we are getting good reporting from Libya, the sourcing is from the ruling family, the highest levels of the military, and diplomats/intel. Mostly via Italy.

As of this hour, some units of the Peoples Militia have gone over to the demonstrators in Benghazi, and that is the origin of the report of mutinies. This is a possibility and the government no longer controls Benghazi, but it is too early for large scale mutinies.

There are two subplots, tension between the eastern (Benghazi) and western (Tripoli) parts of the country, and tension between the two oldest Qaddhfi sons. In the east there is support for the former royal family, and modern reforms. This area also supports Saif al Isalm Qaddhafi (second son, living in London/Vienna.) At the same time there is a violent conflict between those portions of the Presidential Guard loyal to Saif, the bulk of the Peoples Militia which is loyal to his older brother, national security advisor Motasem Qaddahfi.

Sisme is reporting that the Militia is firing on demonstrators who are attempting to surrender. Military officers, and the hospitals report that many of the wounds are being inflicted from close range.

Sisme believes that once the regime resorts to extreme violence they have set the stage for their downfall; the people, particularly in the east, are enraged. The violence is following the coast highway moving from town to town toward Tripoli.

These sources say that the situation is completely unpredictable and quite dangerous. They advise that all Americans should leave the country as soon as possible, as the Embassy has warned.

BLU-001

While rumors of Qaddahfi's departure for Venezuela are apparently not true, it is important, however, that at this early stage in the struggle they are being taken seriously by some of his supporters. (Qaddahfi is a friend of Hugo Chavez.)

CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Latest Libya intel

This is the latest as of this afternoon, based on sources inside the Libyan intelligence agency:

Overview: During the early afternoon of 21 February a senior official of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) stated privately that the security situation throughout the country is rapidly moving out of control, and that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi is becoming increasingly desperate in his efforts to put down the anti-government demonstrations. These individuals noted that late on 20 February Qaddafi ordered the commander of the Air Force to bomb the barracks of any troops or police who go over to the anti-government forces. (Source Comment: The commander of the Air Force is a Qaddafi loyalist but he has apparently not yet implemented this controversial order. Two pilots have flown their aircraft to Malta rather than carrying out this order.) At the same time, Qaddafi has order the Peoples Militia, the Presidential Guard and the para-military "revolutionary committees" to use whatever means are necessary to gain control of the situation.

ESO officials warn that while Qaddafi seems intent on fighting this battle, he is not suicidal and if he judges there is no hope he will leave the country. They expect he may begin sending family members out of the country later today. (Malta and Italy are the two most likely destinations. Qaddafi is quite concerned about the security of his family, telling one senior official that he never recovered from the death of one of his children during the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in April 1986, in retaliation for an ESO attack on US military personnel at a nightclub in Berlin.)

At the same time, the two main factions in the regime have polarized, reflecting a serious dispute over policy between Qaddafi's two oldest sons. The moderates, led by Saif al-Islam Qaddafi favor aggressive police anti-riot tactics but are opposed the use of

deadly force. Saif is also calling for negotiations with tribal leaders in the east, including members of the former royal family. The more violent faction is headed by Montasem Qaddafi, the National Security Advisor, and believes that the police and military must use deadly force to end the rioting. This faction points out that during the recent revolution in Egypt the military and police did not use their full force against the demonstrators and in the end they were defeated.

Montasem, and his father, according to knowledgeable individuals, appear to view this crisis as an escalation of the longstanding rivalry between the government in Tripoli and tribal groups in the east, centered around Benghazi. At the beginning of the demonstrations, on 18 February, Saif al-Islam made contact with tribal leaders in the Benghazi region in an effort to find a solution for the situation. According to knowledgeable individuals, his representatives came away from these meetings with the view that only the departure of Qaddafi and the establishment of a new regime would satisfy the demonstrators.

Qaddafi and his senior advisors are particularly concerned by the growing number officials and diplomats turning against the government, including, most importantly the Minister of Justice, Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil, and the Ambassador to the Arab League in Cairo, Abdel-Moneim al Houni. At the same time the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Libyan Mission to the UN, Ibrahim Dabachi, made a statement accusing Qaddafi of Genocide.

(Source Comment: At present Montasem Qaddafi and his hard line supporters in the Presidential Guard and ESO have the upper-hand in the government, and are pressing for increased violence, including the use of snipers against demonstrators. There have been some defections from the Peoples Militia in the Benghazi region, which led to the loss of control in the city, but the majority of the Militia and all of the Presidential guard are extremely loyal to Qaddafi. As stated, several senior officials, including senior officers of the ESO believe that the fighting will go on for the foreseeable future, but they believe that in the end Qaddafi will be forced to leave. Senior ESO figures point to the persistence of the false rumor that Qaddafi has left the country to seek asylum with his friend Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, as a sign that support for the regime is beginning to slip.)

Unrest Intensifies in Tripoli: Violence continues to escalate in Tripoli, with troops firing on demonstrators in many parts of the city. Anti-government protesters have set aflame a number of public structures, including the state television headquarters and People's Hall, the seat of parliament. Protesters attacked foreign businesses, including a South Korean construction site, injuring at least 18 foreigners. Fighting between protesters, security forces and "revolutionary committees" supporting leader Muammar Gaddafi, particularly in the vicinity of Green Square; reports indicate that security forces have been issued "shoot to kill" orders and firing on unarmed protesters. Anti-government protesters continue to riot in cities across Libya, demanding that Qaddafi step down. Opposition forces, supported by members of the Peoples Militia have gained control in the eastern city of Benghazi; a massacre by government forces in the city on

February 19 emboldened demonstrators, who have gained control of a number of tanks. Reports indicate that some police and military units have defected in the city, while most others are remaining off the streets. Protesters have also reportedly gained control of the eastern city of Bayda, while fighting has taken place in Ajdabiya, Al Marj, Derna, Tobruk, and Zawiya.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: No fly zone over Libya

UK former Foreign Secretary David Owen has called for a no-fly zone over Libya, imposed by the United Nations and/or Nato, like the no-fly zone imposed on Saddam's Iraq. US might consider advancing tomorrow. Libyan helicopters and planes are raining terror on cities.

Article below:

UN should authorise NATO and Egypt to enforce Libyan 'No Fly Zone' to protect civilians

In the wake of reported air attacks on civilian crowds by the Libyan airforce, former Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen has called on the UN Security Council to immediately meet in emergency session and authorise a 'No Fly Zone' over Libya. Speaking on al Jazeera, Lord Owen called for a UN Charter Chapter 7 intervention (meaning the authorisation of both military and non-military means to "restore international peace and security") to be enforced by NATO air forces with Egyptian military support to demonstrate regional backing for the effort.

Lord Owen said: "The UN Security Council should meet in emergency session tonight and declare the situation in Libya as a threat to peace under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and declare a no flight zone for the Libyan air force and ask the regional power, Nato, to enforce it from dawn tomorrow. And hopefully other Arab nations, particularly Egypt, might decide to participate to demonstrate that this is not just a Western initiative."

Lord Owen went on to call for "air forces in the region with sufficient range to reach Libya to prevent any Libyan air force military action against civilians". The call matches those of human rights advocates for actions not just words from the international community. The New York Times' Nick Kristof tweeted : "Under "Right to Protect" doctrine, West cld bomb air fields from which Qaddafi's warplanes are taking off." And: "Better yet: Egypt & Tunisia could use their air forces to ground Qadaffi's planes, keep him from slaughtering his people."

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Intel on Gaddafi's reinforcements

From another intelligence source, this one a senior counselor to Gaddafi since his taking power but now living in exile in Amman:

Gaddafi is calling in fighter planes and bombers from the governments of Mali and Chad, aircraft he had subsidized with his oil wealth. These other countries are cooperating with Gaddafi—they are on his payroll.

BLU-007

CONFIDENTIAL

February 23, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Latest Libya intel

There's a lot of fresh intelligence here. On the first item (marked unconfirmed), I have heard from an independent source (a former Qaddafi counselor) that it is accurate.

MOST RECENT REPORTING (UNCONFIRMED, PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY): European security officials have received unconfirmed (repeat unconfirmed) reporting that Muammar Qaddafi has order the commanders of the Libyan Air Force to develop plans to destroy the Libyan oil facilities in the event he is killed or driven from the country. According to this source the Air Force officers were stunned by what they describe as Qaddafi wanting to leave nothing behind for his enemies. These officers do not believe they can find pilots to fly such missions.)

(Source Comment: Senior advisors believe that Muammar Qaddafi may lose control of Tripoli in the next five (5) days, in which case he will be forced retreat to his fortress in the southern desert, from which he can fight on for some time, supported by loyal followers and mercenaries. His hope in this case would be that the various tribal councils now being set up as parts of a potential interim government will begin fighting with each other, allowing him to stage a return to power in the future. Qaddafi discussed this situation with two of his sons Montasem and Saif al-Islam Qaddafi (living in London.) It is this possibility that Saif al-Islam is referring to when he has warned of civil war on several occasions. In this regard, Qaddafi is counting on the support of Chad's President Idriss Debi, who was able to defeat the forces of his predecessor, Hussein Habri, only with Qaddafi's aid and support in 1990-91.)

Overview: As of February 23 an official of a Western security services stated privately that as many as 1,500 people have been killed in fighting between Libyan forces—augmented by mercenaries from a variety of African countries--and anti-government demonstrators. (Source Comment: This official adds that members of the family of Muammar Qaddafi attempted to fly to Malta on February 23, but were turned back by Maltese authorities.) At the same time, senior European officials believe that as more

BLU-008

members of the security forces go over to the opposition Qaddafi may lose control of Tripoli, at which point he will be forced to retire to his fortress in the Southern desert.

A senior official of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) stated privately that Qaddafi believes he has lost control of the majority of troops in the Libyan Army, and he no longer trusts the National Guard, the Peoples Militia, the Navy, and even his old colleagues in the Air Force. Qaddafi continues to have confidence in the ESO, and his Presidential Guard.

Over the weekend of February 19 Army Major General Mahmoud Suleiman, commander of the Tobruk garrison, warned Qaddafi's son Montasem that his troops would not continue to fire on demonstrators and that many of his men were defecting to the opposition. In turn, with his father's agreement, Montasem made contact with security officials in Chad, Benin, Nigeria, and a number of other West African countries to recruit mercenary troops to use in suppressing the demonstrations. With the agreement of the security officials in these countries Libyan officials recruited 3,000-5,000 private soldiers. (Source Comment: Qaddafi has cultivated relationships in these West African countries over the last twenty years.) General Suleiman joined the opposition on the morning 23 February.

These mercenary forces have taken part in fighting across Libya and have been blamed by observers for many of the casualties inflicted on the demonstrators. At the same time, a number of these foreign troops have fallen into the hands of demonstrators and been killed, with their bodies set out for public view. There have also been instances where Africans not involved in the fighting have been attacked and killed by the demonstrators.

Current Developments: During the evening of February 23 a well placed source stated that as the situation throughout Libya deteriorates Qaddafi is telling senior advisors and family members that he is being betrayed by the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and many European Union Countries. At the beginning of the current crisis Qaddafi was convinced that his improved relations with the Western nations would allow him to use harsh tactics against protestors while avoiding serious international repercussions. As these tactics fail to end the demonstration and members of the Army and other Security forces go over to the demonstrators, Qaddafi has become increasingly isolated and erratic in his behavior. He is now dealing with Montasem and members of his immediate family and fears that Western Governments may attempt assassinate him in an effort to prevent further disruption of Libya's oil industry.

The Italian Government is paying close attention to the situation in Libya, and the Italian External Intelligence Service (SISME) estimates that up to 500,000 Libyans will attempt reach Malta and Southern Europe if the situation in Libya continues to deteriorate. With this in mind the Italians are reaching out to the leaders of the al-Sanusi tribe—the old royal family—and encouraging them to form a council of tribal leaders. These groups will call for a return to the pre-1969 constitution for a short period of time, using this as a stabilizing factor, while a new constitution is drafted and elections held. (Source

Comment: An officer of the current government stated that it would be interesting to see how the young demonstrators react to the attempts of these tribal leaders to gain power. This same individual stated that the effort to form a new government will be complicated by the attempts by Qaddafi loyalists like former protocol chief Nouri Al Masmari and the Ministers of Justice and the Interior to reinvent themselves as dissidents. Finally, this individual noted that former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil has told European contacts that he has evidence establishing a direct link between Qaddafi and the Lockerbee bombing. He is weighing the possibility that by exposing this information he may ingratiate himself to the West.

Feb 23, 2011

H: Phone #s that may work. S

If anyone needs this information----the phone contacts for General Abdul Fatah Younis, Libya's minister of interior and Qaddafi's No. 2 who resigned yesterday are as follows:

home
---mobile
'---office

Apparently, he wants to be a player in new regime...

Feb 25, 2011

H: FYI, you must know this, but detailed by well informed journalist with much experience with Q. Sid.

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2011/02/25/Commentary-Manic-depressive-megalomaniac/UPI-80221298634695/

Commentary: Manic depressive megalomaniac

By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

UPI Editor at Large

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 (UPI) -- In the late 1970s, Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali couldn't figure out why African summit meetings unanimously voted against Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. So he decided to sprinkle his delegation with intelligence gumshoes for the next summit in Sierra Leone in 1980. Their mission: Find out what kind of chicanery was going on behind the scenes.

All the heads of state were staying in the same hotel in Freetown, which made sleuthing a lot easier. Boutros-Ghali wasn't surprised by the results. Each one received a Gucci briefcase with \$1 million. There was one exception: Hastings Banda of Malawi. He got \$100,000 in a brown paper bag. All courtesy of Moammar Gadhafi.

The Libyan dictator staged his Sept. 1, 1969, coup with exquisite timing. The CIA station chief was taking his time sampling the Michelin Guide's three-star restaurants as he drove through France to Marseilles. The British MI6 chief was on home leave in the United Kingdom. And King Idris was on his yacht in the eastern Mediterranean, soon to land in Turkey for medical treatment.

For this journalist who interviewed Gadhafi six times over the past four decades, the Libyan absolute dictator is a megalomaniac manic depressive. In his first year in power, he endeared himself to most Libyans by showing up at the back door of a hospital disguised in rags as a poor, stooped old woman. He explained in a high-pitched voice that he needed help as he thought he was dying. He was told to come back in the morning and the door was slammed in his face.

Next day, Gadhafi closed the hospital and sent the staff to look for work elsewhere.

His popularity soared.

Then, with a mix of lavishly funded propaganda, subversion, assassination and terrorism plots, he went on to interfere in the internal affairs of no less than 40 countries over his four decades in power.

He dispatched a Libyan expeditionary force with armored personnel carriers and tanks by ship to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. By the time the ship docked in Dar, Idi Amin had taken off into a golden exile in Saudi Arabia.

Gadhafi plotted coups and counter-coups all over sub-Sahara Africa. Armed with petrodollars, he established himself as Africa's supremo. One great news photo shows him on a large couch in Tripoli with four African heads of state -- two on each side -- with a bored Gadhafi reading a newspaper.

Before the 1973 Yom Kippur war, he flew to Cairo several times in his private jet without advance notice, raced through the VIP lounge and jumped in a taxi to see his favorite Egyptian newspaper editor Mohamed Heikal, close friend of the late dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser. On one such caper, Heikal had just returned from Beijing. He regaled Gadhafi, whose historical knowledge started and stopped in high school, the story of China's "Long March" led by Mao Zedong in 1934-35. This gave Gadhafi his next idea.

No sooner back in Tripoli than he organized a "Long March" on Cairo. This was designed to provoke President Anwar Sadat into a more muscular Pan-Arab foreign policy. Thousands were mobilized in eastern Libya and sent off to march to Cairo. Sadat's intelligence service followed all the planning -- and his elite troops were deployed to turn the marchers back whence they came.

In 1974, after an interview with Gadhafi, this reporter was on a Swissair flight about to take off for Geneva when Libyan plainclothesmen came aboard and shouted my name. They ordered me off the plane. I explained I had a bag in the hold. They said, "No worry. Plane no leave without you."

As we drove off the tarmac they explained "Colonel Gadhafi wants to see you immediately." I protested I had just seen him the day before.

"Yes, we know, but he wants to see you again." It took 30 minutes to get to his headquarters at Azizia barracks.

"Yesterday," the interpreter said listening to the chief, "you said Sadat might invade Libya. Now you must tell me everything you know."

I gave him my word of honor I knew nothing about Sadat's plans, only that I knew he was more than a little angry at the colonel's lavishly funded subversive activities in Cairo. And that I wouldn't be surprised if Sadat retaliated.

After giving Gadhafi my word of honor on his Koran, he relented and let me return to the airport. By the time I got back aboard, the aircraft had been held at the gate three hours. It was mid-June and more than 90 degrees. Angry dagger looks from fellow passengers would be an understatement.

In 1993, at the end of a two-hour interview, I said, "Now you're going to tell me what really happened with Pan Am 103." He dismissed everyone in the tent about 60 miles south of Tripoli. And in halting English he reminded me that a "peaceful Iran Air Airbus on its daily flight across the gulf from Bandar Abbas to Dubai, with no other planes in the sky, was shot down in July 1988 by the USS Vincennes, killing 290 people. ... You claimed it was an accident but no one in our part of the world believed you. So retaliation was unavoidable."

He went on to explain that the Iranian intelligence service subcontracted part of the counter-blow to one of the Syrian intelligence services, which, in turn, turned to Libya for assistance. "We knew this would be a big blow," he said but claimed they didn't know what, specifically, the target was.

Pan Am 103 was blown out of the sky over Scotland in December 1988, killing 259 on the aircraft and 11 on the ground. Gadhafi eventually turned over two wanted intelligence service suspects. One was cleared and the other released on compassionate grounds two years ago. Turned out he wasn't dying of cancer. It was allegedly part of another oil deal with BP.

Gadhafi forked over \$2.7 billion as a settlement with the families of 270 killed, or \$10 million per victim.

After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Gadhafi thought he might be next on President George W. Bush's hit parade. He quickly surrendered his entire secret nuclear weapons program, bought from Pakistan's infamous Dr. A.Q. Khan.

But now, cornered in an Orwellian nightmare, he praised President Barack Obama's African ancestry and Muslim proclivities and blamed everything on a common enemy -- Osama bin Laden. He still has a chemical-biological arsenal. And this mentally sick head of state could be tempted by an apocalyptic Gotterdammerung.

H: Q's scuds, Seif's private strategy, more. Sid
Feb 25 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

February 25, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Qaddafi's Scuds and strategy for holding on

On the morning of February 25, a former official of the government of Muammar Qaddafi stated in confidence that he and other former members of the Qaddafi regime are concerned by the knowledge that the soldiers and officers assigned to the Libyan Army's Scud Missile Battalions remain loyal to Qaddafi. While the issue remains open as to whether or not the Libyan government maintains small quantities of mustard gas and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, Qaddafi's forces can use these Scuds to carry conventional high explosives, and launch random, but destructive attacks against Benghazi, Tobruk or other towns under the control of anti-government forces.

(Source Comment: These sources repeated their earlier warning that Qaddafi would not hesitate to use all of the resources at his disposal to attack civilian, political, and economic targets if he feels he is on the verge of being defeated by anti-government troops.)

During the afternoon of February 25, Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam stated in private that his father is convinced he can hold power, if he can maintain control of portions of Tripoli for the next ten (10) days. Saif al-Islam states that it is important to remember that his father is still the Head of State in Libya, and that the UN and the major nations of the world are reluctant to depose a sitting Head of State. (Source Comment: The United States invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan serve as the examples that prove the rule in this case.) The Libyan diplomats serving abroad who remain loyal to Qaddafi have been instructed to press this point with other governments. These diplomats are particularly active in sub Saharan African, and at this point Saif al-Islam is pleased with what he considers the rather mild reaction of these states to the violence used by forces loyal to Qaddafi in suppressing anti-government activities in Libya. Saif al-Islam

BLU-015

believes that while the leaders of countries like Chad, Benin, and Burkina Faso must call for an end to violence, they will continue to stop short of statements supporting the demonstrators. By the same token the Organization of African Unity (OAU), after delaying its response to the violence for several days, has limited its statements to an expression of concern.

The current President of the OAU is Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the President of Equatorial Guinea, who, according to well placed sources, considers himself a friend and supporter of Qaddafi. Mbasogo received support from Libya when he seized power in a violent military coup d'état in 1979, and he has remained loyal to Qaddafi over the years. Mbasogo receives technical and business advice from Libyan experts, particularly in managing Equatorial Guinea's substantial oil resources.

Since coming to power in 1969 Qaddafi has worked to establish strong relationships with the Heads of State in many sub-Saharan African nations. This support has included technical and financial aid, military support, and private payments to the various Heads of State. According to Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi believes these African states will now continue support him as he deals with the rebellion in Libya. Well placed sources report that Mbasogo has received millions of dollars in private payments from the Qaddafi regime.

Since 1969, Qaddafi has been one of the only Islamic leaders in North Africa to seek out cordial relations with the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. According to a former official of the Kenyan government, these African states feel that the Islamic nations of North Africa look down on their southern neighbors and focus most their attention on relations with the Arab states of the Middle East. Libya and Israel are the two countries of North Africa and the Middle East who have invested substantial time, money and personnel resources in supporting these African states. For its part, Kenya has a history of conflict with Libya rooted in the Cold War, however, this individual notes that even these relations improved after the 2003-2004 Libyan agreement with the Western powers regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(Source Comment: The leaders of the OAU states also fear that the wave of anti-corruption unrest that is sweeping North Africa will spread south. This is particularly true in the case of dictators like Mbasogo and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. However, even elected leaders like South Africa's Jakob Zuma must be concerned because of the economic downturn in their countries and the rampant corruption that exists across Africa. It is highly unlikely that these African states will support any attempt by the UN, or NATO to organize some form of military response to the Libyan situation, including the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya.)

Violence continues throughout Tripoli, with those military, and Para military units still loyal to Qaddafi using deadly force against protesters. These forces are being supported by mercenaries from the sub-Sahara Africa. The various tribal, civic and political groups continue to form revolutionary committees in an effort to begin to organize the parts of the country under the control of anti-government forces. According to a former government official, these committees are hoping that the international community will reach out to them and assist in establishing a new government in Libya.

H: Option WMD Libya. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

February 25, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Option on WMD

Depending on the state of play within the U.N. Security Council, it might be useful to think about generating a statement from the UNSC that any officer or government official in the chain of command in Libya who is involved in deploying or using WMD would be subject to war crimes and crimes against humanity prosecution.

This option might have the effect of intensifying pressure and creating further splits between Qaddafi and his remaining loyal generals. His senior officials should be made to understand that they still have a choice of whether they will personally go down with him. There is probably some urgency if this option were to be adopted before the opposing forces converge.

BLU-017

H: FYI, article below, new intel coming soon. Govt in formation, Justice minister heading it. Sid
Feb 26, 2011

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/shadi-mokhtari/george-bush-and-turn-to-human-rights-in-arab-world>

George Bush and the turn to human rights in the Arab world

Shadi Mokhtari, 25 February 2011

Some have linked the emergence of a strong human rights agenda in the Arab world with the policies of the last American president. In a way they are right: post-9/11 abuses overseen by the Bush administration were the tragedy that brought to light the urgency of claiming rights.

About the author

Shadi Mokhtari is Assistant Professor at the School of International Service at American University, Washington D.C.

In the stunning popular uprisings that have been sprouting up throughout the Arab world, the desire for the realization of rights seems ubiquitous. For this, some have argued, George W. Bush deserves some credit. In fact, there is a link to be made between recent developments and Bush administration policies. However, it is not so much that we are finally seeing the fruits of the Bush era's democracy and human rights promotion agenda, or that a liberated Iraq has now set an example for the rest of the region to follow. Rather, we are seeing the fruits of an Arab engagement with human rights which was in part spurred by the Bush Administration's array of post-9/11 policies thwarting human rights.

Before 9/11, the human rights idea was widely debated in the Arab world. Many voices including among Islamists argued that it was essentially a Western idea not compatible with Arab and Islamic values. It was also held that human rights were mainly an instrument the United States used to paint a moral veneer on self-interested agendas in the region. These arguments resonated with Arab populations because they tapped into widespread frustration with American policies. While they paid lip service to human rights internationally, the Arab world's authoritarian rulers were all too happy to exploit this popular disillusionment with human rights and even reinforce its association with American cultural and political hegemony.



"Abu Ghraib brought home the concept of human rights more strongly than anything else. People started debating human rights in talking about Abu Ghraib..."
 Arab activist

A particular event can trigger a rise or decline in rights consciousness in any country or culture in the world- East or West. Abu Ghraib served as a pivotal moment for human rights consciousness in the Arab world. Because the torture and abuse depicted was so widely seen as directed towards the Arab or Muslim man, many felt a profound sense of personal violation. As they grappled to formulate a response, they often found themselves invoking human rights. "Abu Ghraib probably brought home the concept of human rights more strongly than anything else. People started debating human rights issues in talking about Abu Ghraib...What is your right to be treated like a human being in dignity?" an Arab activist told me in Amman in 2006. Gauging public sentiment, some Arab leaders joined in. Hosni Mubarak called Abu Ghraib "abhorrent and sickening, and against all human values and human rights confirmed and defended by the international community".

Denials of fair trials in Guantanamo, CIA black sites, renditions of terrorist suspects to third countries known to torture, and legal formulations paving the way for "enhanced interrogation techniques" all brought discussions of human rights further to the fore of Arab consciousness. Instead of viewing human rights as a Western imposition, increasingly it became a language that Arab populations embraced to challenge America's post-9/11 policies.

Leaders in places like Yemen and Bahrain generally tolerated all of the local protests, conferences, media coverage, and slew of other mobilizations decrying post-9/11 abuses because they were directed at the United States, not them. It did not take long however for the focus to turn inward to the Arab world's own "Guantanamo's", "Abu Ghraib's," and widespread practice of torture. Activists began exploiting limited openings to draw compelling analogies to the repression pervading their own societies. In Jordan, human rights forces were able to gain access to the Hashemite Kingdom's prisons for the first time, initiate a public previously inconceivable debate on torture and eventually force King Abdullah to close down one of Jordan's most notorious prisons which had also been the site of American "War on Terror" renditions. Thus, American post-9/11 human rights abuses not only focused attention on and brought increased legitimacy to the human rights idea, they also opened up important avenues for the expression of longstanding rights aspirations. As the post-9/11 era progressed, the immense injustice of torture and false imprisonments- whether perpetrated by the United States or their own governments- came to occupy a central place in Arab sensibilities.

Islamists were no exception. After 9/11, they were often tied to terrorism and targeted by local regimes. When this happened, it was human rights defenders who often came to their aid, sometimes providing common cause between forces that had traditionally been at odds. In 2007 Yemeni women's rights activists who had condemned denials of due process to Islamists told me that they saw a new openness by Islah Party members to engage with them on women's rights issues. Perhaps more importantly, accusations of human rights violations became an integral strategy in Islamists' political challenges to local rulers. The Muslim Brotherhood's website has for years been replete with accusations of human rights violations and torture committed by the Mubarak regime. It is difficult to determine how much of the Islamist turn to human rights stems from a new consciousness and how much of it is purely strategic. But in the final analysis, it may not matter all that much. Once they adopt the discourse, labeling human rights "a foreign imposition" becomes an increasingly thorny undertaking.

Thus for some time now, as Americans have been gravitating towards the position that torture is sometimes necessary and terrorism suspects can be held indefinitely without trial, the Arab world has been inching towards a consensus on human rights. In many ways, the rise in rights consciousness evident in protests throughout the Arab world (epitomized by the January 25th slogan of "revolt against torture, poverty, unemployment and corruption" or the centrality of the torture case of Khaled Said in Egypt) follows this trend.

Undoubtedly, America's post-9/11 rights failings are just one of many factors coalescing to bring about the Arab world's current engagements with the human rights paradigm. Indeed, the most powerful catalyst for the dramatic events of the last two months is Arab populations' own lived experience of oppression. Still it is important to recognize that historically societies have often embraced human rights on the heels of a human rights tragedy that profoundly impacts them. In many ways, the post-9/11 denials of human rights that were overseen by George W. Bush were the Arab world's tragedy that brought to light the urgency of claiming rights.

Shadi Mokhtari's new book is available in hardback and will shortly be published in the paperback by Cambridge University Press

H: latest, lots of intel. Sid
Feb 26 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

February 26, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Q location, new defections, beginnings of interim govt

(Source Comment: In a private conversation during the evening of February 26, Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa stated that Muammar Qaddafi is moving his living quarters on a daily basis, primarily between secure Air Force and External Security Organization (ESO) facilities in the Tripoli region. Qaddafi is convinced that he is under threat of attack from Western military forces (particularly NATO), as well as disloyal members of his regime. Accordingly, he is seeking council from a shrinking circle of advisors, including Mousa Kousa, his sons Montasem, and Saif al-Islam, as well as loyal officers from the Air Force, Presidential Guard, and the ESO. Qaddfi believes that, in the event of a collapse of security situation in Tripoli, he can always retreat to the town of Sirte, which is controlled by his Qadhafah tribe.)

During the morning of February 26 a former official of the Libyan Government stated in confidence that Muammar Qaddafi was visibly shaken when informed by security officials that the large Magariha tribe, based around the southern city of Sabah, could no longer be counted on to support him. Many of the leaders of the Armed forces and the Intelligence services come from the Magariha, and Qaddafi has favored this tribe since coming to power in 1969. According to these individuals, Qaddafi began receiving reports on 19 February that the Magariha were turning against the government, but he believed that they would support him when faced with a full scale uprising in the eastern part of the country. (Source Comment: The leaders of the Magariha were angered when Qaddafi allowed tribal member Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi to take the blame for the Lockerbie bombing in an international tribunal in 2001. The Libyan leader believed that he had resolved this situation when al-Megrahi was released from prison in Scotland and returned to a hero's welcome in Libya in 2009.)

BLU-021

Qaddafi was particularly angry when Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa also warned that Abdessalem Jalloud, his lifelong friend, former Prime Minister, and senior member of the Magariha, is believed to be giving encouragement to the anti-government forces in the western part of the country, and in parts of Tripoli. Jalloud is in ill health and has kept a low profile in recent years, but he is one of the original young officers who supported Qaddafi in the 1969 coup d'état against King Idriss al-Sanusi.

(Source Comet: Jalloud and Qaddafi are childhood friends and attended the Royal Military Academy together in the mid-1960s. Following the coup, Jalloud was Qaddafi's most powerful advisor from 1969 to 1993. While the two have not been close since Qaddafi relieved Jalloud as Prime Minister in 1993, the idea that one of his few lifelong friends has turned against him seems to his advisors to have shaken Qaddafi. He did not indicate what action he planned to take against Jalloud, if he can get to him.)

While the Magariha situation was difficult for Qaddafi to hear, Mousa Kousa and his other security advisors were more concerned when three tribes important to the protection of the oil fields in the Wahat region south of Benghazi went over to the opposition on February 25: the al-Zuwayya from Jikharra oasis, El-Mjabra from Jalu's oasis and al-Awajila from Awjila oasis. These tribes have now announced that they will protect the oil fields if forces loyal to Qaddafi attack the facilities there, in an effort to carry out his threat to cut off oil to the West, if his regime begins to falter.

As the revolution in Libya spreads into Tripoli, tribal leaders, former members of the regime, students and academics, have begun organizing into new political structures in the areas held by opposition forces. Former Minister of Justice Mustafa Abdel Galil, and tribal leaders from the eastern part of the country met in the town of Al Bayda to begin the process of forming an interim government. At the same time, individuals with access to these new political leaders state that some of the student and academic leaders are skeptical of the motives of Galil and other former members of Qaddafi's government. One Libyan academic told a member of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt that Galil and others are trying to avoid responsibility for past crimes, while taking advantage of the chaos in the country to gain power.

This individual added that opposition forces in Benghazi have been carefully watching the activities of former Minister of Interior, General Abdul Fatah Younis al Abidi, and have placed him under guard. At present he is not being allowed to have outside contact. Opposition leaders know that Younis can be valuable in the struggle against Qaddafi, but they also feel that after 40 years as a senior Army officer and Minister of Interior, he may have to answer for the activities of the old regime. (Source

Comment: Younis is under house arrest in Benghazi, and no decision has been made by the various opposition leaders on whether or not to enlist him in support of the leadership of the opposition, as a new government starts to take shape.)

H: Up to minute detailed state of play politically and militarily. Sid
Feb 28 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

February 28, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: State of play politically and militarily

The latest report:

On February 26, 2011, Professor Idris el-Sharif, the chairman of the committee formed in Benghazi to coordinate opposition military activities, made contact with the newly formed National Libyan Council (NLC) stating that the Benghazi military council would join the NLC as long as he was assured that the National Council was not acting as an interim government. According to el-Sharif it is too early to discuss an interim government. In addition, el-Sharif warned NLC leader Mustafa Mohamed Abud al Gilil that the opposition is made up of a wide variety of ad hoc groups of students, academics and professionals, and that the NLC must guide rather than try to control these groups. At the same time they have to maintain relationships with the National Conference for the Libyan opposition (NCLO) and other established opposition groups, without allowing these groups to establish control of the movement. El-Sharif warned that the NCLO and the largely exile groups that fall under its umbrella have little credibility with the current opposition movement, which is based on the problems and actions of average people living inside of Libya. El-Sharif added that the NLC is much more relevant to the current situation; however, it must resist the temptation to begin acting like a government or established political party.

On the morning of February 28 sources with access to the various groups in the Libyan Opposition movement stated in confidence that while the NLC is working to establish itself as the central point for the opposition to Muammar Qaddafi, their leader, al Gilil, and other founding members realize that they must be careful to avoid the appearance of trying to seize power. Gilil stated privately that he made a mistake in describing the NLC as an interim government and that after discussions with other members of the council realized that the students and young people who have carried the bulk of the conflict with Qaddafi's forces would react badly to an effort by another group of established figures to gain control over the parts of the country held by the

opposition. Accordingly, NLC spokesman Hafiz Ghoga has gone to great lengths to state that the NLC is not an interim government. Instead, he described it as an effort to begin to organize the opposition.

At the same time, the Senussiyyah family, representing the old monarchy, is planning to choose a formal leader under the traditional consultative process last used in 1951 by King Idriss al Senussi. The chosen leader will have the title of As-Seyyed (a descendant of the prophet Muhammed). Seyyid Idriss bin Abdullah al-Senussi is the leading candidate for this position based on his well established relationships with the leaders of the other Libyan tribes. Seyyid is 54 years old and has, until his recent return to Libya, lived in the United States for many years. He has the support of the powerful al-Obeidat tribe, as well as a group of smaller families who will soon gather together under the name el-Senussiyyah. These moderate Sunni groups intend to restore the pre-1969 constitution, aiming for a national election in eighteen (18) months.

As fighting continues in the area around Tripoli, the NLC, the al-Sennussi and others are working to identify the new leaders of the revolution in an effort to begin working with them in a formal manner. All of these groups will be working to establish relationships with the United States and the other world powers. One individual noted that this is precarious process since they want to establish their legitimacy but must avoid looking like the puppets of foreign governments, as Qaddafi and his sons have alleged.

A highly reliable source stated in confidence that African mercenaries continue to land in Tripoli, passing through the airport of Sebha (410 miles south of Tripoli) which is still in the hands of Qaddafi loyalists. These troops are flown in on aircraft belonging to the Libyan Company, Afriqiyah Airways. Until February 24 these forces were recruited in Nigeria, Chad, Benin; however, beginning on February 25 the recruits began to include fighters from Algeria, including troops from the Frente Popular de Liberación de Sagúa el Hamra y Río de Oro (Polisario Front.) (Source Comment: These Polisario troops are drawn from the Saharawi people fighting against Morocco for the independence of the territory of Western Sahara. These Polisario troops have been trained by the Algerian military and intelligence services to fight against the Moroccan Military in Western Sahara.

An advisor to Qaddafi stated privately that the Government of Morocco has used private channels to protest the recruitment of these forces to the Libyan Government. The Moroccans state that they learned from Polisario sources that Qaddafi has promised to support their struggle against in Western Sahara, if they send mercenaries to fight with the Algerians in support of his regime.

The current military situation in Libya:

- **ZAWIYAH** (a city only 27 miles west of Tripoli), Armed rebels maintain control of the city and repulsed an attack by about 2,000 troops loyal to Gaddafi. The loyalists are armed with tanks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks.
- **Misrata**, (116 miles east of Tripoli), A counter-attack launched from the airport by forces loyal to the regime was rebuffed in fighting that left at least 30 people dead.
- **Benghazi**, Opposition forces are currently in possession of 14 fighter aircraft at the Benghazi Airport, but they have no pilots or maintenance crews to support them.

- While Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and his brother Montasem receive the majority of attention in the world press, an advisor to Qaddafi stated in confidence that two other sons, Saadi (who is involved with Libyan Army Special Forces units), and Khamis, who commands the Khamis Brigade of heavily equipped Special Forces troops, are concerned that they may face international war crimes tribunals for the actions taken by troops under their command. These Special Forces troops, particularly snipers, have been accused by opposition leaders of firing on unarmed demonstrators.

- In addition to the rescue of British citizens by the SAS and Royal Air Force, German GSG-9 Special Forces units evacuated 132 people from the desert during a secret military mission on Saturday. Two German military aircraft landed on a private runway belonging to the firm Wintershall AG, evacuating 22 Germans and 112 others, flying them to the Greek island of Crete.

H: Very latest, Egypt special forces now in Libya, more... Sid
Mar 1 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 1, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Egypt in Libya; US rhetoric

I am told this information is especially sensitive. Two points that can be drawn:

1. The commitment of Egyptian Special Forces to the overthrow of Qaddafi is rooted in more than longstanding Egyptian hostility to Qaddafi, but also the Egyptians' belief that their economic future may be greatly aided by the outcome in Libya and the relationship with post-Qaddafi Libya.
2. The personal name-calling by certain U.S. officials of Qaddafi is stiffening his resistance and he is using it internally to support his case with his followers that he is fighting Western/Israeli imperialism, foreign interests, etc., according to one of his advisers. This rhetoric differs from the formal condemnations of Qaddafi's abusive rule and policies by other senior officials and Western governments.

During late February, 2011 Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, Chairman of Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and Army Chief of Staff Sami Annan ordered elite, clandestine Special Operations units of the Egyptian Army to begin carefully providing support to the forces fighting against Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Officers from these clandestine units have crossed the border into Libya and made contact with representatives of the National Libyan Council (NLC) in Benghazi and begun discussing how to provide support and weapons to the opposition forces. This aid will be particularly valuable as these anti-government forces are formed into rudimentary military units by Libyan Army officers who have gone over to the opposition. These Egyptian troops are

operating with great care, as Tantawi and the other members of the SCAF do not want this effort to come to light in any way.

According to knowledgeable individuals Tantawi, Annan, and the staff of the SCAF want the opposition forces to succeed in their fight against Qaddafi, and restore stability to Libya. The Egyptian leaders are deeply concerned about the refugee crisis along their border, and the danger of potential terrorists taking advantage of the situation to enter Egypt.

The Egyptian military commanders harbor longstanding animosities toward Qaddafi, particularly regarding territorial disputes over the oil rich region along Libya's Southeastern border. The Egyptian authorities are also allowing NLC supporters to bring cash across the border to support the activities of the anti-Qaddafi opposition forces. This program is being managed under very tight security controls; however, one particularly sensitive source added that a small number of these Egyptian Special Operations officers are assisting opposition forces in their successful defense of the town of Zawiyah against repeated attacks by up to 2000 troops loyal to Qaddafi.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals the Egyptian Special Operations troops are working in small teams under cover as Libyans from the border region with Egypt. Also, Tantawi, Annan, and the other leaders of Egypt want to see the Libyan oil fields return to full capacity as soon as possible. The cash remittances sent home by the Egyptians working in these fields are a major source of revenue for the country. These payments will be particularly important as the SCAF, and the new government that follows, attempt to improve Egypt's economic situation.)

According to sources in Libya, the NLC and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil, are working to establish an orderly system to provide food and other essential materials to the people of Benghazi and Eastern Libya. The NLC is proceeding cautiously in this effort, resisting the temptation to call itself an interim government in an effort to avoid angering the other anti-Qaddafi groups; however, they are faced with shortages that must be addressed.

At the same time an adviser to Qaddafi states that the Libyan leader remains confident he can survive this crisis and regain control of the country. As the revolution has continued, the circle of people around Qaddafi has contracted to a group of family members and longtime supporters, many of whom feel that if Qaddafi falls they will be held to account for activities conducted on his behalf. According to this individual Qaddafi and his sons are prepared to carry on this struggle as an all out civil war if a revolutionary government is established in Benghazi. These individuals add that Qaddafi also believes the revolution against his government is being funded and supported by foreign regimes, business interests, and Islamists hostile to him and his family. This individual added that policy statements by senior officials of the United States government continue to anger Qaddafi, who feels betrayed by Western governments. However, Qaddafi and his sons believe that personal attacks by the United States Ambassador to the UN, and various U.S. politicians, characterizing the Libyan leader as insane or "delusional," serve to give credence to his claim that the revolution is being organized and driven by foreign interests.

H: Latest, Qaddafi fears & strategy this am. Sid
Mar 6 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 6, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Qaddafi fears interim government

Latest report:

During the afternoon of March 6, advisors to Muammar al-Qaddafi and his son Saif al Islam stated in confidence that, while Qaddafi himself remains confident that his forces can gain the upper hand against rebel forces throughout the country, Saif is increasingly concerned that the rebels will form an interim government that will give the United States and the nations of Western Europe a focal point for providing both military and humanitarian aid to the rebels. Saif is encouraging his father to continue to speak out accusing the rebels of being puppets of these Western states. By the same token, Saif has instructed government spokesmen to return to the idea that, if this revolution succeeds, Islamist groups such as al Qa'ida and the Libyan Fighting Group (LFG), which Qaddafi has suppressed, will use Libya as a base for attacking the Western states and their allies. Saif believes that pressing these two themes will, if nothing else, confuse the foreign governments, and complicate their efforts to aid the rebels.

(Source Comment: One source with access to Saif stated that word had spread through the Qaddafi government that NATO special forces troops --either Dutch or German -- had been captured by government forces outside of Tripoli on 4 or 5 March. Their sources also reported they believe 8-10 British troops had been taken into custody by rebel forces in Benghazi on 4 March. Similar reports have appeared in the press, but there is no independent confirmation.)

As of 6 March, Qaddafi's military advisors, including his sons Montasem and Khamis are warning Qaddffi that the 1500-2000 person rebel force advancing from Benghazi toward Tripoli presents the most immediate threat to the regime. They are particularly

BLU-028

concerned by the situation in Misrata, warning that if the rebels can consolidate their hold on this town, they will be able to threaten Sirte, the base of Qaddafi's tribe, the Qadhafah. According to some advisors, Qaddafi views Sirte as a fallback position if he cannot remain in Tripoli; loss of this town would be a serious Psychological and Strategic blow to the regime. Government forces have used attack helicopters and ground support aircraft to attack the rebel forces at Misrata and, while they have been unable to secure the town, they have inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels and slowed their advance on Sirte.

(Source Comment: Individuals with access to Qaddafi's military advisors believe government forces will make increasing use of their attack helicopters and the 250 combat air craft still under their control. They also state that Qaddafi believes that the rebels may soon receive more sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons from the Western allies; weapons which will offset the government's air superiority. This would be particularly true in the case of attack helicopters, which are vulnerable to modern, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.)

Qaddafi also wants his forces to continue to tie down rebel troops in and around the town of Zawiyah, 30 miles west of Tripoli and any facilities that it can reach in the rebel held areas in the western part of the country. Qaddafi is pleased with the performance of his troops, but according to these individuals he is concerned that Western governments, particularly the United States will soon begin to provide active support to the rebel forces.

Individuals advising Mustafa Abdul Galil, the former Libyan Minister of Justice, and the current leader of the opposition National Libyan Council, (NLC), stated in confidence that Galil is now convinced that the NLC must form an Interim Government, and establish relations with the Western powers and the members of the Arab League. Galil recognizes that the independent students and workers who make up the majority of the rebels, particularly those engaged in fighting Qaddafi's forces, as well as various tribal leaders, including Senussiyyah family of former King Idriss, warn against this step. That said, Galil believes that without a major increase in Western aid, the situation will deteriorate into a civil war with no end in sight.

(Source Comment: Advisors to Saif al Islam Qaddafi added that his father will not leave Libya, and would rather sacrifice his life in fighting the rebels, rather than turn over the country to the opposition forces. Also, Saif believes that the current forces loyal to his father will support him in this effort, as well as allies in Syria, Africa, and among the Algerian military.)

H: Crucial contact. Sid

Mar 6 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 6, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Crucial information for Libya

Cody, on his own, still at heart an indefatigable journalist, simply picked up the phone, dialing the number given by _____ and had a conversation with one of the key figures in the Libyan National Council that seeks to become an interim government. Cody's notes, including Jipreel's phone numbers are below. Cody says that Jipreel said he has not been contacted by anyone from the US government.

The note:

So I spoke to Dr. Mahmod Jipreel (he's on _____ list) today. He was the former minister of planning but is now the point man between the reformist government in waiting and the West. I spoke to him in Cairo. He will fly tomorrow morning to Rome and then on to Strausborg, France, where he plans to address the European Parliament on Wednesday morning. His cell phone numbers are as follows: _____ or _____. Mahmod seems very smart, level-headed, has no desire to serve in a future government, only wants to help in the transition. We talked for 20 minutes and he emphasized how important it is that any help from the West, not to be perceived as interference by the heroic young people who are losing their lives in fighting the madman. He thinks it is going to be a protracted battle but the West must recognize the temporary opposition government ASAP.....He told me that the chief medical director from the Red Crescent Society is Dr. Muftah Twilib--cell number -- _____ who is coordinating all medical relief efforts; obviously difficult to reach him on cell.

Someone should contact Mahmod Jipreel. He is balanced, level-headed and understands current situation well. He left the madman's government within past year when he realized he was completely deranged.

H: serious trouble for Libyan rebels. Sid
Mar 9 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Serious problems for Libyan rebels

The latest report:

(Source Comment: Private individuals in Europe, with ties to the leadership of the National Libyan Council (NLC), plan to urge the NLC military committee to consider hiring private troops (mercenaries) to support, organize, and train the rebel forces in Libya. These individuals believe that NATO and the Western allies will not make a decision to aid the rebels until they are faced with a humanitarian disaster, and that the revolution is in danger. At the same time, these individuals believe a small number of private troops could turn the battle against Qaddafi's forces, particularly if they are equipped with sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. These individuals also believe that experienced troops will have little trouble shooting down Libyan aircraft and attack helicopters. In the opinion of these sources, this would have a devastating psychological affect on Qaddafi's troops.)

During the afternoon of March 8, individuals with access to Saif al Islam Qaddafi stated in confidence that Muammar al Qaddafi is increasingly confident that his troops can drive back rebel forces attempting to advance on Tripoli from Benghazi. According to these individuals, Qaddafi continues to believe that, if he and his supporters can hold on to power for the next two weeks, the morale of the rebel forces will begin to falter, while the opposition NLC, and the tribal leaders will begin to fight among themselves.

Knowledgeable individuals with access to the European security community state that they believe reports that Qaddafi may be preparing to flee the country are false. That said, they add that, in their opinion, the NATO surveillance of Libya will be able to tell if and when Qaddafi does prepare to leave. They add that to date there appears to be no

BLU-031

activity indicating that such a move is about to take place.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals, military commanders loyal to Qaddafi, including his son Khamis, are surprised that NATO and the other Western military organizations have not taken a more direct hand in the fighting. They continue to be concerned over this possibility, particularly in the wake of the capture of Dutch Marines west of Tripoli, and reports of British Special Forces troops being detained by rebel forces near Benghazi, while attempting to contact the NLC. That said, these military commanders still believe that NATO, and particularly the United States are using satellite imagery and other sophisticated surveillance devices to monitor the military situation in Libya. They have warned Qaddafi, that although the Western powers appear to be reluctant to enter the fighting, this surveillance can identify anti-aircraft facilities and other sensitive targets, and allows NATO commanders to move quickly if they decide to implement a no fly zone over Libya, or become more directly involved in aiding the rebels. Qaddafi remains confident that NATO and the Western allies will continue to debate a course of action for the immediate future. He also assured his commanders that neither the Arab League nor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would participate in, or support any attack on Libya. Finally, according to these sources, Qaddafi believes that Russia and China will not support any action that involves increasing the military role the United States or NATO.)

In Benghazi, individuals with access to the NLC state in confidence that despite the best efforts of the NLC, a unified governing body has yet to emerge. At present, NLC leader Mustafa Abdel Galil is experiencing limited success in his efforts attract members of the academic and student movements to the NLC. Galil is from the town of Albeida, northeast of Benghazi and has family and traditional ties to many academic and civic leaders in the region. The leaders of the el - Senussi family continues to assert that they should be the basis for an interim government. Galil and his supporters reject this, and only one member of the el-Senussi has been allowed to work with the NLC. (Source Comment: This individual was imprisoned by Qaddafi for many years and is respected by all sides.).

PORTS:

Individuals with access to the military committee of the NLC stated in confidence that as of March 8 the major Libyan oil ports of Ras Lanuf and Brega in the eastern part of the country are closed. The Libyan army fought rebels for control of Ras Lanuf on March 7 and a rebel official reported that a captured Libyan Army officer stated that Qaddafi would attack oil fields if he believes that the rebels were winning the conflict.

On Saturday, March 5 a Turkish owned vessel left Ras Lanuf with over 500,000 barrels of crude oil. Sources with access to the NLC stated that this was the last cargo vessel to sail from that port. (Source Comment: These individuals said that on March 7 the NLC received word that the port of Tobruk was operational. Various sources reported on

March 7 that the general cargo ports of Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms were operational.)

The NLC sources add that many of the oil ports appear to be closed, and too dangerous to use. During the week of February 28 London's marine insurance market added Libya to a list of areas deemed high risk.

OIL PRODUCTION

According to The International Energy Agency, before the uprising Libyan wells pumped around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). As of Friday, 1 million bpd of this oil production was lost, after foreign oil firms evacuated their workers.

H: Q's trick, Galil's approach. Sid
Mar 10 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 10, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Qaddafi's coming tricks and fears; Galil's strategy

Latest report:

As of March 10, 2011 individuals with access to officials of the government of Muammar Qaddafi stated in confidence that, several of his advisors, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa, have discussed the idea of proposing a ceasefire to the National Libyan Council (NLC), followed by negotiations to form a new government led by a council of technocrats. Under this plan Qaddafi would stay in power as the head of state and national leader, and the day to day management of the country would be given over to the technocrats. According to these individuals Qaddafi does not believe the NLC or its leader Mustafa al Galil will accept this offer, but feels that it enhances his position as head of state in the eye of the world, making it less likely that NATO or some combination of foreign powers will come to the aid of the rebels.

Mousa Kousa is concerned that while the Western powers remain reluctant to commit to military action in Libya, they appear to be moving toward a series of political and economic gestures which may weaken the government. He was particularly concerned by the French government announcing it was recognizing the NLC as the legitimate government of Libya.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals both Qaddafi and Mousa Kousa believe the announcement of the Russian government that it was suspending arms sales to the Qaddafi regime is symbolic in nature, and that the Libyan military will continue to obtain new equipment and replacement parts for its existing Russian material, even if comes via an indirect route. Qaddafi repeatedly states that he has survived numerous assassination attempts, an attack by the United States Air Force and tribal uprisings. He is now increasingly confident that he will survive this crisis.)

BLU-034

On March 10 the rebels continued to move back slowly from the town of Ras Lanuf under fire from the Libyan Air Force, and the 155 mm motorized guns of the Libyan Army. Galil has expressed concern to the Military Committee of the NLC regarding unsuccessful efforts to organize the opposition troops into an effective fighting force. Galil also said to other members of the NLC that he fears the United States and the other NATO countries are reluctant provide arms to the rebels, because they fear that these weapons will fall into the hands of al Qai'da and other radical Islamist groups.

Galil is convinced that one of his most important tasks is to convince these Western governments that the rebels are not supported by al Qai'da, as Qaddafi regularly claims. (Source Comment: To date Galil has had only limited success in this regard. He also stated that sources in Washington have informed him that certain officials of the United States Government want to adopt a policy urging the Government of Saudi Arabia to fund rebel efforts to purchase better weapons. However, as of this time the proposal has not received high level support.)

In fighting on March 10, forces loyal to Qaddafi advanced into the outskirts of Ras Lanuf. The Libyan Army forces moved two T-72 tanks toward the oil town and are firing on rebel positions throughout the day. Eyewitnesses reported that the rebels are pulling out of the city under the ongoing artillery bombardment. Similarly, military airstrikes targeted the oil town of Brega, located 56 mi/90 km east of Ras Lanuf.

The Qaddafi regime has begun a crackdown on international media in the country. According to knowledgeable individuals, journalists from the BBC were detained and tortured by regime officials earlier in the week. BBC staff members were arrested just outside of the embattled city of Zawiyah, located 30 mi/50 km west of Tripoli. The BBC journalists received permission from the government to operate in the country. At the same time, a reporter from Britain's press outlet The Guardian is missing in the country. The Guardian correspondent and a Brazilian newspaper journalist disappeared on the outskirts of the city of Zawiyah. Guardian officials are reportedly in touch with Libyan authorities in an attempt to ascertain whether the men have been detained. (Source Comment: During the evening of March 10 Libyan Army forces advanced into Zawiyah, as the rebels withdrew.)

On March 9 advisors to Saif al Islam Qaddafi stated in confidence that his father had dispatched senior officials to Lisbon, Brussels, Cairo, and Vienna, carrying the message that Qaddafi is willing to negotiate the surrender of rebel forces, insuring their safety if they lay down their arms. Qaddafi believes that Mustafa Galil and other former members of his government who joined the rebels must be prosecuted for treason, but he is prepared to pardon the bulk of the rebels. In the opinion of these sources Qaddafi is asking these governments of the European Union and Egypt to weigh in with the rebels and influence them to receive Qaddafi's representatives to discuss an end to the fighting.

In Egypt, Qaddafi's representative, Maj. Gen. Abdul-Rahman al-Zawi, received a cool reception from representatives of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), who reminded al-Zawi of the incident in 1991 when ten members of the rebel Libyan

National Army (LNA), under Colonel Khalifa Haftar, accepted Qaddafi's offer of amnesty if they returned to Libya from their base in the Congo. Upon their return these LNA fighters were arrested put on trial for treason and executed. (Source Comment: Al-Zawi asked to discuss these matters further after he had talked to Tripoli.)

According to these knowledgeable sources, forces loyal to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi closed in on rebel forces in locations in both the eastern and western parts of the country on 9 March 2011. In Zawiyah, located approximately 30 mi/50 km west of Tripoli, government forces surrounded rebels in the central city square. Eyewitnesses have reported seeing snipers and tanks surrounding the fighters and stated that clashes are ongoing. Government forces also drew closer to the rebel-held port city of Ras Lanuf in the eastern portion of the country on March 9. Rebel and government forces clashed just outside of the city, approximately 12 mi/20 km from the city center. Government forces also launched rockets at strategic areas of Ras Lanuf during the overnight hours of 8-9 March. Several injuries have been reported over the last 24 hours.

Conditions in Tripoli have been calm in recent days. Tensions remain significantly elevated, but government orders and edicts have instilled an almost forced normality to day-to-day operations in the city. Traffic and transport is normal, and shops and businesses are open; however, business operations have become increasingly difficult due to stifled economic activity, rising prices and an increasing scarcity of goods. Internet services and telecommunications, including text and most mobile phone services, have been suspended in the country for nearly a week, creating further business operation problems for workers and companies in the capital. Government surveillance has increased, and security and pro-Qaddafi militia patrols are prominent throughout the city.

H: Dramatic new Libya & Bahrain developments. Sid
Mar 16 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 16, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Startling Libya developments; & UAE joining Saudi invasion of Bahrain

I. First, a spot report on Libya:

1. Confirmation by phone and email that a Libyan bomber pilot has crashed his plane onto Qaddafi's Bab-Azizya compound headquarters. One, if not two, of Qaddafi's sons have been confirmed badly hit. One may be transported to a hospital in Malta.
2. At this moment, at the Hilton Hotel at Malta, one of Qaddafi's cousins is meeting with officers of the Malta Air Force offering bribes to purchase jet fuel from Malta. Qaddafi's planes have virtually run out of high quality jet fuel.
3.
 1. Saif Qaddafi was in London last week meeting secretly with high officials in the UK and Italian governments. Saif told them that if they opposed the no-fly zone his father would no longer skim 20 percent off the top that he has been stealing from every oil transaction with Western government. Saif also joked that he did not want to spend the rest of his life in Ryadh.
4. General Abdulfattah Younus, former Libyan interior minister, has been appointed general in chief of the Libyan rebel army. Jibril is traveling from Cairo into Libya to meet with Younus.

BLU-037

H: Q momentum stalled, Khamis Q badly burned, more. Sid
Mar 17 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Q momentum stalled; Khamis Q severely injured; IDs of NLC

Latest:

During the afternoon of March 16 individuals with access to the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in private that, while rebel forces had lost a good deal of ground to forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi, the NLC leadership believes these Libyan military and security troops have overextended their supply lines and are beginning to lose momentum in their advance on the rebel center of Benghazi. The NLC leadership was particularly encouraged by the suicide attack carried out by a Libyan Air Force Pilot, who crashed his plane into Qaddafi's headquarters at Bab-Azizya in Tripoli. Qaddafi was apparently uninjured in the attack, but two of his sons were injured, including Khamis, the commander of the 32nd brigade of the Libyan army, who was severely burned. Khamis led the eastern advance of the Libyan army, and his troops are believed by the rebels to have committed particularly violent attacks against civilians in recaptured towns like Ras Lanuf.

These rebel leaders believe this incident was a shock to Qaddafi, who in an effort to distract the Western Nations and weaken the rebel's morale, allowed his son Saif al Islam to issue statements regarding the impending fall of Benghazi. Saif also revealed that Qaddafi covertly provided funds to support the 2007 election campaign of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. According to these individuals this statement was intended to punish Sarkozy for recognizing the NLC government, while deflecting any potential action by other Western Nations to move against Qaddafi's forces.

At the same time, individuals with access to advisors to Qaddafi stated in confidence, that while Libyan military and security forces had made significant progress against

dissident troops in their drive toward the rebel center of Benghazi, Qaddafi's troops were beginning to experience logistical problems that may slow their progress. The Libyan forces are moving farther from their bases around Tripoli and are suffering from exhaustion after ten days of continual fighting.

At present, the bulk of the combat is being born by Qaddafi's Special Forces units and mercenary troops drawn primarily from Chad, Nigeria, and the Taureg tribe of Southern Algeria. These forces have sufficient ammunition and other supplies, but they are experiencing technical difficulties with their tanks, armored cars, and attack helicopters, all of which require regular maintenance and replacement parts. At present their most effective and durable weapons have been their 155 mm motorized guns. They are using these weapons to attack rebel held population centers; the guns firing from beyond the reach of rebel counter fire. (Source Comment: According to sources with knowledge of the Libyan military, their mercenary troops believe that the rebels summarily execute any foreign fighters they capture.)

For their part, rebel forces under General Abdulfatth Younus continue to hold out against the Libyan military, while reinforcing their facilities in and around Benghazi. Younus believes that despite their losses, the rebel forces will be able to hold Benghazi and the area twenty five (25) miles to the west. He is convinced that with the loss of Khamis, added to their logistic and morale problems, the Libyan government forces will be unable to capture a large, well defended city like Benghazi. That said, Younus is pressing NLC leader Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil to lobby Western Governments for support. Without this foreign aid, Younus believes the fighting will settle into a costly stalemate.

(Source Comment: Some NLC officials believe that Qaddafi has approached the government of Malta to obtain fuel for his attack aircraft. At the same time NLC officials stated that they continue to hope that the United States and Germany will join France in officially recognizing the Council as an interim government. They believe that this step will provide a significant morale boost to the rebels and, by the same token, will discourage the loyalist troops.)

Knowledgeable individuals provided the following details on the NLC:

The Council is composed of thirty one (31) members representing the various regions and cities of Libya. A number of these members have been identified; however the names of the individuals representing Ajdabiya, Al Kufrah, Ghat, Nalut, Misratah, Az Zintan and Az Zawiya will not be identified in an effort to protect their families if these areas are captured by Qaddafi's troops. The Council is anticipating the selection of representatives from Central and Southern Libya, and Tripoli.

The following are the names of Council members who have been identified:

1. Counselor: Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, chairman of the NLC.
2. Mr. Othman Suleiman El-Megyrahi (Batnan Area)

3. Mr. Ashour Hamed Bourashed (Darna City)
4. Dr. Abdelallah Moussa El-myeoub (Qouba Area)
5. Mr. Zubiar Ahmed El-Sharif (Representative of the political prisoners)
6. Mr. Ahmed Abduraba Al-Abaar (Benghazi City)
7. Mr. Dr. Fathi Mohamed Baja (Benghazi City)
8. Mr. Abdelhafed Abdelkader Ghoga (Benghazi City)
9. Mr. Fathi Tirbil and Dr. Salwa Fawzi El-Deghali (Representative of youth and women)

It was also announced that Mr. Omar Al Hariri will chair the military affairs committee, supporting Younus. Mr. Mahmood Jibril and Ali Al Issawi are responsible for foreign affairs and international liaison.

Mustafa Abdul Jalil Fudail was born in the city of Bayda, east Libya in 1952. He graduated from the department of Shari'a and Law in the Arabic Language and Islamic Studies faculty from The Libyan University in 1975. AbdulJalil was appointed assistant to the Secretary to the Public Prosecutor in the city of Al Bayda, he was appointed as a judge in 1978. In 2002 he became President of the Court Appeals, and then President of the Court in Al Bayda. He was chosen as Minister of Justice in 2007.

Mr. Mahmood Jibril:

Born in Libya in 1952, Jibril earned a degree in Economics and Political Science from Cairo University in 1975. He later attended the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania earning a Masters degree in 1980 and a PHD in Strategic planning and decision-making in 1984. Jibril remained at Pittsburgh as a professor of Strategic planning, and he has published 10 books on this subject. He also led the team who drafted and formed the Unified Arab Training manual, and organized the first two Training conferences on this subject in 1987 and 1988. Jibril later took over the management and administration of many of the leadership training programs for senior management personnel in Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Turkey and Britain

Mr. Ali Al Issawi

Born in the city of Benghazi in 1966, Issawi holds a PhD in privatization from the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest Romania. He occupied the position of Minister of Economy, Trade and Investment in the Qaddafi government, and was the youngest minister appointed by Qaddafi. Before taking the ministerial position, he founded the Centre for Export Development in 2006, and became the first Director General. He also became Director General for the Ownership expansion program (privatization fund) in 2005.

H: Libya, Med & big idea. Sid
Mar 17 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya & Big Idea

1. No-fly! Brava! You did it! I am deeply proud and grateful. More intel to come...
2. Big idea: See the article below on a projected Union of the Mediterranean by Mustapha Tlili, research scholar at New York University, founder and director of the NYU Center for Dialogues, and a member of Human Rights Watch's advisory committee for the Middle East and North Africa.
Sarkozy hit upon this as an earlier ploy and has not taken it up again because he's playing demagogic games about "multiculturalism." But this is a strategic idea to reorient thinking about integration of the Muslim world and the West, with the US playing a critical role—the Union of the Mediterranean. Such a Union is only possible after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. It can begin with initial economic links much like the EU began with a coal and steel accord and then unfold into many other areas. After your trip to Tunisia and Egypt—and the opportunity that Libya will present—the US can take a leadership role. You might consider formulating some first steps and articulating the concept. This gives the US a new role in Europe; recasts the war on terrorism; isolates those Arab states that remain authoritarian repressive regimes without imposing punitive measures; gives the US a hand in reform and development in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, etc.; and offers a new incentive into the Mideast peace process (such as it is).

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mtlili2/English>.

Best regards,

Mustapha Tlili

Imagining a New Mediterranean World

Mustapha Tlili

2011-03-15

NEW YORK – Mediterranean countries are experiencing turbulence unseen since the era of decolonization and independence. Popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have swept away entrenched autocracies. Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi is holding on by the skin of his teeth, and political leaders in Algeria and Morocco are scrambling to maintain authority.

Can a Mediterranean space nurtured by shared democratic values, interests, and hopes emerge from this maelstrom?

The Mediterranean countries are home to 475 million people – 272 million Europeans, including 20 million Muslims, and 200 million non-European Arabs and Jews. It now seems possible that the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the mechanism that French President Nicolas Sarkozy set up in 2008 to increase regional cooperation, may actually step up to the challenge of reclaiming the region's past as the cradle of reason, tolerance, and humanism. The UfM could offer a model for coexistence to a world injured by dictatorship and fear of Islamic fundamentalism.

Rising tensions in Europe over what has ominously crystallized as "the Muslim Question" has made it all too easy to forget that there was a time when Islam – a more tolerant and inclusive civilization than it appears to be in the post-9/11 West – was fully a part of European life.

Today, no less than yesterday, Mediterranean people – Muslims, Christians, and Jews – share inescapable geopolitical, demographic, and economic realities. They should remind themselves that demonization, exclusion, and division are not the only options – and should not be the region's destiny.

Among Sarkozy's main interlocutors at the birth of the UfM in 2008 were Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Now that they are gone, so is their limited and limiting approach to international dialogue, based almost exclusively on state-to-state relations without any significant input from civil society.

It is sad to note that European leaders sometimes adopt such narrow positions, too, responding to the short-term demands of electoral politics instead of facing the challenges of long-term strategic thinking. Sarkozy, too, has fallen prey to this trend. Indeed, in February, he declared that multiculturalism was a "failure," adding, "Our Muslim compatriots should be able to live and practice their religion like anyone else...but it can only be a French Islam, not just an Islam in France."

Sarkozy, of course, did not define what he meant by a "French Islam." But the comments were widely interpreted as an echo of pronouncements a few days earlier by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the far-right National Front party.

Cooler heads should look, instead, to Muslim Spain, Al-Andalus, which shone in Europe from the eighth century until the fifteenth century – a fertile period of cultural brilliance that paved the way for the Western Renaissance, as well as an inspiring paradigm of convivencia, or coexistence.

Integrating the Mediterranean world into a tolerant community that ensures the peace and prosperity of all its peoples can happen today, because it has happened before. Such an achievement would offer the world a needed alternative to the increasingly questionable model of economic globalization.

Looking at Europe from a distance, it is tempting to see a continent receding from the world stage and in conflict with itself and with its past. Yet the reality is more nuanced. Today's Europe is filled with potential, provided that the Mediterranean region harnesses the forces and wealth implicit in such initiatives as the UfM.

Two important features of both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions will be significant in assessing the chances for a renewed Mediterranean Union.

First, the large and effective use of social media in both countries revealed remarkable technological savvy and creativity among the young. More significantly, it displayed this generation's unprecedented level of political awareness and activism. Indeed, the test of success of any new Mediterranean structure will be the degree to which it meets the aspirations and scrutiny of this young, politically aware generation throughout the region.

For the same reasons, a new Mediterranean union could be a framework for a new moral vibrancy, informed by the same universal values that mobilized the young in Tunisia, Egypt, and beyond – freedom, individual responsibility and accountability, transparency, tolerance, solidarity with the weak and oppressed, justice, gender equality, and other fundamental human and democratic rights.

In light of this hopeful trend, how long can Europe's obsession with Islamic fundamentalism hold sway? How long can the so-called "Muslim Question" be used as a tool to defeat political adversaries? Many young European voters, who may know better, will most likely not look kindly at such opportunistic tactics.

Finally, one would hope that the concept of belonging to the same Mediterranean family could bring about new solutions to old conflicts – for example, offering Palestinians and Israelis alike the healing that both peoples desire, but which the dying old Arab order failed to achieve.

The great philosophers of the Enlightenment would not hesitate to endorse the moral consciousness expressed in the postings that flooded cyberspace during the Tunisian revolution. Moral secularism at its best was on full display from the rugged streets of Sidi Bouzid to the imposing refinement of Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis.

This renewed sense of belonging to the same human family and the same moral universe resonated profoundly with Mediterranean Europeans, who found, in the claims and expectations emerging on the opposite shore, echoes of their own unfulfilled claims and expectations.

Mustapha Tlili is a research scholar at New York University, founder and director of the NYU Center for Dialogues, and a member of Human Rights Watch's advisory committee for the Middle East and North Africa.

H: Q offensive. Sid
Mar 19 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 19, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: The Qaddafi offensive

Note: Unconfirmed, one source: Q is taking bodies from the Tripoli morgue for PR display as victims of the Allied no-fly zone.

Latest:

On Saturday March 19, the forces of Muammar Qaddafi entered into parts of the city of Benghazi from the west. According to advisors to Saif al Islam Qaddafi the Libyan security forces stepped up pressure on Benghazi in an effort to gain control of the rebel stronghold before the Western Allies and UN forces can organize military attacks against the Libyan forces. Saif and his father remain defiant in the face of UN demands for a ceasefire and were pleased by reports that rebel forces were pulling back. Later in the afternoon, the Qaddafis were concerned over the first reports from outside of Benghazi that Libyan tanks and armored vehicles were under attack by the French Air Force. Qaddafi was attempting to obtain confirmation of these reports from commanders on the scene. Saif noted that if the reports are true, Libyan commanders on the scene must pull back to defensive positions outside of Benghazi and prepare for a counterattack by rebel forces under cover of the French assault.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable sources with access to the rebel forces, on March 18 Libyan jets attacked targets on the road to Benghazi's airport and elsewhere on the outskirts of the city. These attacks took place as Western and Arab League officials met in Paris to plan for military action in Libya. The rebels believe that Qaddafi's troops will press the attack on Benghazi, attempting to capture the city before the allies can get their forces into place. Libyan Army units continue to shell the western city of Misurata with artillery and tanks.)

On March 19 sources with access to the commanders of the rebel military committee stated in confidence that they hope that the allies also enforce a "no-drive" zone against

Libyan tanks, armored cars and motorized guns moving between Ajdabiya, where loyalist forces are already in position, and the rebel capital of Benghazi. In an ideal situation they would like to see this effort move westward to Tobruk, which is the last energy export terminal still in rebel hands. Though located in the far northeastern corner of the country, Tobruk is directly connected by road to Ajdabiya and is a significant objective as it is major road junction. Also, holding Tobruk will be important in maintaining access from Egypt to the rebel held territory.

Hr: France/Libya. Sid
Mar 20 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 20, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: France/Libya

Latest:

During the evening of March 20 individuals with access to the French and British military and security leadership stated in confidence that French President Nicolas Sarkozy plans to have France lead the attacks on Libya's Muammar Qaddafi over an extended period of time. According to these individuals, Sarkozy is genuinely concerned about the possibility that Qaddafi's troops will commit genocide against the people of Benghazi. However, he also sees this situation as an opportunity for France to reassert itself as a military power. French military commanders were extremely disappointed when, what they believe to be, political differences between the United States and France prevented them from participating in the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Sarkozy and his military advisors believe that operations in Libya will rebuild the reputation of the French military, which was also damaged by a problematic performance in the first Gulf War.

(Source Comment: For his part, British Prime Minister David Cameron is concerned over how the allies will deal with the rebel forces, if, and when, they take advantage of the air attacks on Qaddafi's forces to renew their move on Tripoli. British intelligence believes that when the rebels recapture Ras Lanuf and other towns they will find evidence of atrocities committed by Libyan troops against the local population. They are, in turn, concerned that the rebels will seek vengeance on Qaddafi's supporters.)

H: Q son killed. Sid

Mar 21 2011

Also confirmed by other sources:

Colonel Gaddafi's son 'killed in kamikaze pilot attack on Tripoli barracks'

Khamis, 27, who runs the feared Khamis Brigade that has been prominent in its role of attacking rebel-held areas, is said to have died on Saturday night.

Full Story:

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368410/Libya-crisis-Gaddafi-uses-civilians-human-shields-prevent-military-targets.html>

21 March 2011

www.dailymail.co.uk

For the sins of his father: Gaddafi's son 'killed in kamikaze pilot attack on barracks'

By [Richard Hartley-parkinson](#)

Last updated at 7:28 PM on 21st March 2011

Read more: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368410/Libya-crisis-Gaddafi-uses-civilians-human-shields-prevent-military-targets.html#ixzz1HGdvzOk0>

Colonel Gaddafi suffered a massive personal setback today when one of his sons was allegedly killed in a suicide air mission on his barracks.

Khamis, 27, who runs the feared Khamis Brigade that has been prominent in its role of attacking rebel-held areas, is said to have died on Saturday night.

A Libyan air force pilot crashed his jet into the Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli in a kamikaze attack, Algerian TV reported following an unsubstantiated claim by an anti-Gaddafi media organisation.

Khamis is alleged to have died of burns in hospital. The regime denied the reports.

It was claimed he died in the same compound hit by RAF cruise missiles hit by coalition forces last night.

Read more: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368410/Libya-crisis-Gaddafi-uses-civilians-human-shields-prevent-military-targets.html#ixzz1HGe66wyR>

H: how France created NLC. Sid
Mar 22 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 22, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: How the French created the National Libyan Council, ou l'argent parle

During the evening of 22 March, a knowledgeable individual stated in strictest confidence that in late February 2011 officers of the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) began a series of secret meetings with the current leader of the National Libyan Council (NLC), Mustafa Jalil, and General Abdelfateh Younus, the soon to be commander of rebel troops around Benghazi. At that time, the two had just left the government of Muammar Qaddafi, Jalil having been Minister of Justice and Younus Minister of the Interior. According to these knowledgeable sources, the DGSE officers provided money and guidance to assist in the formation of the NLC. These officers explained to Jalil and Younus that they were speaking under orders from French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and they promised that as soon as the NLC was organized France would recognize the council as the new government of Libya. The DGSE officers added that Sarkozy felt that he would have the support of British Prime Minister David Cameron in this matter. Jalil and Younus accepted this offer and have maintained contact with the DGSE officers in Cairo.

In return for this assistance, the DGSE officers indicated that they expected the new government of Libya to favor French firms and national interests, particularly regarding the oil industry in Libya. Jalil and Younus agreed.

BLU-049

During the week of March 14, as Qaddafi's forces approached the NLC base in Benghazi, the NLC leaders appealed to France, via the DGSE, for assistance. Jalil and Younus believe Sarkozy's efforts in pressing for allied attacks on Qaddafi's forces saved their movement.

(Source Comment: Both Jalil and Younus are convinced that Qaddafi's troops would massacre the citizens of Benghazi, if they captured the city.)

Para-military forces from the Special Section of the DGSE are present in the rebel held territory, but have not begun providing direct aid to the rebels. These individuals add that Egyptian Special Forces officers continue to serve with the rebels, focusing primarily on keep the lines of communications open between eastern Libya and the Egyptian border.

Younus' forces have used some of the DGSE funds to bring in basic supplies from Egypt, including uniforms and vehicles. As the allied attacks against Qaddafi's troops continue, Younus is trying to organize his inexperienced troops into an effective force, and intends to move against areas held by the Libyan Government under cover of allied air patrols. As of March 22 Younus' efforts were meeting with mixed results.

H: Q's military strategy. Sid
Mar 25 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Q's military strategy and rebel difficulties

Latest:

During the afternoon of March 25, individuals with access to advisors to Saif al Islam Qaddafi stated in confidence that forces loyal to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi are feeling the effects of the western allies bombing and missile attacks, that began on March 19/20. According to these individuals, many of their tanks, armored cars, and heavy motorized guns have been destroyed in these attacks and, under orders from Libyan commanders in Tripoli, they have pulled back from the suburbs of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. These forces consolidated their position in the important oil center of Ajdibya, which they captured from rebel forces in mid-March. At the same time, in the view of these Libyan commanders, the rebels have begun to go back on the offensive, following 3 days of confused efforts to organize their forces after the allied raids began. These individuals believe that morale is deteriorating in units loyal to Qaddafi under the allied attacks. They are particularly bewildered by cruise missile attacks, which come with no warning.

At the same time, units loyal to Qaddafi have deployed throughout residential neighborhoods in Ajdibya, areas they believe the allies will be reluctant to attack due to the danger of large numbers of civilians being killed in any bombing. Two armored units attached to the 32nd battalion of the Libyan Army are dug in with their tanks on the road that bypasses downtown Ajdibya. These forces will have to be defeated before the rebels can move into the town, where they expect difficult house to house fighting. Qaddafi's forces believe that the rebels will hesitate before moving into this urban area, where they cannot receive support from allied aircraft and missiles.

(Source Comment: Libyan Army commanders believe that French, British and Egyptian Special Forces units are supporting the rebels. They suspect these foreign troops are targeting their positions and concentrating on keeping the roads to Egypt open, allowing regular supplies to reach Benghazi, Tobruk and other rebel held centers.)

According to these individuals, the hurried unilateral attack by the French on March 19 placed the coalition in a difficult political and diplomatic situation with the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which have both condemned the manner in which the UN resolution on Libya was put into action. The support of these two international bodies is vital to the coalition because it legitimizes the intervention. If the coalition loses the support of this important part of the international community it may limit the scope of their attacks, which in turn may lead to a stalemate between Qaddafi's forces and the rebels. The rebel leaders are concerned that this course of action will create two Libyan states locked in an ongoing struggle.

According to sources with access to the NLC, the dialogue going on between certain rebel leaders in Benghazi and potential allies in Tripoli has become very difficult because the inhabitants of Tripolitania fear domination by the people of the eastern region of Cyrenaica. Longstanding ethnic and tribal divisions are complicating efforts to coordinate a common rebel strategy for east and west Libya, while Qaddafi remains in power.

(Source Comment: These knowledgeable individuals believe that complications between the rebels in the east and west provide a picture of the potential difficulties involved in organizing a post-Qaddafi regime. Many individual tribal and political groups are expected to strike independent deals with the allies regarding current support and future access to oil reserves. This will be a challenge for the allies as well as the Libyan people as they try to move beyond Qaddafi.)

Re: H: Q's military strategy. Sid

Mar 26 2011

Confidential

March 26, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Shock & Awe

Here's a possibly counter-intuitive notion and option: That aspects of the Bush war plan for the invasion of Iraq, now verboten for planning or even thinking, might be applicable, in particular shock-and-awe. Though Libyan air defenses have been degraded under the no-fly zone directive, Qaddafi's army's morale and cohesion might be conclusively shattered by another round or two of ferocious bombing targeting concentrations of his military assets. This might just be the ideal moment for it. The situation does not appear to be similar to that of Germany in World War II as studied by the Strategic Bombing Survey that found bombing hardening support for the regime. Pulling back now might allow Qaddafi's army, on the precipice, to restore its steadiness. Wars are usually won when one army breaks in the field, or a major power previously outside the conflict imposes its will--US entry into World War I, Russian withdrawal of support for Milosevic. There's no such power hovering in the Libyan situation to enter one way or the other. It's hard to know how lengthy a war might be, or how suddenly it might end. This one could go either way, long or short. The handoff to Nato, if accompanied by an intense air attack, not the end of attacks, might break Qaddafi, those around him and his army.

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Sat, Mar 26, 2011 5:23 pm

Subject: Re: H: Q's military strategy. Sid

This fits our info analysis. Thx.

From: sbwhoeop@aol.com [<mailto:sbwhoeop@aol.com>]

Sent: Friday, March 25, 2011 12:58 PM

To: H

Subject: H: Q's military strategy. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Q's military strategy and rebel difficulties

Latest:

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BLU-054

fighting. Qaddafi's forces believe that the rebels will hesitate before moving into this urban area, where they cannot receive support from allied aircraft and missiles.

(Source Comment: Libyan Army commanders believe that French, British and Egyptian Special Forces units are supporting the rebels. They suspect these foreign troops are targeting their positions and concentrating on keeping the roads to Egypt open, allowing regular supplies to reach Benghazi, Tobruk and other rebel held centers.)

According to these individuals, the hurried unilateral attack by the French on March 19 placed the coalition in a difficult political and diplomatic situation with the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which have both condemned the manner in which the UN resolution on Libya was put into action. The support of these two international bodies is vital to the coalition because it legitimizes the intervention. If the coalition loses the support of this important part of the international community it may limit the scope of their attacks, which in turn may lead to a stalemate between Qaddafi's forces and the rebels. The rebel leaders are concerned that this course of action will create two Libyan states locked in an ongoing struggle.

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(Source Comment: These knowledgeable individuals believe that complications between the rebels in the east and west provide a picture of the potential difficulties involved in organizing a post-Qaddafi regime. Many individual tribal and political groups are expected to strike independent deals with the allies regarding current support and future access to oil reserves. This will be a challenge for the allies as well as the Libyan people as they try to move beyond Qaddafi.)

H: Q rape policy. Sid
Mar 27 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 27, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Rumor: Q's rape policy

I communicated more than a week ago on this story—Qaddafi placing bodies to create PR stunts about supposed civilian casualties as a result of Allied bombing—though underlining it was a rumor. But now, as you know, Robert Gates gives credence to it. (See story below.)

Sources now say, again rumor (that is, this information comes from the rebel side and is unconfirmed independently by Western intelligence), that Qaddafi has adopted a rape policy and has even distributed Viagra to troops. The incident at the Tripoli press conference involving a woman claiming to be raped is likely to be part of a much larger outrage. Will seek further confirmation.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/26/robert-gates-libya-violence-gaddafi-bodies_n_841081.html

WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration says the Libyan government's claims of civilians killed in airstrikes are unproven. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says "the truth of the matter is we have trouble coming up with proof of any civilian casualties that we have been responsible for." Gates said there were numerous intelligence reports suggesting Moammar Gadhafi's regime was taking bodies of people killed by the pro-government forces and placing them at sites attacked by U.S. planes. Gates said the American forces and those of other countries enforcing the U.N. resolution to protect Libyan civilians have been "extremely careful." Gates spoke Saturday in an interview pre-taped for CBS News' "Face The Nation" to be aired Sunday.

BLU-056

H: Lang & Libya. Sid
Mar 27 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 27, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Pat Lang's view on Libya

I prompted Pat to write his views. As you know Pat's protégés are the top officers in the Middle East in military intelligence.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/03/libya-what-is-next.html

#Libya-What is next?

Patrick Lang

Just to clarify my views on the Libyan revolt and its likely progress.

- Someone has gotten the rebels up off their haunches and headed back to the west. Who that someone might be is, at this point, a bit of a mystery. The passage of time will undoubtedly clarify that point.
- The provision of air support to the rebels has made a decisive difference in this civil war. All the lawyerly obscurantism about the UN Resolution cannot obscure the fact that a NATO led coalition supported by the US is going to drive Qathafi's forces all the way back to Tripoli with the rebels following along behind on the coast road.
- Qathafi's "forces" are extremely brittle. They have already begun to run from air attacks or even the sound of aircraft, abandoning their equipment and supplies as they flee in civilian vehicles. It is not necessary to arm or supply the rebels. Qathafi's disintegrating forces will provide the needed materiel as they withdraw.
- As the rebels approach Tripoli the populace will rise again. How long will all this take? As I have written elsewhere, an outside estimate of six months is reasonable. The actuality may be a considerably shorter departure date for Qathafi.

BLU-057

- Am I concerned about an Islamist "takeover" in Libya? No. The chance that Islamist parties are likely successors in power in any of the presently disputed countries is minimal. There are far too many non-Islamist political forces in all these countries for the Islamists to rise to power. Will they still exist in these places? Yes, but they will not rule. Pl

Colonel W. Patrick Lang is a retired senior officer of U.S. Military Intelligence and U.S. Army Special Forces (The Green Berets). He served in the Department of Defense both as a serving officer and then as a member of the Defense Senior Executive Service for many years. He is a highly decorated veteran of several of America's overseas conflicts including the war in Vietnam. He was trained and educated as a specialist in the Middle East by the U.S. Army and served in that region for many years. He was the first Professor of the Arabic Language at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. In the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) he was the "Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, South Asia and Terrorism," and later the first Director of the Defense Humint Service."

H: unconfirmed: q's security chief assassinated. Sid
Mar 27 2011
CONFIDENTIAL

March 27, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Unconfirmed: Q's chief of security assassinated?

Unconfirmed: Sources high in the Libyan rebel council report to us through a telephone call at 3:45 p.m, EST, that Qaddafi's chief of personal security, Mansour Daw, has been assassinated. Moreover, sources also report that rebels have stormed the prison in Tripoli and liberated thousands of political prisoners. Checking...

H: Lots of new intel; possible Libyan collapse. Sid
Mar 27 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 27, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Lots of new intel; Libyan army possibly on verge of collapse

Latest:

During the evening of March 27, 2011, individuals with direct access to the military committee of the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in confidence that while the rebel forces continue to have organization and communications problems, their morale has improved drastically, and they believe the Libyan Army is on the verge of collapse. Under attack from allied Air and Naval forces, the Libyan Army troops have begun to desert to the rebel side in increasing numbers. The rebels are making an effort to greet these troops as fellow Libyans, in an effort to encourage additional defections.

(Source Comment: Speaking in strict confidence, one rebel commander stated that his troops continue to summarily execute all foreign mercenaries captured in the fighting. At the same time Colonel Khalifa Haftar has reportedly joined the rebel command structure, in an effort to help organization the rebel forces. Haftar was the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), a 1500 man force of anti-Qaddafi troops based in N'djamena, Chad, until current President Idryss Debi overthrew Chadian President Hussein Habre in the fall of 1990, with the assistance of Libyan and French troops. Haftar and his troops fled to a country in central Africa and many, including Haftar, later settled in the United States.)

An extremely sensitive source added that the rebels are receiving direct assistance and training from a small number of Egyptian Special Forces units, while French and British Special Operations troops are working out of bases in Egypt, along the Libyan border. These troops are overseeing the transfer of weapons and supplies to the rebels.

(Source Comment: The rebels are moving back into areas that they lost in mid- March fighting, and using the allied air cover, they are confident they can move into the Tripoli district in a matter of days. One rebel source reported that they had reliable intelligence that people were evacuating Qaddafi's hometown, Sirte, anticipating its capture by the rebels. Sirte is located mid-way between Tripoli and Benghazi; its loss will be a psychological blow for Qaddafi.)

Separately, a sensitive European source stated in strict confidence that French military commanders anticipate a complete collapse of the Libyan military command and control structure in the next week. These officers, who have experience with the Libyan Army during its invasion of Chad in the late 1980s stated that the Libyan troops did not perform well under concentrated fire from troops armed with modern weapons.

This source also noted that information from Tripoli has become increasingly difficult to obtain, but there are reports of deaths among some Qaddafi's senior security officials, including Mansour Daw, and that the Libyan leader himself may have experienced a health problem. Unfortunately, the European Intelligence services have been unable to confirm or discredit these reports. This situation has become increasingly frustrating for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who, according to knowledgeable individuals, is pressing to have France emerge from this crisis as the principal foreign ally of any new government that takes power.

Sarkozy is also concerned about continuing reports that radical/terrorist groups such as the Libyan Fighting Groups and Al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are infiltrating the NLC and its military command. Accordingly, he asked sociologist Bernard Henri Levy, who has long established ties to Israel, Syria, and other nations in the Middle East, to use his contacts to determine the level of influence AQIM and other terrorist groups have inside of the NLC. Sarkozy also asked for reports setting out a clear picture of the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the rebel leadership.

These sources note that French diplomats and intelligence officers in Egypt are in contact with the following rebel figures in Benghazi:

MESMARI Nouri (Qaddafi's former head of protocol, who along with Mousa Kousa was considered the Libyan leaders most loyal follower. Nouri currently lives in France;

Gehan (GHEHANI) Abdallah (colonel);

CHARRANT Faraj,

BOUKHRIS Fathi,

General Abdelfatch **Younis** (commander of the rebel forces)

(Source Comment: Senior European security officials caution that AQIM is watching developments in Libya, and elements of that organization have been in touch with tribes

in the southeastern part of the country. These officials are concerned that in a post-Qaddafi Libya, France and other western European countries must move quickly to ensure that the new government does not allow AQIM and others to set up small, semi-autonomous local entities—or “Caliphates”—in the oil and gas producing regions of southeastern Libya.)

These knowledgeable sources add that the insurgents have the following weapons stockpiled in Benghazi:

82 and 120 mm. mortars;

GPZ type machine guns;

12.7mm. machine guns mounted on 4x4 vehicles;

some anti-aircraft batteries type ZSU 23/2 and 23/4 as well as Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) type SAM7;

some tanks type T-72;

Possibly some fixed wing aircraft, and some light transport/medium helicopters.

A seemingly endless supply of AK47 assault rifles and ammunition (even for systems ZSU 23/4 and 23/2). French, British and Egyptian Special Forces troops are training the rebels inside of western Egypt, and to a limited degree in the western suburbs of Benghazi.

(Source Comment: These sources add that the MANPAD SAM7 systems appear to be old and badly preserved, and have been judged useless by the rebels.)

H: Mousa Kousa fallout. Sid
Mar 31 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 31, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Mousa Kousa fallout

Latest report:

On the evening of March 30, 2011 individuals with access to the leaders of the National Libyan Council (NLC), speaking in confidence, expressed concern that the resignation of the Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa and his travel to London may be part of a plan created by Saif al-Islam Qaddafi designed to initiate a dialogue between the government of Muammar Qaddafi and the Western allies, whose forces have been carrying out air attacks against Qaddafi's troops since March 19. These officials believe that Qaddafi's military commanders are concerned that the current reduction in the number of allied air attacks is simply the result of bureaucratic complications involved in turning over command of the operation from the United States Military to NATO. These commanders fear that once this transfer is complete, the number of attacks will increase. At the same time, Qaddafi's intelligence services are telling him that allied intelligence and special forces officers are now working with the rebels and eventually the fighting performance of this force will improve.

Accordingly, rebel commanders are concerned that Qaddafi, under advice from Saif, is sending envoys to friendly business and political leaders in Europe in an effort to obtain their assistance in bringing an end to the allied attacks. In this regard, the rebels believe that Mousa Kousa, in meetings with British officials, will raise the idea that a peace agreement can be reached between the government and the rebels, one that will leave the Qaddafi family in power, while guaranteeing economic and political reforms. Those individuals who subscribe to this point of view believe Saif still sees himself as an acceptable replacement for his father.

BLU-063

(Source Comment: The leadership of the NLC remains committed to the goal of deposing Qaddafi and will not accept a negotiated settlement that leaves the Libyan leader or his sons and close advisors in power.)

In commenting on the situation in Libya, a source with access to senior Western European officials stated in private that if NATO does not maintain the same level of attack against Qaddafi's troops as the United States military, the situation will become a stalemate in the next six weeks. In that case, these European officials add that Libya will divide into eastern and western halves, with Germany, Turkey, and Italy having good relations with the Qaddafi regime in the west, while France, Egypt, and Great Britain work with the NLC in the east.

These officials state that the Western powers must avoid the trap of making decisions based on domestic political considerations, giving the NLC enough support to survive, without providing the material and training needed to win the war.

(Source Comment: According to this source, the officials in question believe that the various European and NATO countries have already begun to make plans for such a stalemate. They believe that Qaddafi will eventually fall, as his inner circle is degraded, but they fear the process may take some time. These individuals qualify this position by adding that if the NATO attacks resume at their previous levels, and the rebels improve their organizational structure, the Libyan Army will not be able to hold captured areas, and will eventually give up the fight.)

H: Sarko. Sid
Apr 3 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

April 3, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Sarko of Arabia

Hilarious story about Sarkozy, BHL (Zelig as Lawrence of Arabia), and Libya, from Carla Bruni detail down to disinformation at end about France providing trainers and arms. Only Moliere could do this justice.

Undoubtedly, you saw Wash Post piece today on hostility between Haftari and Younis. Sources say long-time Qaddafi resister Haftari has contempt for Younis (French client), who is devoting more energy to cutting him out than organizing a military force. (See Moliere or is this part Evelyn Waugh?)

Sarkozy: Statesman or Madman?
by Christopher Dickey
April 2, 2011 | 8:39pm

An intimate look at the French president and his ties to the incestuous world of French intellectuals who helped launch the war in Libya.

In their favored haunts all across the city, at the bar of the Hotel Raphael near the Arc de Triomphe, in the tearooms of the Lutetia on the Left Bank and the Bristol on the Right Bank—a long way, in short, from the carnage in the Libyan desert—the Paris literati banter non-stop about the nuances of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's somewhat puzzling decision to lead their country and the Western world to war. Not a few have been amused, or chagrined, or both, to learn that one of their own, the ever-so-flamboyant (some would say insufferable) philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy had a pivotal role in prompting the allies' intervention. "I might write a book about it myself," says the man commonly known as BHL—by far the most controversial public intellectual in France—as he settles into the Raphael's dark red-velvet upholstery. Any such account will, inevitably, lay out the moral case for protecting civilians from a tyrant. But the more one learns of the inside story of the war's inception, as told by people close to Sarkozy, the clearer it is why U.S. President Barack Obama seemed

BLU-065

wary of this alliance from the first. Intervention in Libya might well serve American "interests and values," as Obama said, but from the start White House aides shied away from what they called "Sarkozy's war" and were glad to let France have the glory—or blame. Later, under the NATO command structure agreed last week, they spread responsibility around so widely it was hard to know who the White House thought was in charge. Press Secretary Jay Carney spoke of a "group effort," saying, "It's not a question of, you know, who gets credit."

Day to day, sometimes hour to hour, the battle lines have lurched back and forth along Libya's coastal highway, and the action behind the scenes has been just as chaotic. And again and again the story comes back to the French president. Aside from mad Muammar Gaddafi, no character in this drama is so enigmatic or so compelling. "He's everything people say about him—unpredictable, impulsive—and at the same time he's the contrary," suggests playwright Yasmina Reza (*Art*, *The God of Carnage*) who spent a year following Sarkozy on the campaign trail for her book-length sketch of him, *Dawn Dusk or Night*. Although his moods change for all the world to see, she says, he can't be reduced to any simple formula. During the effort to build a coalition for the action in Libya, as Sarkozy struggled to keep the Arabs on board, fend off German opposition, and rein in his own cabinet, his moods shifted from dark and silent to excited and on the top of his game "like he was 14," in the words of a close friend.

Sarkozy has at least one painfully obvious reason to want this war: his recent polls have been down in the 20s, the lowest ever for a French head of state. He's up for reelection next year with no support on the left and a potent challenger, Marine Le Pen, on the far right. But Reza doesn't believe it's about that. "He is smart, but not a cynic," she says. "For me he has something that is perhaps more dangerous than cynicism—what might be called serial attachments." He embraces a cause passionately, but then his attention moves on. It's a quality that Reza's book describes as "childlike." Author and literary critic Pierre Assouline, who knew Sarkozy as a teenager and has watched him ever since says "he has not changed."

Yet for all that, few who are familiar with the French president—whether friend or foe—question Sarkozy's concern for the Libyan people. "Even among the Socialists, everybody recognized that he did what should be done," says a leading party operative on the left, ordinarily no fan of Sarkozy's. But outside the bars and lounges of the five-star hotels in Paris, the French on the street are not so kind. Even though two thirds of the public approve of what Sarkozy has done in Libya, his personal numbers remain abysmal. "The French people do not like him," says a veteran of the presidential press corps. "They just do not like him."

Last week, as the Libyan rebels he's embraced veered between exaltation and near annihilation, Sarkozy made himself scarce, setting off on a long-scheduled Asia trip to preside at a meeting of the G-20. Allied foreign ministers gathered in London to discuss Libya, but France's role seemed suddenly and weirdly minor in his absence. NATO took command from the Americans; the British were holding the floor, and allied airstrikes on Gaddafi's forces suddenly slowed down. U.S. officials blamed the weather. A NATO spokeswoman insisted the pace had not diminished. But that wasn't how it looked on the ground. After the dictator's heavy weaponry once again reversed rebel gains near the strategic town of Brega, routed insurgents shouted to a BBC correspondent: "Where is Sarkozy? Where is Sarkozy?"

From the uprising's outset, the French president's objective was to take down Gaddafi, says an intelligence source close him. "We almost decided to do it ourselves," he adds. The French have a long history of unilateral interventions in Africa, including against Gaddafi in Chad in the 1980s. This time, however, they quickly found partners. The British under Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron were very much on board. So were the leading members of the Arab League, who had their own grudges against Gaddafi. But Sarkozy seemed practically obsessed.

It's worth remembering that Sarkozy once made a mission of bringing Gaddafi into the world's good graces. Just weeks after his election in 2007, the new French president outbid his European partners to ransom five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who had been imprisoned in Libya for eight years and threatened with execution. And late that year, clearly hoping for huge contracts from a supposedly rehabilitated Gaddafi, Sarkozy spent almost a week playing host to him, only to be humiliated daily by the Libyan leader's outlandish demands. Gaddafi pitched his famous tent next to the presidential palace, at the 19th-century Hôtel de Marigny, and when Gaddafi decided to visit the Louvre on the spur of the moment, Sarkozy ordered the museum cleared. Still, the really big contracts did not materialize. Helping Libyans to get rid of their dictator might help wipe that memory clean.

But you can't just support an amorphous "uprising." You need somebody to call. Who could speak for the New Libya? Sarkozy had no idea.

At just that moment, BHL rang the Elysée Palace switchboard to tell the president he'd decided to go to the rebel capital of Benghazi. Sarkozy told BHL to let him know if he found any leaders among the fighters, and the self-styled intellectual swashbuckler needed no further encouragement. From Bosnia to Afghanistan, Iraq to Pakistan, BHL has always taken the side of those he saw as oppressed—and never failed to promote himself in the process. "BHL did the usual," says a close friend of Sarkozy. "You know, 'Save this! Save that!' But he did manage to push the system to do something that cannot now be undone."

Sarkozy and BHL used to be good friends. They went skiing together in Alpe d'Huez and vacationed on the Riviera. When BHL was pushing for intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s, Sarkozy (a relatively junior minister in the cabinet of then prime minister Jacques Chirac) took BHL's side against formidable opponents like Alain Juppé, who was then, and is again, France's minister of foreign affairs.

The BHL-Sarkozy friendship turned icy during Sarkozy's 2007 presidential run. BHL backed the Socialist candidate and, adding ink to injury, published the story of Sarkozy's failed efforts to recruit him. "Now I hear the clannish, feudal, possibly brutal Sarkozy that his opponents have denounced, and which I never wanted to believe in," BHL wrote: "a man with a warrior vision of politics, who hystericizes relations, believes that those who aren't with him are against him, who doesn't care about ideas, who thinks interpersonal relations and friendship are the only things that matter."

Then Sarkozy's wife ditched him and Sarkozy hooked up with Carla Bruni, who had previously stolen the husband of BHL's daughter. To describe relations among the French elite as incestuous is almost literally true.

Even as BHL took off for Libya at the beginning of last month with Sarkozy's blessing, the relationship between the two remained uneasy. It was a mission on a wing and a prayer. Inveterate networker BHL knew no one in the country, in fact. He had to hitch a

ride in a vegetable vendor's panel truck to get to Benghazi. And once he was there the protestors seemed to be losing the revolutionary fervor that had enabled them to seize half the populated areas of the country with scarcely a shot fired in the previous weeks. "What I smelled was the democratic revolution cooling down," BHL recalls. His cause was slipping away from beneath him. And at the same time, Gaddafi's forces had begun to regroup for a counteroffensive. So BHL grew bolder. With a lot of name-dropping, he got himself invited to a meeting of the newly named Interim National Transitional Council.

On a sketchy old satellite phone that shut off every few minutes, BHL repeatedly called Sarkozy—who put up with the interruptions—and brokered a deal for a Libyan delegation to be received in Paris at the presidential palace. Two days later, on Monday, March 7, BHL was back in Paris, meeting with the president. Sarkozy said he'd take the extraordinary step of recognizing the rebels' government the following Thursday. Then BHL took an extraordinary step of his own. He asked Sarkozy to keep the whole thing a secret from the Germans, who were already expressing reservations about supporting the Libyan uprising—and also from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, who would, BHL insisted, "throw a wrench in the works."

Sarkozy was riding high just then. He bragged to the Libyans that he'd have no problem persuading the European Union to back his play. But at a summit in Brussels the day after he recognized their government, he found "the door slammed in his face," says a friend. Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel tried to distance herself from French bellicosity, and, following her lead, the German press branded Sarkozy and BHL "a pair of egomaniacs." The French president also took a pounding from one of the news magazines owned by Gaddafi's best friend in Europe, Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi. The cover of Panorama showed Sarkozy dressed as a demented Napoleon. Meanwhile Juppé was left to soldier on in the diplomatic trenches, working with several disgruntled allies to get the all-important imprimatur of the U.N. Security Council.

As the rebels at Brega demanded: Where is Sarkozy? Certainly his profile (if not BHL's) has been lowered. But apparently he's still on the case. Last week as U.S. officials and members of Congress debated who the rebels are and whether to train and arm them, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told Congress that the Obama administration doesn't want those jobs. "As far as I'm concerned, somebody else can do that." And that somebody is France. According to sources close to the Élysée, the French now have covert military trainers on the ground in Libya and are sending in munitions by sea as well as attacking Gaddafi's military from the air. It's still very much Sarkozy's war—until something else, or someone else, attracts his attention.

Christopher Dickey is a columnist for The Daily Beast and Newsweek magazine's Paris bureau chief and Middle East editor. He is the author of six books, including Summer of Deliverance, and most recently Securing the City: Inside America's Best Counterterrorism Force—the NYPD.

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URL: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-04-02/nicholas-sarkozys-road-to-libyan-war/p/>

H: latest: Younus/Haftar conflict; Saif's play. Sid
Apr 5 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

April 5, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Backstory to Younus/Haftar conflict; Saif's play for power

Later report:

During the evening of April 4, 2011, sources with access to the Military Committee of the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in confidence that rebel military officers continue to divide into factions aligned with various senior military officers and leaders in the NLC. There is also a degree of mistrust between the civilians, who have borne the majority of the fighting and regular army units that have turned against Muammar Qaddafi. Two officers in particular are vying for command of the rebel forces.

Former Minister of the Interior and long-time Qaddafi loyalist, General Abdel-Fattah Younus, joined the rebels early in the struggle, and after a tense vetting process was accepted by the NLC leadership group. Younus considers himself the commander of the rebel forces; however, his position has been challenged by the arrival from the United States of Colonel Khalifa Belgesia Haftar, who commanded the Anti-Qaddafi force known as the Libyan National Army (LNA) until he was driven from N'djamena, Chad in 1990. He took refuge in the United States, where he has lived for over twenty years.

Haftar and Younus were colleagues in the Qaddafi's military forces until Haftar was captured by the Chadian Army during the Libyan invasion of Chad in 1986-87. While in custody Haftar agreed to form the anti-Qaddafi force known as the LNA, which became a particular irritant for Qaddafi. For his part, Younus worked with dissident Chadian general (and current President) Idriss Debi to overthrow Haftar's patron in N'djamena, Hussein Habre. France played an important part in the struggle for Chad, and Younus played a valuable role in organizing French Military and Intelligence

BLU-069

support for Debi. During this period Younus established a close relationship with officers of the French external intelligence service, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE); a relationship that continues to this day. Younus and Debi believe that Haftar is associated with the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The resulting personal conflict between Haftar and Younus continues today, as does, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Younus' relationship with the DGSE. According to one source, Haftar continues to point out to the NLC that a number of the mercenaries fighting for Qaddafi are from the Chadian Gorang tribe, who, in 1989, Younus helped persuade to support Debi, then an ally of the Libyan leader. These tribal forces have continued to work for Qaddafi over the years. Younus, in turn, points out that Haftar has been living in the suburbs of Washington DC, while others struggled against Qaddafi. According to one source, the younger rebels find these arguments confusing and frustrating.

(Source Comment : A knowledgeable source adds that Younus and Haftar agree on the fact that NATO forces will not have the same effect on the battlefield as the United States aircraft which launched the initial attacks against Qaddafi's forces on March 19 and 20. In particular, they are concerned that only the American A-10 « warthog » ground support aircraft are suited to deal with the remaining elements of Qaddafi's army. These officers believe that the Tornados and other sophisticated NATO aircraft are simply too fast to deal with the Libyan Army on the ground, now that much of their heavy equipment has been destroyed. One sources noted that NATO is equipped to fight the Russians, not the Libyans. The NLC plans to press United States officials for further commitment of these specialized resources.)

At the same time, rumors are circulating that Saif al -Islam, with the acceptance of his father, has forwarded a proposal to assume the reigns of power. Saif's plan suggests governing Libya under a constitutional democracy, in which he would serve as a transitional leader until formal elections could be held.

This proposal is not new. Saif first launched his ideas for reform in 2004, when he enlisted the help of outside consultants to develop a plan for Libyan economic prosperity. Entitled "LibyaTomorrow" this plan soon developed from an economic and social agenda into a political plan. Several times between 2004 - 2010, Saif was asked to leave the country by his father because he proposed reform measures that were not acceptable to most of the "old guard."

In his role as the President of the Qadaffi Development Foundation, Saif raised the idea of a constitutional democracy, while working to develop a constitution for Libya. Shortly before violence broke out in Libya, Saif, his colleagues, and consultants completed the final version of a proposed constitution. It never gained widespread support due to strong resistance from the "old guard."

Now that one of the major figures in the “old guard movement”, Musa Kusa, has defected, Saif may feel empowered to put forth this document. Another reform initiative by Saif was the development of a free press. Saif was involved in launching the first Libyan media empire, Al -Ghad, which was not technically controlled by his father. This media empire, which included print, radio and television, was run by a youthful group of Libyans who were very tech and media savvy. Al -Ghad was shut down in 2010 during a very high profile disagreement between Saif and his father over its open criticism of Libyan issues. Muammar Qaddafi threw many of these young employees in jail while advising his son to leave the country for a “cooling off” period.

It is also likely that Saif’s most recent plan for a constitutional democracy includes an element of freedom of the press as well as freedom of internet access. Saif and his brother Mohammed were in a very difficult battle with their younger brother, Mutassim, over the shutting down of You Tube – due to some videos of Mutassim celebrating on New Year’s Eve and his father violently quashing rebellions in the West. Saif insisted on allowing You Tube to continue – but Mutassim wanted to block its access. Saif also proposed holding elections for a Libyan People’s Congress.

Saif’s proposal almost certainly contains his ideas regarding a strong role for Libyan NGOs. Saif helped arrange for the first trip by Amnesty International to Libya to visit the prisons, and then later followed up by announcing the release of several hundred prisoners. It is likely that Saif’s vision for a constitutional democracy includes an active role for non -governmental organizations.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals, the NLC is not prepared to accept a transitional government in which a member of the Qaddafi family plays a lead role. Too much blood or too little blood has been spilled for such a compromise at this time. The NLC is incapable of consolidating military gains and is on the verge of returning to the strategic military position it had before NATO forces intervened to stop Qaddafi’s siege of Benghazi. In short, their negotiating position is weak. Moreover, the NLC has few leaders of sufficient stature to head a transition government that represents a workable compromise between pro and anti Qaddafi forces. On the other hand, and in spite of the military assistance and air coverage being provided by NATO to the rebel forces, Qaddafi remains in control of his destiny. He is negotiating from a relative position of strength and the Saif proposal reflects that.)

H: UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in. Sid
Apr 8 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in

Latest report:

LIBYA/GREAT BRITAIN/France

On the morning of April 8, an individual with direct access to the leadership of the Libyan National Council (LNC) stated in strictest confidence that members of the Military Committee of the LNC are concerned that, despite the involvement of NATO against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi, the government of Great Britain is using its intelligence services in an effort to dictate the actions of both the LNC and the Qaddafi regime. These individuals add that they have been informed by contacts in France and Italy that, while they have been engaged in discussions with the LNC regarding possible assistance, British diplomats and intelligence officers have maintained contact with members of the Qaddafi government, in an effort to protect the British position in the event the rebellion settles into a stalemate. These LNC officials believe that the defection of Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa to the United Kingdom was part of this effort. By the same token they believe that British intelligence officers are in discussion with associates of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, regarding future relations between the two countries if he takes over power from his father and implements reforms.

According to these individuals, senior LNC military personnel suspect that despite early indications that they would provide clandestine military support to the rebels; neither the French nor the British government will provide the rebels with enough equipment and training to defeat Qaddafi's forces. They also believe that the French, British, and other European countries will be satisfied with a stalemate that leaves Libya divided into two rival entities.

(Source Comment: In the opinion of these individuals the LNC military leaders are considering the possibility of hiring private security firms to help train and organize their forces. One of these individuals added that a number of the LNC members believe that this solution may be best for the rebels; noting that if they accept clandestine aid

from France and/or Great Britain those two countries will be in a position to control the development of post-Qaddafi Libya.)

LIBYA - INSURGENT ACTIVITY

(This information is based on sensitive reporting from individuals with direct access to the leadership of the LNC.)

1. With little hope of achieving a quick military victory, the LNC is deploying a three part strategy; leveraging tribal relationships, oil production and diplomatic pressure to get the better of Qaddafi. A former spokesman for the Libyan Human Rights League (LHRL) in Europe, Ali Zidane, is in talks with representatives of tribes in Sebha and Sirte in an effort to persuade them to rally to the revolution and the LNC before fighting actually reaches their regions. Zidane is a candidate to be the Minister of the Interior in the "new Libya." Among his close associates is Mohamed Allagui, president of the LHRL, who is interested in the justice portfolio in the future, transition government.

2. At the same time, Ali Tarhouni, the LNC's financial expert and possibly Finance Minister in post-Qaddafi Libya, is struggling to get oil exports back on track in eastern Libya, with backing from the United States and Qatar. The LNC believes that the U.S. will focus on restarting operations at the oil terminal in Tobruk, and an American envoy is expected in Benghazi in the near future to facilitate this process. For its part, Qatar is advancing cash to the LNC to stimulate the shipment of oil from eastern Libya. Some commodity traders stepped in recently (under contract from Qatar) to deliver refined oil products to the insurgents. VITOL and the Swiss firm GLENCORE are operating in the rebel zone, but denied any involvement in this shipment.

Elsewhere, these sources add that Mahmud Shammam is overseeing the information and communications campaign for the rebels against Qaddafi. Considered one of the LNC most important leaders, Shammam brings to the insurgency the expertise he acquired while working for *Voice of America*, *Foreign Policy*, *Newsweek* and *Al Jazeera*. Shammam lived in the U.S. for more than twenty years, and he is believed to have excellent connections in the U.S. Government.

3. **Islamist activity:** Libya's Islamist activists have maintained a low profile since the start of the insurgency in late February; fearing that their activities would give credence to Qaddafi's claims that the rebels are terrorists. As the LNC is taking shape, they are now working to make their voice heard, and influence events within the LNC. Ali Sallabi, Salem Al Shiki and Mohamed Al Guirtili, leading Islamic figures who had taken refuge in London (and are close to the Moslem Brotherhood), drafted a "national pact" which looks like a road map for organizing the role of the Islamist movement in the transition to a post - Qaddafi Libya.

Sallabi and his two associates draw their inspiration from the "February 17 Movement" which helped spark the uprising by commemorating the massacre of Islamist prisoners at the Abu Salim prison in 1996. Prior to the current rebellion, Mustapha Abdel Jalil, the President of the LNC and former Minister of Justice called for the release of reformed

Islamists. At present, the Islamists are handicapped by the fact they supported Saif's reform projects before the recent crisis. Saif played a crucial part in getting the Islamists to sever ties between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

EGYPT AND LIBYA:

A source with excellent access to the highest levels of the SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES (SCAF) states that the Egyptian Military has turned its full attention to the crisis in Libya. Traditionally, Egypt is a strong influence in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica and is now taking advantage of the current crisis to regain that position. Regardless of whether Muammar Qaddafi remains in power or not, the political division of Libya will give Egypt the opportunity to fill the void in the east. A senior diplomatic source reported that since the early days of the Libyan crisis, the Egyptian government has been quietly supporting Libyan opposition forces through training, weaponry, food, and medical supplies, while attempting to organize a political structure in the east. In addition, Egyptian Special Operations troops are serving with rebel forces in the eastern part of Libya. Senior Egyptian military officers stated privately that these troops are responsible for many of the rebel's combat successes.

The following factors are the focus of Egypt's plans for a post-Qaddafi regime:

- **Avoiding a refugee crisis.** In the event Qaddafi's forces invade the east, Egypt is the most logical destination for refugees from Libya. Egypt has an interest in controlling any turmoil in Libya that could harm efforts to restart its struggling economy.

- **Labor market.** Libya is an important market for unemployed Egyptian laborers. According to the Egyptian Labor Ministry, around 1.5 million Egyptians reside and work in Libya, sending home an estimated \$254 million in remittances. In the past few years, Qaddafi has placed heavy restrictions on foreign workers, and Egypt hopes that a new regime will be more flexible, and open to receiving Egyptian workers.

- **Radical Islamists.** Traditionally, the eastern part of Libya has been a stronghold for radical Islamist groups, including the al Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. While Qaddafi's regime has been successful in suppressing the jihadist threat in Libya, the current situation opens the door for jihadist resurgence. Egypt has a growing interest in keeping a close eye on jihadist movements in eastern Libya. This is especially true as the Egyptian Military is already concerned about Islamist militancy overflow from Gaza, after their forces were pulled back to Cairo during the uprising against Mubarak.

- **Oil and energy resources.** Egypt has strong economic interests in the oil rich eastern part of Libya. Any opportunity to gain direct or indirect access to these energy resources will increase Egypt's wealth.

-Regional power. The Egypt's military-led government is looking to reestablish their country's role in the Arab world. So far, Egypt has fostered discussions in the Palestinian territories between Fatah and Hamas, while reaching out to Syria and Saudi Arabia on the issue of Iran.

(Source Comment: According to a sensitive diplomatic source, the current Egyptian diplomatic strategy is to enhance its stature by defending the Libyan people against Qaddafi's regime, while at the same time, distancing itself from any military intervention led by the region's former colonial powers in Europe.)

It should be noted that, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Egypt cannot count on the support of every Arab power in the region. Egypt led the call for imposing the no-fly zone in Libya, while Algeria, while Yemen, and Syria voted against it. These countries (especially Yemen) fear the precedence that would be created for their own governments in the event Qaddafi is ousted.

(Source Comment: A source with access to the leadership of NATO state in confidence that their information indicates that Syria and Algeria are concerned with Egypt's revival in the region. This source stated that a de facto split between eastern and western Libya would give Egypt the opportunity to reassume an influential position in Cyrenaica.)

H: Zuma and Q's new Bealrus mercs. Sid
Apr 12 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

April 12, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Zuma's sham offer and bribes; Q hiring Belarus mercs

Latest report:

During the morning of April 12, 2011, sources with access to the Military Committee of the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in confidence that their contacts in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) gave them advance information on the ceasefire plan put forth by South African President Jacob Zuma during his visit to Tripoli and Benghazi in early April 2011. Armed with this information the NLC was prepared for Zuma's offer, which they characterized as Muammar Qaddafi offering to allow them to surrender. In their discussions in Benghazi Zuma warned that Qaddafi has not used all of the military resources at his disposal, and that NATO, and the United States could not be trusted to support an African nation for any extended period of time. As reported in the press, the rebels rejected this offer out of hand, a decision that was made easier, in the opinion of a knowledgeable source, by increased NATO air attacks against Libyan Army forces fighting at Ajdabya.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals, NLC officials also believe that like many OAU heads of state, Zuma has accepted substantial secret financial support from Qaddafi. They add that the Libya dictator is now calling in these favors to gain international support for his regime. At the same time, Western intelligence sources add that Zuma believes strongly that it would be a mistake to set a precedent for allowing protestors/rebels to replace a sitting head of state. While South Africa has democratic elections and Zuma remains popular with a large portion of the South African population, his government has been plagued by allegations of corruption and other criminal activity. According to these sources, Zuma worries that these accusations will spark a protest movement that could endanger his government, particularly if they can look to Libya and other countries in North Africa as examples of where these movements succeeded.

(Source Comment: These sources noted that Zuma was frustrated by his negative reception in Benghazi, but believes that he helped improve Qaddafi's image in the eyes of the World.)

During the evening of April 11 European supporters of the NLC stated in confidence that Qaddafi, working through established military contacts in Eastern Europe, hired a new contingent of mercenaries from Belarus. These 200-400 troops are former members of the elite 334th regiment of the Belarus army. This force is considered by the rebels to be far more dangerous than the mercenaries from Chad, Algeria and other African countries used by the Libyans in the past. They are experts with the Soviet weapons that make up much of the Libyan arsenal and according to knowledgeable individuals the Libyans are interested in their expertise in using advanced, long range weapons systems, particularly artillery. Qaddafi and his military commanders see these forces as a way to offset NATO air strikes.

(Source Comment: Knowledgeable sources add that as many as 3,000 former members of the Belarus armed forces are negotiating to work as "free-lance" contractors for a number of North African Governments.)

According to sources with access to the NLC (also known as the Transitional National Council), the ruling council is functioning as the government of Eastern Libyan, and includes the following individuals:

- Moustapha Abdul Jalil, Head of Council (Former minister of Justice);
- Terbil FATHI (Lawyer known as a defender of human rights);
- Ahmed Abou El (Bank);
- Mohammed Fathi Baja (Political science professor);
- Salwa Bougaghis (Legal expert);
- Ali Aziz el Eisawi (Former ambassador to India and former minister of economics);
- Mahmoud Jibril (A long time associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi);
- Omar Harirl (A long time associate of Qaddafi. He participated in the 1969 coup against King Idriss. He later fell out with Qaddafi and served a long prison sentence.) the putsch in 1969);
- Abdel Younus el Obeid, General (until 20 February Interior minister).

On August 10, a source with access to the advisors of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi reported in confidence on the structure of the Libyan security forces.

According to these individuals, Muammar Qaddafi commands between 15,000 and 30,000 troops. They are trained and well equipped; recruited in large part from the "ghou" clan of the Qaddafha tribe (from the region of Sirte). These forces are personally loyal to the Qaddafi family and make up units such as the 32nd brigade, commanded by the Libyan leader's, Khamis.

(Source Comment: Qaddafi's personal body guard has been reinforced by a small contingent of Serbian Mercenaries, recruited in the same effort that introduced Belarus forces into the Army.)

By the same token, these knowledgeable individuals state that the rebel forces suffer from a chaotic chain of command, untrained troops, and political bickering inside of the

NLC. That said, approximately 6,000 former Libyan army soldiers deserted to the insurgents; these include:

A battalion of elite troops who followed Younus when he defected. They are personally loyal to him and follow his orders only.

Civilian volunteers from Beida and Derna (where the Muslim Brotherhood is in well entrenched). These volunteers include a significant number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

The following information was provided by an extremely sensitive source during early April 2011:

THE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE LIBYAN ARMY

1. Weapons of Mass destruction: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Nuclear:

No longer active, although military sources in Libya state that Qaddafi stored some artillery shells loaded with Derivatives of Yellow-cake in southern Libya, probably in the area GHAT.

Biological

No longer active.

Chemical:

Limited to an uncertain number of artillery shells loaded with mustard gas, and intended for destruction in accordance with international agreements. (Source Comment: The destruction of these stocks was not carried out before the rebellion began.)

2. Conventional Weapons; in addition to the individual AK47 assault rifles have: machine guns, RPGs, and GPZ:

- ☐ ☐ T64 and T72 tanks,
- ☐ ☐ Soviet self-propelled 155 mm,
- ☐ ☐ Troops transport vehicles such as BMP,
- ☐ ☐ System AA ZSU 23/2 and 23/4,
- ☐ ☐ Man-Portable Air Defense System (manpad) missile type SAM7, • Missile c/a Family SAM5,
- ☐ ☐ Counter tanks missiles; Spigott,
- ☐ ☐ Soviet machine gun 12.7mm,

H: latest on UK/French advisers in Libya. Sid
Apr 19 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

April 19, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: UK/French advisers in Libya

Latest report:

During the week of April 18, 2011 a source with direct access to the Libyan rebel command under the Transitional National Council (TNC, also known as the National Libyan Council, NLC) stated in secret that senior members of the TNC are concerned that the announcement that British military advisors will be joining the rebels will give false hope to their forces. These TNC leaders believe that the approximately ten (10) high ranking British officers will concentrate on assessing the rebel's prospects for survival while providing the British and French governments with intelligence that will allow them to make hard decisions on providing aid to the rebels. French officers will also be involved in these meetings.

(Source Comment: Senior TNC officers are concerned that in the end neither the British nor the French will provide tangible assistance at a level that will make a difference for the rebels. These individuals are particularly bitter about the French position, since they note that early in the rebellion officers from the Action Group of the French external intelligence service (DGSE) met with rebel leaders and encouraged them to rise up against Muammar al Qaddafi; while promising French aid when the fighting began.)

At the same time, these individuals state that DGSE officers continue to maintain a close relationship with rebel commander, General Abdul Fattah Younus, encouraging him to support French and British diplomatic and economic plans for post – Qaddafi Libya. These foreign officers, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, work against the efforts of General (formerly Colonel) Khalifa Haftar to establish himself in the rebel

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army. The DGSE believes that Haftar, who lived in the United States for twenty years, is too close to American interests. Again, these individuals find this intrigue frustrating at a time when the rebellion is in serious danger of failing. They are encouraging the TNC to broaden their efforts to obtain military assistance.

In the meantime, as the fighting continues, TNC military officers in the field report that prisoners captured from Qaddafi's forces have reported that prior to the initiation of the no-fly zone by the Western powers, ALGERIA provided Qaddafi's forces with a number of T55, T/56 E T/64 tanks. According to these prisoner interrogations; ALGERIA is continuing to supply fuel to Qaddafi's forces.

(Source Comment: These TNC officers are frustrated by France's failure to attempt to block these supply efforts. The Libyans believe France continues to exert a degree of influence in Algeria.)

H: Here it is: latest. Sid
Apr 26 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

April 26, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re:

Latest report: Rebel friction with NATO; future plans

During the evening of April 25, 2011 sources with access to the leadership of the Libyan rebellion's ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) stated in strictest confidence that the rebel military commanders are extremely frustrated by the performance of NATO air forces over the weekend of April 22. At the same time, these commanders believe that the small number of tactical advisors sent by Great Britain and France, under their NATO mandate, is not equipped to deal with the scope of the challenge facing the rebels as they continue to fight the forces of Muammar al Qaddafi.

These individuals add that the military situation across Libya has reached a state where, without the direct participation of advisors/trainers with rebel troops in the field, the fight will become a stalemate. In the opinion of these individuals, Misrata and other rebel held areas in the Western part of the country will remain cutoff and eventually fall to the forces of Muammar al Qaddafi, with extremely heavy casualties.

(Source Comment: At the same time these individuals do not believe that Qaddafi will be able to organize an attack by tribal forces on Misrata as has been threatened. The rebel commander's point out that such an attack would be led by the Warfalla tribe and that the leaders of the Warfalla have begun to waiver in their support for Qaddafi. They view this threat as one of the psychological warfare tactics developed by Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam and his advisors for use against the beleaguered rebel forces defending Misrata.)

BLU-081

According to knowledgeable individuals, the rebel troops have started to perform quite well, and have held their own in fighting at Misrata; however, they do not have the heavy equipment or tactical training to win a complete victory and lift the siege. For their part, government forces have experienced problems with morale and discipline among their troops.

A separate source with access to the advisors of Saif al-Islam stated privately that the Libyan army is suffering a steadily increasing rate of desertion, and captured deserters have reported under interrogation that numerous rank and file Libyan soldiers are considering desertion to the rebels. The same is true among foreign mercenaries fighting for Qaddafi. One knowledgeable source added that Libyan Army officers have been able to hold Chadian and other mercenary troops in place through fear that they will be summarily executed if captured by the rebels.

An individual with excellent access added that, while the rebels are encouraged by the United States deployment of its PREDATOR drone aircraft to the Libyan battlefield, they are concerned that the PREDATOR is designed to deal with very select individual targets, when what they believe they need is coverage from more traditional ground support aircraft such as the A-10 WARTHOGS, C-130 GUNSHIPS, and APACHE attack helicopters. They are facing substantial numbers pro-Qaddafi troops using smaller vehicles. (Note: Often these troops use BMD armored cars and Toyota Land cruisers armed with heavy machine guns and recoilless rifles, which can be dealt with by slow, heavily armored aircraft.)

(Source Comment: As of late April, 2011 leaders of the TNC, as well as rebel commanders in the field, expressed concern that the UN/NATO commitment in Libya did not necessarily require a rebel victory in the fight with Qaddafi's forces. Their fear is that the international community may be willing to accept a ceasefire that leaves Qaddafi, or his son Saif al-Islam, in power in Tripoli, with the TNC exercising tenuous control over the eastern part of the country. The rebel leaders are convinced that this solution would, over time, lead to a complete victory for the Qaddafi family, as they worked to wear down the resolve of the TNC supporters. In addition, these individuals added that the leadership of the TNC believes that a stalemate will only serve to frustrate the rebel troops. Under these circumstances disaffected rebel troops may blame the West and even moderate members of the Muslim Brotherhood for not providing more support for their cause, and turn from the TNC to al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other radical Islamist groups.)

Finally, a well informed source reported in late April that senior members of the TNC military committee have endorsed the idea of hiring private/professional military personnel to train and organize the rebel forces. They reached this conclusion after coming to believe that the United States and NATO will not be able to provide the support on the ground that is needed to press the fight with Qaddafi. As this position develops, the military committee will have to coordinate the plans being drawn up with the aid of senior British and French officers working with TNC leaders and the operations of field units trained by private soldiers.

2-May-11

H: UBL, AQ & Libya. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

May 2, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Bin Laden, AQ & Libya

Latest report:

During the early morning of May 2, 2011 sources with access to the leadership of the Libyan rebellion's ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) stated in confidence that they are concerned that the death of al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden will inspire al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to use weapons they have obtained, which were originally intended for the rebels in Libya, to retaliate against the United States and its allies for this attack in Pakistan. These individuals fear that the use of the weapons in this manner will complicate the TNC's relationship with NATO and the United States, whose support is vital to them in their struggle with the forces of Muammar al Qaddafi. In this regard they are concerned that U.S. officials will believe reports, often created by the Tripoli Government, regarding the degree of influence exercised by AQIM on the TNC.

These individuals note that the TNC officials are reacting to reports received during the week of April 25 from their own sources of information, the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), and British external intelligence service (MI-6), stating that AQIM has acquired about 10 SAM 7- Grail/Streela man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS or MPADS) from illegal weapons markets in Western Niger and Northern Mali. These weapons were originally intended for sale to the rebel forces in Libya, but AQIM operatives were able to meet secretly with these arms dealers and purchase the equipment. The acquisition of these sophisticated weapons creates a serious threat to air traffic in Southern Morocco, Algeria, Northern Mali, Western Niger, and Eastern Mauritania.

(Source Comment: According to very sensitive sources, the Libyan rebels are concerned that AQIM may also obtain SPIGOTT wire-guided anti-tank missiles and an unspecified number of Russian anti-tank mines made of plastic and undetectable by anti-mine

BLU-083

equipment. This equipment again was coming through Niger and Mali, and was intended for the rebels in Libya. They note that AQIM is very strong in this region of Northwest Africa.)

In the opinion of these knowledgeable individuals, Libyan rebel commanders are also concerned that the death of Bin Laden comes at a time when sensitive information indicates that the leaders of AQIM are planning to launch attacks across North Africa and Europe in an effort to reassert their relevance during the ongoing upheavals in Libya, as well as the rest of North Africa and the Middle East. They believe the first step in this campaign was the April 30 bombing of a café in Marrakesh, Morocco that is frequented by Western tourists. These individuals point out that AQIM also maintains a wide reach in Europe.

The TNC leaders are also concerned that, with the death of Saif al-Arab Qaddafi, the youngest son of Muammar Qaddafi, the Tripoli Government may pursue retaliation against the United States and its Western allies through surrogate terrorist groups, particularly Hezbollah. While the deaths of Bin Laden and Saif al-Arab are completely unrelated, two separate and very dangerous groups will now be looking for revenge against the U.S. and its allies.

(Source Comment: These knowledgeable sources believe that the leaders of the TNC are also worried about the reaction to the death of Bin Laden among rebel fighters and their supporters in Libya and Egypt, where the al Qa'ida leader was very popular. These TNC officials do not want the death of Bin Laden to affect their relations with the West or their support from NATO, the U.S., France, or Great Britain.)

H: Lots new. French economic grab/Levy/Q & OBL/AQ base in Algeria. Sid
May 5 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

May 5, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: French economic grab/Levy/Q & OBL/AQ base in Algeria

Latest:

On the morning of May 5, 2011, individuals with access to the leadership of the Libyan rebellion's ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) stated in strictest confidence that In mid-April, 2011 the French Air Force, in an operation organized in cooperation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began bringing medical and other humanitarian supplies to the TNC led rebels in Benghazi, using civilian aircraft. The flights began on April 13 with a cargo including 9 tons of medical supplies. At the same time, these sources add that these flights are bringing in representatives of major French corporations, as well as officers of the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), all of whom are looking to establish working relationships with the rebel leaders as they move toward becoming the government of Libya.

The initial flight included executives from the French oil company **TOTAL**, the large construction firm **VINCI** and the **European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V. (EADS)**. The aircraft for the operation are provided by **AIRBUS**, which is a subsidiary of EADS. Subsequent flights have carried representatives from the conglomerate **THALYS** and other large French firms, all with close ties to the government of President Nicolas Sarkozy. After meeting with the TNC these French business executives leave discreetly by road, via Tobruk to Egypt. These convoys are organized and protected by para-military officers of the Special Action Group/DGSE, who also use these visits to establish contacts in the intelligence units of the rebel army under the command of General Abdul Fatah Younus, who, according to these sources, has longstanding ties to the DGSE.

BLU-085

This operation is the idea of Bernard Henri Levy, a private advisor to Sarkozy, who has been involved with the Libyan rebels since the beginning of unrest in February 2011. According to these knowledgeable individuals, while no contracts were signed in the first series of meetings, Levy arrived again in Benghazi on April 22nd, and obtained the signature of the appropriate TNC leaders on a Memorandum of Agreement, establishing the fact that French firms will receive favorable consideration in all future business matters. According to knowledgeable individuals, Levy, speaking in polite terms, made it clear to the TNC officials that they owed a debt to France for their early support, and that Sarkozy needed something tangible to show to the leaders of France's business and political communities in return. Both sides agreed to handle the agreement discreetly for the time being, not wanting to anger other countries involved with the rebels.

Levy closed by telling a small group of rebel leaders that Sarkozy was criticized privately by leaders of the French Jewish community for becoming involved with the rebels before determining their policy toward Israel, adding that this agreement would help deflect these complaints in Paris. The rebel leaders assured him that they were completely focused on fighting the forces of Muammar Qaddafi and his sons. They did point out, however, that early in the uprising they had allowed the Israeli navy to enter Tobruk harbor and evacuate Palestinian laborers stranded there in the first days of fighting.

(Source Comment: Sources with excellent access to the DGSE state that Levy is using his status as a journalist to provide cover for his activities. However, he is working under direct orders from Sarkozy. DGSE and French Military officers involved in the Libyan rebellion complain about Levy's status as a "gifted amateur" but admit that he is very effective in dealing with the rebels, while carrying Sarkozy's complete trust.)

Also on May 5, 2011, sources with access to the advisors for Qaddafi's son Saif al Islam stated in private that he and his father are considering options for striking back at NATO, the United States and the other Western powers involved in the air raid that killed Qaddafi's youngest son Saif al Arab on April 30. At this point no firm decisions have been made and the discussions are general in nature. Interestingly, these individuals add that Qaddafi and his sons were pleased when they learned of the death of al Qa'ida leader Osama Bin Laden at the hands of the U.S. military on May 1, 2011. According to these sources, Qaddafi viewed Bin Laden as a long time adversary and is glad to be rid of him. At the same time he sees a possible benefit if the U.S. attack stirs up resentment against the United States across the Arab world, distracting the American people and their leaders from the situation in Libya. For his part, Saif al Islam believes that in the event of a retaliatory attack by al Qa'ida against the U.S. or its interests abroad, it may be possible to use his contacts in the Western press to link the Libyan rebels to al Qa'ida, and weaken Western support for the TNC.

These same individuals with access Saif al Islam add that groups of fighters loyal to al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have taken advantage of the fighting between rebel and government forces to establish a presence among some of the tribes located in

the remote Southwestern part of Libya. At the same time AQIM operatives have established a central base close to the southern reaches of the Algerian Hoggar Mountains, from which they are directing katabats in the following locations:

- Northern Mali, in the village of TAOUDENI (22°48'30.48''N 03°58'26.55''E)
- Eastern Mali, in the town of GAO (16°16'23.01''N 00°03'03.41''W);
- Niger in the town of TAHOUA (14°54'00.44''N 05°16'00.46''E));

The operational area for the AQIM's Katibat(s) is the region that runs along the borders of:

- Mali - Niger;
- Niger - Algeria;
- Niger - Libya.

(Source Comment: Katibat is a term used by the old Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) for units of about 100 fighters, The GSPC was one of the groups that helped form AQIM in 2006-7 under the auspices of Bin Laden's Deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.)

Re: H: Memo on OBL photos; more to come soon on Libya. Sid

May 6 2011

H:

On Libya, TNC very, very happy about your meeting, I've heard. My own view is that they desperately need professional military trainers, preferably Americans, not only to train, organize and mobilize but also to establish a more professional military for the aftermath in dealing with post-Q Libya, etc. Some of the funds released should go to that end. The scene on the Misurata dock on Wednesday, total chaos, no sign of any TNC presence, no soldiers, showed the dire need for training, etc. Hope the allergies are better. S

H: New memo: Q's secret bid to UK. Sid
Jun 3 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Q's secret bid to UK

On the morning of June 2, 2011 sensitive sources with access to the advisors to Muammar Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam, stated in strict confidence that the Libyan government has opened extremely complicated negotiations with the government of the United Kingdom (UK) in an effort to obtain their support in reaching a ceasefire agreement with the rebels of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC), allowing the Qaddafi's to maintain some level of control in the country.

This initiative is directed by Saif al-Islam and, according to these sensitive sources, the Libyans have asked the UK officials to broker a deal with the TNC that will allow some form of power sharing, with the possibility of Saif al-Islam acting as head of state and the TNC members making up a substantial portion of the cabinet in a new government. Under the plan Muammar Qaddafi would be allowed to leave the country and go into exile with no danger of indictment on charges of human rights abuses and corruption by Libyan or international courts.

(Source Comment: In the opinion of these sensitive sources, this initiative reflects the concern of the Qaddafi government that as a result of continuing NATO air raids against their forces, they can no longer defeat the rebel army. They add that there has been no firm response from the UK government, and the initial discussions have been conducted by officers of the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS / MI-6). In the opinion of these same sources the initial idea of these talks may have been raised by former Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Koussa, after his arrival in London in late March 2011.)

According to these sensitive sources, Saif al-Islam and his advisors realize that there is little chance the TNC will agree to such an offer, and that SIS may be using this contact as a means of collecting intelligence while protecting British interests in Libya.

BLU-089

Notwithstanding this concern, in the opinion of these individuals, Saif al-Islam believes that introducing the possibility of a ceasefire and the subsequent negotiations may create divisions within NATO and weaken their military operations against Qaddafi's forces.

(Source Comment: These sources add that many of Saif al-Islam's advisors do not know if, or to what extent, the UK Government has shared knowledge of this initiative with the governments of the United States and the other NATO allies.)

At the same time, sources with access to the operations of the TNC military committee state privately that on June 1, 2011 Libyan intelligence officers detonated a car bomb outside the Tibesti Hotel in the TNC capital of Benghazi. One person was injured in the blast and a number of nearby vehicles were damaged. TNC security officers occupied the hotel and the surrounding area immediately after the attack, but were not able to identify any of the attackers. The Tibesti Hotel is an important landmark in the heart of Benghazi and is used by the TNC government, as well by foreign journalists and diplomats. Hotel security has been heightened in the hours following the attack and all foreign residents are under surveillance by TNC security officers, looking for suspicious activities and contacts.

H: Who killed Younis and why. Sid
Aug 8 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

August 8, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Who killed Younis

SOURCE: Sources with access to the Libyan Transitional National Council as well as Western Intelligence and security services.

During the morning of August 5, 2011 sources with direct access to senior levels of the Libyan Transnational Council (TNC) stated in strictest confidence that the rebel military commander, General Abdel Fatah Younis was executed by security forces on orders from TNC Chairman Mustapha Jalil. According to these sources, in late July 2011 TNC security officers received what they believed to be reliable information that Younis was involved in a secret dialogue with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the son of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. These discussions involved planning for Younis and Saif al-Islam to establish a government of reconciliation, with Muammar Qaddafi living in internal exile, and the TNC being disbanded in favor of officials, and military officers loyal to Saif and Younis. Jalil ordered Younis' arrest, and once he was in TNC custody instructed security officers to shoot the army commander.

According to these knowledgeable individuals, Jalil and his supporters began disseminating the story that Younis was killed by either pro-Qaddafi forces, or Islamic radicals within the TNC military. There is no indication that rebel Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabil, his senior aid Abdul Hafiz Ghoza, overall military commander General Abdelessalem Jalloud, or Younis replacement as field commander General Khalifa Haftar were involved in the decision to execute Younis.

Younis, was a former senior military officer and Minister of Interior in the Qaddafi regime, who joined the rebels in February 2011, after serving his friend Muammar Qaddafi for over 40 years. When Younis first joined the rebel forces TNC security

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officers placed him under surveillance, believing that he might have been sent by Qaddafi to infiltrate their ranks. After a variety of loyalty tests he was welcomed into the rebel leadership, however, it now appears that the security officers maintained their coverage of Younis and at some point in early July established his contact with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi.

(Source Comment: Knowledgeable sources state that Jalil and his security forces felt that Younis' actions posed an immediate threat to the TNC and the ongoing revolution. Jalil made the decision to order Younis' arrest and execution rather than submit the matter for debate in the 31 member TNC. To date these sources add that there is no indication that none of the TNC members have challenged Jalil's decision.)

Jalil remains committed to defeating the Qaddafi regime and is unwilling to negotiate with Saif al-Islam, or another representative of Muammar Qaddafi. According to these sources, Jalil believes reports that the Saif – Younis negotiations had at least the tacit support of the governments of the United States, Germany, France, and Russia.

(Source comment: A separate sensitive source noted that Jalil remains highly suspicious of the activities of the four governments, and has privately expressed hostility toward their representatives in TNC capital of Benghazi. That said he is well aware of the fact that he will need the support of the major powers, particularly the United States, to guarantee the future of the TNC government.)

H: Latest Libya intel. Sid

Aug 20 2011

I have received information that Qaddafi is shelling neighborhoods in Tripoli he considers threatening and that rebel forces are on outskirts of the airport.

H: Post-Q. Sid
CONFIDENTIAL

August 22, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Your statement post-Q

Just a quick note:

First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be credited for realizing it.

When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of course make a public statement before the cameras wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation house. You must go on camera. You must establish yourself in the historical record at this moment.

The most important phrase is: "successful strategy."

Just a few points:

*The US has pursued a successful strategy in Libya. We did not know how long it would take, but we knew it would not be easy, and that it would require steadiness and persistence. This was the right course, based on our interests and principles. And it has worked.

*Do not skimp on the reasons in the US interest behind the successful strategy: We prevented a humanitarian tragedy on a vast scale. Qaddafi, who had already killed 2,000 people in April, threatened to massacre the residents of Benghazi, tens if not hundreds of thousands of people. We worked closely with our NATO allies, proving that cooperation within the Western alliance can achieve our mutual goals. The US has demonstrated its principled belief in the rule of law and acted on the basis of the United Nations resolution. We have supported the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for democracy and freedom. We have ousted a murderous dictator who has been a source of terrorism, civil war throughout Africa and a prop for dictators elsewhere. By acting in Libya we have helped advance the cause of democracy and freedom throughout the Arab world. We have provided an important support for neighboring Egypt. We have put Assad on notice that the sands of time have run out for him as well. Our successful strategy in Libya stands as a warning that our strategy will work again. Etc.

*Be aware that some may attempt to justify the flamingly stupid "leading from behind" phrase, junior types on the NSC imagining their cleverness. To refute this passive construction on US policy and help remove it as an albatross from the administration as

it enters the election year, do not be defensive but rather simply explain that the US had a clear strategy from the start, stuck with it and has succeeded.

*Then you can say whatever on future policy—but only after asserting the historic success and explaining the reasons why.

*This is a very big moment historically and for you. History will tell your part in it. You are vindicated. But don't wait, help Clio now.

H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid
Aug 30 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Inside NTC latest

As of August 30, 2011, the leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) are adjusting to their success in fighting against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi in Tripoli and throughout the country. According to a knowledgeable source, the numerous tribal, regional, political divisions within the 31 member NTC are complicating the process of moving from a revolutionary movement focused on Qaddafi, to a new, established government.

In the opinion of this source, there is a danger that governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the other major powers will identify allies on the NTC, expediting the formation of rival groups among the council members. These sources believe that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, and General Khalifa Haftar lead a faction that is well disposed toward the U.S. government. Their principal rivals in the NTC appear to be President Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and General Suleiman Mahmoud, who, in the opinion of one sensitive source have well established relationships with the British and French governments respectively. In light of the dangerous situation that exists throughout Libya, all of these leaders are remaining as discreet as possible regarding their relationships with foreign governments and firms.

(Source Comment: Generals Haftar and Suleiman Mahmoud are rivals for the overall control of the National Liberation Army (NLA). This is the continuation of the struggle between Haftar, and General Abdel Fatah Younis, the previous commander of the NLA, who was detained and secretly executed by NTC security personnel on orders from Jalil. The President ordered this execution after receiving evidence that Younis was carrying on a secret dialogue with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. Several members of the NTC pressed for Jalil's removal from office after this incident, but he was able to hold on to his position as Chairman of the NTC and President of the new Libya.)

A separate sensitive source adds that, in their opinion, the various leaders of the NTC are well aware of which governments and firms supported them during the rebellion, including the major oil companies and international banks. As the new government takes shape, its leaders will factor this information into decisions they make regarding future business relationships, including oil leases. This source adds that the Libyans will, of course, weigh these concerns against the practical advantages offered by particular relationships with foreign governments and firms. That said, the source notes that the feeling of animosity toward certain countries and firms is particularly pronounced.

In the opinion of this individual, Italy, and the Italian oil firm ENI are in especially problematic positions. Jalil and his supporters are convinced that the Italian government and ENI did not fully support the rebellion against Qaddafi's rule, hedging their bet against the contingency of a victory by the old regime. According to this source, the recent meetings in Rome between Prime Minister Jabril and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi did not produce the definitively positive results the Italians had hoped for.

(Source Comment: According to a very knowledgeable source, the Italian government and ENI found themselves in an impossible position during the rebellion, with much of their investment in Libya located in the Western part of the country, which was held by Qaddafi's forces throughout the fighting. This source believes that in the end, given the longstanding cultural and political links between Italy and Libya, the NTC will have positive business and diplomatic relationships with Rome, however; given their frustration over the Italy's role in the rebellion, the Libyans can be expected to demand highly favorable terms in any future business dealings with Italian firms. This source adds that while U.S., British and French firms will most likely have positive positions under the new government, the final details of any major business arrangement will be subject to serious debate in the NTC. This is particularly true in terms of contracts related to the oil industry and international bank.)

In addition, during the afternoon of August 28, 2011 sources with direct access to the highest levels of the NTC stated in confidence that the new Libyan regime would resist efforts by the United States and its allies to arrange the extradition to any country of the convicted organizer of the Lockerbie bombing, Mohamed Ali al-Megrahi. In a private discussion, these senior NTC officers reacted forcefully to questions regarding this possibility, pointing out that such a move "will never happen, and even so, Megrahi was just a captain in the Libyan Mukhabarat (Security/Intelligence service)." They explained that as a captain he was of no particular importance and was "just following Muammar Qaddafi's orders." This matter has been discussed at some length within the NTC. These officials stated that many NTC members blame the Bush administration for accepting \$2.7 billion in "blood money" as compensation from Qaddafi for the Lockerbie bombing. One particularly senior official said that act "dishonored the dead" and caused the Libyan people to "lose respect for America," especially after the U.S. Department of State lifted sanctions against Libya.

At the same time, these individuals added that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was in contact with the leadership of the NTC, requesting that Muammar Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, and other senior officers of the regime be turned over to the ICC for prosecution when they are captured. Speaking in strict confidence, the NTC officials replied that Saif al-Islam and any other officials would, if capture alive, be extradited to The Hague for trial. However; they added that a majority of the NTC had decided that Muammar Qaddafi would be held for trial in Libya if he is captured by forces under the direct control of NLA central command. That said, they added that it was very likely that if Muammar Qaddafi is captured by one of the regional militias that make up the bulk of the NLA, he will be summarily executed. The ICC representative protested this stance but was rebuffed.

Re: H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid
Aug 30 2011

Got this. Will be in touch with further intel. Sid

-----Original Message-----

From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
To: sbwhoeop@aol.com <sbwhoeop@aol.com>
Sent: Tue, Aug 30, 2011 12:58 pm
Subject: Re: H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid

Thx. I'm going to Paris tomorrow night and will meet w TNC leaders so this and additional info useful. I still don't have electricity or blackberry coverage post Irene so ive had to resort to new iPad! Let me know if you receive this.

Sent from my iPad

On Aug 30, 2011, at 12:00 PM, sbwhoeop@aol.com wrote:

CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Inside NTC latest

As of August 30, 2011, the leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) are adjusting to their success in fighting against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi in Tripoli and throughout the country. According to a knowledgeable source, the numerous tribal, regional, political divisions within the 31 member NTC are complicating the process of moving from a revolutionary movement focused on Qaddafi, to a new, established government.

BLU-099

In the opinion of this source, there is a danger that governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the other major powers will identify allies on the NTC, expediting the formation of rival groups among the council members. These sources believe that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabil, and General Khalifa Haftar lead a faction that is well disposed toward the U.S. government. Their principal rivals in the NTC appear to be President Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and General Suleiman Mahmoud, who, in the opinion of one sensitive source have well established relationships with the British and French governments respectively. In light of the dangerous situation that exists throughout Libya, all of these leaders are remaining as discreet as possible regarding their relationships with foreign governments and firms.

(Source Comment: Generals Haftar and Suleiman Mahmoud are rivals for the overall control of the National Liberation Army (NLA). This is the continuation of the struggle between Haftar, and General Abdel Fatah Younis, the previous commander of the NLA, who was detained and secretly executed by NTC security personnel on orders from Jalil. The President ordered this execution after receiving evidence that Younis was carrying on a secret dialogue with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. Several members of the NTC pressed for Jalil's removal from office after this incident, but he was able to hold on to his position as Chairman of the NTC and President of the new Libya.)

A separate sensitive source adds that, in their opinion, the various leaders of the NTC are well aware of which governments and firms supported them during the rebellion, including the major oil companies and international banks. As the new government takes shape, its leaders will factor this information into decisions they make regarding future business relationships, including oil leases. This source adds that the Libyans will, of course, weigh these concerns against the practical advantages offered by particular relationships with foreign governments and firms. That said, the source notes that the feeling of animosity toward certain countries and firms is particularly pronounced.

In the opinion of this individual, Italy, and the Italian oil firm ENI are in especially problematic positions. Jalil and his supporters are convinced that the Italian government and ENI did not fully support the rebellion against Qaddafi's rule, hedging their bet against the contingency of a victory by the old regime. According to this source, the recent meetings in Rome between Prime Minister Jabil and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi did not produce the definitively positive results the Italians had hoped for.

(Source Comment: According to a very knowledgeable source, the Italian government and ENI found themselves in an impossible position during the rebellion, with much of their investment in Libya located in the Western part of the country, which was held by Qaddafi's forces throughout the fighting. This source believes that in the end, given the longstanding cultural and political links between Italy and Libya, the NTC will have positive business and diplomatic relationships with Rome, however; given their frustration over the Italy's role in the rebellion, the Libyans can be expected to demand highly favorable terms in any future business dealings with Italian firms. This source

adds that while U.S., British and French firms will most likely have positive positions under the new government, the final details of any major business arrangement will be subject to serious debate in the NTC. This is particularly true in terms of contracts related to the oil industry and international bank.)

In addition, during the afternoon of August 28, 2011 sources with direct access to the highest levels of the NTC stated in confidence that the new Libyan regime would resist efforts by the United States and its allies to arrange the extradition to any country of the convicted organizer of the Lockerbie bombing, Mohamed Ali al-Megrahi. In a private discussion, these senior NTC officers reacted forcefully to questions regarding this possibility, pointing out that such a move "will never happen, and even so, Megrahi was just a captain in the Libyan Mukhabarat (Security/Intelligence service)." They explained that as a captain he was of no particular importance and was "just following Muammar Qaddafi's orders." This matter has been discussed at some length within the NTC. These officials stated that many NTC members blame the Bush administration for accepting \$2.7 billion in "blood money" as compensation from Qaddafi for the Lockerbie bombing. One particularly senior official said that act "dishonored the dead" and caused the Libyan people to "lose respect for America," especially after the U.S. Department of State lifted sanctions against Libya.

At the same time, these individuals added that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was in contact with the leadership of the NTC, requesting that Muammar Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, and other senior officers of the regime be turned over to the ICC for prosecution when they are captured. Speaking in strict confidence, the NTC officials replied that Saif al-Islam and any other officials would, if capture alive, be extradited to The Hague for trial. However; they added that a majority of the NTC had decided that Muammar Qaddafi would be held for trial in Libya if he is captured by forces under the direct control of NLA central command. That said, they added that it was very likely that if Muammar Qaddafi is captured by one of the regional militias that make up the bulk of the NLA, he will be summarily executed. The ICC representative protested this stance but was rebuffed.

H: New intel on NTC politics of humanitarian aid. Sid
Aug 31 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

August 31, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: NTC politics of humanitarian aid

During the morning of August 31, 2011, sensitive sources with excellent access stated in strict confidence that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabil, President Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and the other leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) continue to debate how best to organize their efforts to deal with foreign governments and firms in an effort to address the humanitarian and security needs of the Libyan people, as they attempt to form an effective government. The recent success of the rebellion against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi has surprised these NTC leaders, and they are now struggling with the divisions inside of the movement. Jabil and Jalil realize that the real success or failure of their rebellion depends on their ability to form an administrative structure that can deal with other governments and major foreign business interests on behalf of the people of Libya.

(Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, the NTC leadership is increasingly concerned over the failure of the rebel National Libyan Army (NLA) to capture Qaddafi or his remaining family members, particularly his son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. They are especially worried that the former dictator may take advantage of tribal loyalties in the Southern and Western parts of the country, in order to carry on a guerrilla war against the new NTC government. At the same time they believe that certain governments will continue to hold back full recognition and cooperation until the Qaddafis are removed from the scene. In this regard Jalil is pressing the idea of asking the United Nations to provide experts to organize and administer any humanitarian aid the NTC receives, believing that this will give the new regime greater credibility as a national government. Jabil has not yet commented on this idea, and it has not been fully debated in the NTC.)

At present, these sources note that various European governments and firms are working with their particular friends on the NTC to gain favorable positions for future business opportunities. These sources believe that the private talks between NTC members and these foreign officials and businessmen involve discussions regarding how best to meet the needs of the population. For his part Jabril is concerned that many of the tentative offers of assistance appear to be linked to business concessions for the donor countries, particularly in the oil industry. One advisor to Jabril has stated in private that if the NTC accepts this assistance without question, Libya will become a client state of the major European powers.

At present, senior NTC officials believe that the government of the United Kingdom is working to strengthen the position of British Petroleum (BP), pointing out that, while in the past BP was forced to deal closely with the Qaddafi regime, the UK was among the first of the major powers to come to the aid of the rebels. By the same token, the French government has quietly but forcefully continued to remind Jalil and other NTC leaders that they were the first major country to support the rebels. At the same time, the French, who feel that in the past firms like TOTAL/ELF were not fairly treated by the Qaddafi regime are looking for the NTC to open up a greater percentage of the Libyan oil fields to their operations.

The NTC continues to maintain a correct but cool attitude toward the Italian government and the Italian oil firm ENI. The NTC leadership believes that the Italians quietly dealt with Qaddafi regime well into the rebellion, and the new government will continue to move very carefully in dealing with either the Italian government or ENI.

At the same time, both Jabril and Jalil are particularly suspicious of the intention of the government of German Chancellor Angela Merkel toward the new Libyan regime, and have taken steps to monitor the activities of German diplomats and businessmen in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. By the same token, the NTC has received unconfirmed reports from their security officers and military commanders in the field that officers of Germany's external intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND) are maintaining clandestine contact with Qaddafi's forces in and around the city of Sirte. These NTC officials believe strongly that the Germans continue to hedge their bet on Libya, in the event that Qaddafi can continue to fight until the political, tribal, and regional divisions on the NTC weaken their efforts to form a government.

(Source Comment: In the opinion of a source with excellent access to the NTC leadership, Jabril and his advisors are working to bring in private firms to meet their pressing humanitarian needs. The Prime Minister believes that if they wait for foreign governments to provide this assistance the death toll among the wounded and injured will continue to rise, and the NTC will be held responsible for failing to bring in emergency and battlefield medical support. To this end they have signed an agreement with the Osprey Security Group (OSG), a U.S. firm specializing in emergency medical care and humanitarian assistance. OSG is prepared to deliver the aid immediately upon receiving the funds from the NTC. Jabril's advisors believe that the use of this American firm will not only allow the NTC to meet a pressing need, but will also serve to cement

good relations with the U.S. government and business community. One NTC official noted that OSG's ability to provide this medical and humanitarian support sets it apart from firms like the French security group SECOPLEX, which look to provide foreign fighters to support the rebel's NLA. Jabril continues to emphasize that unlike the Qaddafi army the NLA does not and will not use foreign mercenaries for military operations.)

H: Latest intel, NTC/army/relations allies/China. Sid
Sep 1 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

September 1, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: NTC, its army, allies, & China

As of the morning of September 1, 2011, a source with excellent access to the highest levels of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) stated in confidence that one of the greatest challenges facing the new government of Libya is the increasing self reliance of the regional and tribal militias that make up the bulk of the NLA. The NLA commanders, including Generals Khalifa Haftar and Mohammed Suleiman, believe that the upcoming siege of Muammar al Qaddafi's traditional stronghold at the city of Sirte affords them the opportunity to increase the level of coordination among these individual units. The NLA commanders are aware of the fact that while the centralized NLA forces continue to struggle with battlefield coordination, medical care, and matters of logistics, the smaller militia units have become better organized as individual commands. As the NLA attempts to wind up resistance in Tripoli and moves toward Sirte they are concerned that these units are beginning to compete with each other to be in position to take the greatest share of credit for final victory.

The NLA commanders are attempting to deal with a disparity in the level of logistical support from unit to unit. Those militia units that are based in Benghazi and other relatively prosperous areas have been able to improve their support to the units drawn from their regions. At the same time, units arising from the poorer, rural parts of the country have suffered from shortages of food and ammunition. Extremely sensitive sources note that medical care is limited and unreliable throughout the NLA.

(Source Comment: The NLA commanders are also concerned that their allies in NATO continue to worry about the presence of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in various

NLA units. They are monitoring the activities of these individuals to guard against attempts by radical Islamist groups within the Brotherhood to press for an Islamic state in Libya. NLA security officers believe that these Libyan Brothers receive support from the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, and that this support will only increase as the Brotherhood plays an increasingly important role in the new Egyptian political structure that is developing after the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak.)

These knowledgeable sources add that the leaders of the regional militias in the NLA are already maneuvering for positions of authority in the new NTC government, based on their service in the rebellion. At the same time, Prime Minister Mahmud Jabil, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil, vice President Abdul Hafiz Ghoza, and the other more traditional leaders of the NTC are working to obtain support from NATO and its constituent members. At the same time, they remain highly suspicious of the relationships that the governments of Italy and Germany maintained with the Qaddafi regime, particularly Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi.

(Source Comment: Jabil and the other NTC leaders are highly suspicious of the efforts of China and Russia to establish increased economic contact with the new Libyan government, believing that these relationships will not work to their advantage. This is particularly true in the case of China. The NTC's contacts in Africa have warned them that while the Chinese appear to be interesting partners, they are very aggressive in exploiting natural resources, and that the relationships end up being very one sided in favor of China.)

H: Per our conversation. Jamie writes editorial... Sid
Sep 8 2011

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-09-08/hillary-clinton-deserves-credit-for-the-positive-u-s-role-in-libya-view.html>

Bloomberg

Hillary Clinton Deserves Credit for U.S. Role in Libya: View

By the Editors - Sep 7, 2011

The unsung hero of the Libya drama in the U.S. is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton's actions were critical for several reasons. Most important, she overcame Defense Secretary Robert Gates's caution about using military force in Libya and his reluctance to support an operation led by France and Britain. Clinton also personally managed the unorthodox partnership with French President Nicolas Sarkozy that proved so crucial to joint action to defeat the Qaddafi regime.

Despite the unusual arrangement in which the U.S. was a supporter rather than a leader of NATO's military operation, she defended intervention before a skeptical Congress and performed the hard slog of daily diplomacy around the world, helping Arab countries, the Europeans and the U.S. work together with a minimum of friction and a maximum of determination.

Aside from the killing of Osama bin Laden, the decision to support NATO military action in Libya is probably the Obama administration's most important achievement in international affairs. Although Muammar Qaddafi is still at large and the country is a long way from having a stable, representative government, there is little doubt that the Qaddafi regime has been defeated as a result of an internal revolt led by the Transitional National Council. History will surely judge that, by intervening on the side of the rebellion, the West -- primarily the governments of France, the U.K. and the U.S. -- made a unique and invaluable contribution to the democratic aspirations of the people of the Middle East.

That said, the Obama administration's decision-making process remains opaque. The veteran journalist Bob Woodward's next book, due out in the fall of 2012, may shed some light on the question of whose voices were decisive this past March, when President Barack Obama decided to support a United Nations resolution and a NATO military operation for Libya.

Based on our discussions with administration officials, as well as the public record, some preliminary conclusions about the decision are possible. First, while we argued for a more active U.S. military role in NATO's operation, it is now clear that Obama's unprecedented approach -- in which Washington supported, rather than led, a NATO operation -- was successful in the end.

Second, by breaking with Gates, Clinton tipped the balance within the administration in favor of action. Without her strong argument to support the Europeans' call for American help, Washington probably would not have acted. The president's national security adviser, Tom Donilon, was declaring freedom in Libya to be outside the U.S. national interest, and both military and civilian officials in the Pentagon were reluctant

to endorse or even opposed U.S. intervention. But Clinton's push for the U.S. to act in support of Britain and France appears to have been decisive.

In retrospect, the fears of Gates and other military officials that action in Libya would be a slippery slope, perhaps leading to U.S. involvement on the ground in a third war in the Middle East, seem wildly overblown. Obama said the U.S. would play a limited role by offering unique military assets, such as aerial refueling and air-defense suppression capabilities. Congress not only opposed sending in ground troops but mostly opposed any U.S. involvement. Obama wisely resisted.

For better or worse, the Libya model is not likely to be repeated anytime soon. This is not, as some say, because NATO will never again intervene in a situation like Libya's. After the Kosovo war, many also said NATO would never again act against a dictator to save lives. The Libya model is no guide for the future because such a unique set of circumstances in favor of military action is not likely to happen again.

Think about the conditions: A despised dictator threatened mass murder; an open desert provided a decisive advantage for air power; a rebel army on the ground sought democratic change and espoused Western values; the UN at least loosely endorsed NATO air operations; the Arab League called for the West to intervene militarily in an Arab country; and U.S. allies prepared to do all the heavy lifting. Given those circumstances, it is still hard to explain why there were determined opponents, primarily in the Republican Party, to this mission in the first place.

Throughout most of Obama's term in office, only a few administration officials have commanded respect and political power on national security matters: Clinton, Gates and General David Petraeus, the most decorated and admired officer of recent times. With Gates now gone and Petraeus in a non-policy role as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Clinton's power will only increase as the president's re-election campaign heats up. We hope she recognizes her opportunity and uses it well.

To contact the Bloomberg View editorial board: view@bloomberg.net.

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-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Sat, Sep 10, 2011 4:39 pm

Subject: Re: H: Per our conversation. Jamie writes editorial... Sid

It was very welcome and gave me reason to sit down and talk w Jamie who is such a good friend. Hope to talk soon—H

H: Intel: allies in Libya/oil. Sid
Sep 15 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

September 16, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: France, UK, et al, jockeying in Libya/oil

During mid-September 2011 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron traveled to Tripoli to meet with and express support for the leaders of the new government of Libya under the National Transitional Council (NTC). According to knowledgeable individuals, as part of this effort, the two leaders, in private conversations, also intend to press the leaders of the NTC to reward their early support for the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi. Sarkozy and Cameron expect this recognition to be tangible, in the form of favorable contracts for French and British energy companies looking to play a major role in the Libyan oil industry. According to this source, Sarkozy feels, quite strongly, that without French support there would have been no revolution and that the NTC government must demonstrate that it realizes this fact. For his part, Cameron appears most concerned that despite British support for the rebels during the fighting, certain members of the NTC remain focused on the fact that the British government and oil industry had good relations with the Qaddafi regime, particularly the firm British Petroleum (BP).

At the same time, this source indicates that the government of France is carrying out a concerted program of private and public diplomacy to press the new/transitional government of Libya to reserve as much as 35% of Libya's oil related industry for French firms, particularly the major French energy company TOTAL. Sources with access to the highest levels of Libya's ruling NTC, as well as senior advisors to Sarkozy, stated in strict confidence that while much of this pressure is being exerted at very senior diplomatic and political levels, the French external intelligence service (Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieur/General Directorate for External Security --DGSE) is using sources with influence over the NTC to press the French position. At present, as NTC leaders are consolidating their positions in Tripoli, they are attempting to balance the interests of the new government and the Libyan people against the need to recognize

the support provided to them by France and other major powers in their struggle with Muammar al Qaddafi.

These same sources indicate that NTC President Mustafa Abdul Jalil and the NTC leadership continue to be highly suspicious of the activities and goals of the governments of China and Russia in Libya. According to these sources, representatives of the Emir of Qatar have privately warned that while both countries pursue foreign economic policies that work to the disadvantage of the host government, it is somewhat easier to deal with firms associated with Russia. With this in mind the NTC has entered into an agreement with the Amsterdam base energy firm of GUNVOR International BV, which has close ties to the Russian government and the Russian oil industry. The NTC has also entered into an initial agreement, allowing TOTAL, to purchase and ship Libyan oil. This individual believes that this agreement does not set aside any specific portion of the Libyan oil industry for TOTAL, as Sarkozy would like.

(Source Comment: NTC President Jalil continues to favor awarding foreign business agreements on a case by case basis, and has stated privately that he is reluctant to support entering into a comprehensive agreement of any kind with France, or any other country or entity. He is, however, prepared to favor firms from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in specific cases, based on the support they provided for the NTC during the rebellion. He and his advisors are somewhat hostile toward the position of the Italian government and the Italian energy firm ENI, based on their past support for Qaddafi and their caution in coming to terms with the NTC before the fall of the previous government. Jalil harbors similar sentiments toward the UK government and British Petroleum (BP) but does recognize that they moved away from Qaddafi to support the NTC after France began active involvement in the Libyan uprising. Interestingly, although Jalil and Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril have begun a low key power struggle within the NTC, they agree on these points regarding foreign business contracts. A separate source added that the French government in general and the DGSE in particular privately harbor a degree of mistrust toward Jalil based on intelligence indicating that he was responsible for the assassination of NTC military commander General Abdul Fatah Younes in July 2011. Younes was extremely well connected to the DGSE and the French military.)

In the opinion of these sources the NTC leadership is more comfortable dealing with large private firms that are, in turn, well connected to friendly governments. To this end, and in addition to the GUNVOR and TOTAL contracts, the NTC has signed agreements with the Swiss energy firm GLENCORE, as well as VITOL of Qatar to service and ship oil as the fighting dies down across the country. These sources add that both firms provided active support to the NTC during the rebellion and are held in high regard by Jalil, Jibril and the rest of the leadership.

During early September 2011 sources with excellent access to the highest levels of major Western European governments stated in confidence that, despite the stepped up fighting in recent weeks, there has been an unusually low level of damage to the infrastructure of the Libyan oil industry. This is true even in the western portion of the

country and around town of Sirte, which remained under the control of forces loyal to Qaddafi. The NTC is already shipping approximately 300mm barrels of oil per day, primarily via GLENCORE and VITOL. The level of production is expected to increase when the fighting begins to die down in those areas still loyal to Qaddafi.

(Source Comment: According to an individual with excellent access to the governments of Western Europe, the NTC must continue to make the final defeat and capture of Qaddafi their principal preoccupation, and avoid falling into political infighting and attempts by individuals to profit from the revolution. Failure to do so will lead to an extended period of violence and political chaos. Among the most important points the NTC leadership must address are its ability to field an organized and disciplined military force, while providing battlefield medical support for its troops, and humanitarian aid to the civilian population. In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, until these goals are met the NTC will struggle to maintain credibility as an established government in Libya and among its foreign supporters.)

H, Q's location. Sid
Oct 15 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

October 15, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Qaddafi's location

Seymour Hersh, the investigative journalist for The New Yorker, was approached within the last 48 hours by a source who was a former financial beneficiary of the Qaddafi regime asking him whether he wished to conduct an exclusive interview with fugitive former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, according to a close friend of Hersh. Hersh was told that Qaddafi is in Chad. He was also told that Qaddafi intends to wage endless war from his new location. Qaddafi helped install the Chad president, Idriss Deby, supporting him when he overthrew Hussein Habre in the fall of 1990.

H: Latest intel libyan govt and internal conflicts. Sid
Oct 22 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

October 22, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Intel on new Libyan government; conflicts with Belhaj

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On October 21, 2011 Ali Tarhouni, Libya's interim Minister of Finance and Oil stated in confidence that when President Mustafa Abdel Jalil and the National Transitional Council (NTC) begin to form a new government on October 22 and 23 he will press to separate the Finance and Oil ministries. According to this individual, Tarhouni believes that the combined ministry prevents him from giving full attention to either portfolio. He also believes that having the two issues under one ministry creates internal complications that hamper the function of each. Tarhouni stated in confidence that while the Finance Ministry must be dedicated to the careful management of the country's budget, the Oil Ministry should be aggressive and innovative in dealing with their foreign partners and customers. The two ministries must deal with each other as equals, and if they are under one minister, one or the other will suffer.

2. According to this individual, Tarhouni, who is an economist and academic by profession, has been told by Jalil that he will remain as Minister of Finance, while Abdulrahman Ben Yezza remains the leading candidate to become Oil Minister. Speaking in strict confidence, this source stated that BenYezza is a long time associate of Jalil, who asked current Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril to bring him into the government in early September 2011. Jibril did not debate this idea, but delayed making a decision, telling his closest associates that BenYezza, who is a senior executive with the large Italian Oil firm ENI SpA, represents the past in Libya's dealings with foreign oil companies, and that he preferred someone with an academic background in finance and economics fill the position, rather than an "oil man". For this

reason he insisted that Tarhouni maintain his double portfolio until the security and political situation in the country stabilized.

3. At the same time, according to Tarhouni, Jalil discussed the matter at some length with Abdullah al-Badr, the Secretary General of OPEC, who has advised that while a separate Oil Ministry is the best course, it is important for that Ministry to be focus on supporting Nuri Berruien, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Oil Company (NOC). Al-Badr believes that the NOC should have full authority to manage the oil industry, and deal with foreign energy firms. Later, in a private conversation, al-Badr told Tarhouni that Jalil shares his views on this matter. At the same time they are both concerned that rivals on the NTC, led primarily by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj in Tripoli, and Hassan Ali al-Darwa, the NTC leader for the City of Sirte, will press for greater government control of both the oil and banking sectors under a new Libyan Government.

4. Jalil is also concerned that as the country moves toward national elections in May or June of 2012, Belhaj and other groups on the NTC will campaign against the interim Government, saying that, like former leader Muammar Qaddafi, they are allowing foreign interests to dominate the country's natural resources. Jalil stated that if they do choose BenYezza or another technocrat with experience in a foreign firm as Oil Minister, that person will become the focus of this campaign. In addition, according to this source, Jalil fears that Berruien will also be a target of these attacks. In this regard Jalil indicated that he needed Tarhouni to remain in government, complaining that Jibril, while a good and honest man, had been too weak to deal with these complications.

5. (Source Comment: According to this very sensitive source, Jalil is concerned that Belhaj and his heavily armed troops in Tripoli and the Western part of the country, as well as the members of other regional and ethnic militias, will attempt to use the threat of force to impose their views on the NTC in the run up to the national elections. Jalil repeated that he is also concerned that these forces inside of the NTC want to establish a strong national authority in an effort to control the activities of foreign banks, corporations, and energy firms while managing and limiting the ability of these foreign institutions to influence the day to day life of the Libyan people. In Jalil's opinion this approach will only serve to delay the stabilization and reconstruction of the country. In a passing comment, Jalil added that he had not considered any role for former Chairman of the NOC Board of Directors, Shukri Mohammed Ghanem, particularly given the latter's close ties to the Qaddafi family. Jalil added that while he himself had been Minister of Justice under Qaddafi, he had maintained a professional distance from the internal machinations of the late dictator's family. Ghanem, on the other hand, was seen as confident of the family members, particularly Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. According to this individual, Ghanem's renunciation of Qaddafi and flight to Tunisia in June 2011 has not changed the opinion of Jalil and other NTC leaders in this regard on this matter.)

H: Intel, inside libyan cabinet. Sid
Nov 27 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 2011

For: HRC
From: Sid
Re: Inside Libyan cabinet

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the evening of November 21, and the morning of November 22, 2011, as he prepared to announce his new interim Cabinet under the National Transitional Council (NTC), Libya's interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib was involved in increasingly contentious discussions with President Mustafa Abdel Jalil, and former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni regarding the final assignment of Cabinet posts. According to a source with excellent access to the information, despite the fact that all three men are relatively restrained in nature, the conversation became unexpectedly heated, and in the end Tarhouni, having accepted that he would not have a role in the new government, left the meeting promising to speak his mind to the press.

2. According to this sensitive source, Jalil pressed el-Keib to appoint Tarhouni as Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, and even insisted that Tarhouni accompany them to Zintan, and take part in the press conference after the capture of Saif al Islam Qaddafi. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil believes that Tarhouni played an important part in the revolution; organizing the NTC into an effective body, while dealing with Western Governments regarding the disposition of Libyan Government funds held in foreign banks. Despite this, el-Keib insisted on including long time oil industry executives Abdulrahman Ben Yezza as the Minister of Oil, and Hassan Ziglam as Minister of Finance. El-Kieb not only has longstanding relationships with both men, but argued that their experience and professional connections would serve to reassure international oil firms regarding the stability of the new government. This makes them ideal members of the interim Cabinet, which includes a significant number of technocrats.

3. As the debate went on, Jalil pressed el-Keib to name Tarhouni as the Deputy Prime Minister, but el-Keib resisted, stating that he felt this would undermine his authority. In the end the discussion stopped only shortly before el-Keib's press conference announcing the Cabinet. This source noted that, while Jalil was disappointed over the exclusion of Tarhouni, he was generally pleased with the makeup of the Cabinet. He and el-Keib believe that they can manage the expectations and complaints of the Amazigh Berbers and other groups who feel that the new Cabinet does not represent their interests. The President and Prime Minister are particularly satisfied with the decision of Islamist military leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to remain with his troops, and accept the appointment of General Osama al-Juwali as Minister of Defense.

4. (Source Comment: Tarhouni was surprised and angered by his exclusion from the Cabinet, having been told by Jalil on the evening of November 21 that he would be Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. In a private conversation Tarhouni pointed out that the idea separating the Oil and Finance Ministries had been his, and now he was excluded from the process. Tarhouni has not decided if he will remain as chairman of the NTC finance committee, or concentrate on private business, where his contacts, Western academic background, and government experience should make him invaluable to foreign firms looking to do business in Libya. In his frustration Tarhouni told another member of the NTC that he does not expect el-Keib's Cabinet of experts to weather the political pressure, as well as ethnic and religious rivalries that will appear as the national elections approach during 2012. He warned that Belhaj cannot be trusted and is only standing by waiting for an opportunity to increase his power.)

5. During the discussions regarding Tarhouni, el-Keib and Jalil were also forced to deal with serious complaints from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague regarding how best to deal with Saif al Islam Qaddafi, the former heir apparent to deposed ruler Muammar al Qaddafi. ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo traveled to Tripoli to express his disappointment that the new government does not intend to honor the promise made by el-Keib's predecessor, former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, to turnover Saif al Islam to the ICC for trial on charges relating to human rights abuses during the revolution in the last year of Muammar al Qaddafi's rule in Libya. Jalil pointed out that Jibril had no authority to make such a promise, but agreed to consider allowing the ICC to play an advisory role in the trial of Qaddafi. Speaking in private after discussions with Moreno-Ocampo, Jalil stated that Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders would not accept extradition of Saif al Islam to The Hague, where, if convicted, he would spend time in a European prison. El-Keib agreed that it was important for the future stability of the country, and the authority of the interim government, that Saif al Islam receive a fair trial in Libya, after which, given the body of evidence against him, in all likelihood, he will be executed.

6. (Source Comment: According to a sensitive source, both el-Keib and Jalil realize that Moreno-Ocampo will continue to press for greater ICC participation in the trial of Saif al Islam, and that he will attempt to use Western governments to support this effort. They also realize that many Libyans view this as a matter of national sovereignty and are watching to see how the interim government deals with the situation.)

H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid

Jan 5 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

January 5, 2012

For: HRC

From: Sid

Re: Libyan leadership and militias

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jalil engaged in a series of emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups of angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new government.

2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el-Keib has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is

particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)

3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuri Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jalil are also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts.)

5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011 el-Kieb resisted efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 2011 el-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.

6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living standards are met.

7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic.)

Re: H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid

Jan 5 2012

H to youshow details

Thanks, as always, and Happy New Year!

23-Jan-12
CONFIDENTIAL

January 23, 2012

For: HRC
From: Sid
Re: Libya internal strife

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the leadership of the National Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib, stating in a heated exchange that el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of the demobilized fighters from the 2011 revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing this situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point, with a group of more than 2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying computer equipment and NTC files. These demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC headquarters building, continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army, and a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the appointment of cabinet members and senior officials.

2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were camped outside of his office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that this is how the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from Zintan, Misrata, and other western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is to eventually move in and establish a strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib stated that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali to be more efficient in administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander during the revolution, may be maintaining a secret relationship with Belhaj

and his allies. In response, Jalil warned el-Keib to avoid trying to use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar in an effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is, in fact, increasingly frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of his ministers and administrators to arrange contracts with foreign firms. He complains that his principal advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, have been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both old and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an agreement the entire matter is put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the demands of the veterans and the students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in removing the former oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that Jalil is shaken by the January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the demonstrators. Most recently he asked Abdel – Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the Benghazi area, was particularly unpopular with the western troops.)

4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Keib ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the Stock Exchange, to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the services demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this situation they will not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with Belhaj as the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be aware of this threat and that this will frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign contracts set out by the NTC.

5. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke secretly with Haftar, stating that he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to protect the government in the event of increased violence. This effort could include moving against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and organize. El-Keib emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib gives the order. He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is now concerned that Jalil will be unable to deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj and his supporters. In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in senior positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs of the veterans and students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but they must move quickly.)

H: Latest intel Libya turmoil. Progress? Sid
Feb 1 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 2012

For: HRC
From: Sid
Re: Libya turmoil

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western intelligence and security services.

1. On January 30, 2012, following a discussion with the other members of the National Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil stated privately that within the next two months he and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib must support each other as they deal with private firms that can provide the medical assistance and basic needs of daily life for the Libyan people, or risk the country falling into civil war. According to a source with access to the highest levels of the NTC, Jalil is somewhat recovered from the shock of the January 21 attack on his office and the NTC headquarters in Benghazi by demobilized militia fighters from the revolution, and is searching in earnest for a way to finalize contracts with private firms and aid providers.

2. According to this well informed individual, Jalil did not explain his mention of a two month time line, but, in the opinion of this individual, the President fears that crucial medical supplies and other badly needed daily necessities of life may be used up completely in this time frame. This sensitive source noted in confidence that, in late January discussions with el-Keib, Jalil advised that they must also ignore their frustration over, what they see, as the failure of Western European states to provide these supplies in the form of aid, and focus on the crisis at hand.

3. According to this individual, Jalil believes that the NTC's problems in supplying these items lie in the general chaos involved in setting up a new government, complicated by a steady stream of charges from Islamist leaders, that any government official dealing with foreign companies is following the same corrupt path as their predecessors in the government of deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. Jalil believes that el-Keib and the cabinet must take these hard steps, supported by the NTC leadership. At present he is concerned that they have no concrete plan to reach this

point. This individual noted that, Jalil, in an effort to strengthen the resolve of the NTC, decided to make a firm statement in response to the attempted resignation of Abdel – Hafidh Ghoza, the deputy chief of the Council. Ghoza announced his resignation in the wake of the January 21 incident, noting that he was one of the principal targets of the militiamen's anger. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil, after consultation with el-Keib, informed Ghoza that he is not accepting his resignation. Ghoza, has been keeping a very low profile in Benghazi, and has apparently not yet agreed to stay on at the NTC.

4. (Source Comment: Concern over a potential civil war continues to grow in the el-Keib cabinet. An extremely sensitive source added that, in the same time period, Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali informed the Prime Minister that, for all intents and purposes, the country is dividing along ancient traditional lines. Ali stated that former militia forces, many of whom are loyal to Islamist general Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj, control much of Tripoli and the Western portion of the country, and are in regular conflict with militia and regular army troops in the Eastern region and Benghazi, which remain under the rather unsteady control of the NTC. According to Ali, much of the arid Southern portion of the country is under the control of tribal groups nominally loyal to Saif al Islam Qaddafi, the imprisoned son of the former dictator. For his part el-Keib is increasingly frustrated with Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali, who was a commander of forces in the Western stronghold of Zintan. According to this individual, el-Keib believes that Juwali has been unsuccessful in dealing with this situation. Ali added that there is an ongoing series of clashes between heavily armed militiamen from Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as forces of the NTC National Army under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar.)

5. In the opinion of this individual, during late January 2012 Jalil informed el-Keib of his frustration over the fact that the majority of foreign interest in Libya since the revolution has revolved around the disposition of the oil industry. In this regard he cited the planned visit of a French warship to assist in removing mines placed in Libya's harbors by the Qaddafi regime during the 2011 revolution. El-Keib noted that that, while this effort is needed, it is intended primarily as a move to facilitate the shipment of oil from the Libyan ports. While the President recognizes that the oil industry is the key to Libya's future, he also needs to be able to deal with foreign firms regarding the supply of day to day necessities. Jalil and el-Keib agree that the best path for foreign firms to use in gaining a foothold in Libya is through the Stock Exchange, headed by Ngeb Obeda, under Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam. The President and Prime Minister feel that by working through the Stock Exchange the Government can maintain transparency in foreign contracts and avoid charges of Qaddafi-like corruption.

6. (Source Comment: According to a very sensitive source, el-Keib complained to Jalil that Belhaj continues to complicate every aspect of the process of dealing foreign firms and governments. He noted that Belhaj is now attempting to file a law suit against a former senior British intelligence officer who is an advisor to British Petroleum (BP) citing claims that this former officer facilitated his past detention by United States anti-terrorism forces. El-Keib noted that this is the type of activity that raises concerns among foreign firms looking to operate in Libya.)

H: Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias. Sid .
Feb 21 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya politics to control militias

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali and Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal with armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the 2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to an extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of government, told the two ministers that, if they could not stop the fighting and disarm the militias he would be forced to find ministers who can carry out his orders. Ali and Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of succeeding in this matter until el-Keib and Jalil gain credibility as the rulers of the country. Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new government is chosen during the national elections planned for later in 2012.

2. In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned by the situation in the Southern portion of the country, where the area defined by the towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and regional militias has been exacerbated by the activities of Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies, Taureg tribal fighters. This individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to Libya's future stability. They agreed that, at present, if faced with a concerted effort by either disaffected militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces government security forces and the new national army would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western businessmen and oil industry workers in the region.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western firms and seriously damage

Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution. This individual added that al Juwali is particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground force commander General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. A very sensitive source added that the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)

4. In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and al Juwali believe that the Sudanese military is providing arms and supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct orders from Sudanese President Omar al Bashir. El-Keib complained to al-Juwali that Haftar's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on their way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary militias, or stop the fighting between competing tribal groups. In the opinion of this individual, Haftar felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that posed by the regional and tribal fighting.

5. At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in secret that fighting continues between regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean portions of the country. This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and Zintan militias for control of the area west of Tripoli is particularly violent and disruptive for the rest of the country. In the capital itself, fighting continues between regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street gangs, all of whom are very well armed. This individual reports that during mid-February 2012 el-Keib and Jalil agreed to address the problem of disaffected former militiamen and their families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately \$1,500) per month to the families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.

6. In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam to develop an efficient system to provide assistance funds to unemployed former fighters. For his part, Ziglam privately expressed concern that previous efforts in this regard have met with a high level of fraud. According to the government's best estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops, but it is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were maintained. That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take some form of direct action, even if money is paid to fraudulent claimants. The fact is, according to Ziglam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must give something to the veterans of the revolution to slow this process.

7. (Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable individual stated that al-Juwali is concerned by the possibility that the country may deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias, Islamist forces and the national army. At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost control of large portions of the southern part of the country, with tribal fighting spilling over into Mali and Chad. According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the slow pace of military and police training promised to the various Libyan national security forces by the governments of France and Turkey. He added that, while Turkey has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict between the former rebel troops and the NTC government.)

H: Latest Libya intel. Sid
Mar 5 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

March 5, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libyan government attempts to control conflict, links to Egypt

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the first week of March 2012, Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib stated in a private conversation that he had been assured by Abubakir Saddiqe and the other leaders of the Tibu tribe that they are willing to accept the mediation of the representatives of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government and a group of tribal and religious elders gathered from around the country. According to sources with direct access to the el-Keib administration, the Prime Minister is convinced that these negotiations can bring an end to the tribal fighting in the southeastern part of the country. In the opinion of this individual, the central government's inability to bring an end to the conflict between the Tibu and their ancient enemy, the Zwai, has weakened the el-Keib regime in the eyes of the remaining 160 Libyan tribes, all of whom have long standing grievances and claims that were repressed by the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. Accordingly, el-Keib views the resolution of the conflict as one of the most important tasks facing his administration. He also fears that the government's loss of authority in the region is encouraging the supporters of the Qaddafi family to continue their efforts to destabilize the southern portion of Libya, with the assistance of Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir.

2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source, the fighting between the Tibu and Zwai in and around the southeastern Libyan city of al Kufra resulted in the death of over two hundred people. This source believes that in order to gain the support of the tribal elders in resolving the al Kufra crisis, el-Keib made promises to many of them that he may have difficulty keeping; particularly regarding advantages and power to be given to their ethnic constituencies. This source warns that the effort to resolve the situation in al Kufra may lead to new crises in other

parts of the country. They believe that these tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries represent the most important, and immediate challenge facing Libya's new leadership as it struggles to build national stability after the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011.)

3. In the opinion of a very knowledgeable source, the Libyan military moved into the al Kufra region in force during the last week of February 2012, in an effort to end fighting between the Zwai and Tibu. This source believes that this is a rare example of the government in Tripoli imposing its authority over a region in conflict. The decision to make this move involved a debate between the National Army's ground force commander General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Yousef Mangoush. Haftar believes that the army should focus on the Qaddafi loyalist operating along the Sudan border, returning to the al Kufra situation when the supply of weapons from Sudan has been reduced or stopped. For his part, Mangoush is following el-Keib's orders to make a statement of government authority in al Kufra. In the end Haftar took his orders and detached troops and armored vehicles to al Kufra.

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very knowledgeable source, Haftar's acceptance of Mangoush's orders is one of the most important features of this situation. El-Keib, Mangoush, and Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali were concerned that the independent minded Haftar was establishing himself and the army ground forces under his command, as an independent force, free of direct control by the central government. El-Keib was particularly relieved by this turn of events.)

5. According to a very sensitive source, el-Keib has received word that the elders from southern and eastern Libya came to al Kufra in the last week of February, and began a series of meetings with the leaders of both the Tibu and Zwai. In a first step, and with the assistance of the National Army, the elders were able to arrange a temporary ceasefire, and hope to have a formal peace agreement by mid-March 2012.

6. This source notes that al Kufra is in the region dominated by the al Senussi clan, the old royal family of Libya. This individual believes that the al Senussi leaders, who had held the NTC at arm's length during the 2011 revolution, assisted the National Army commanders, and the visiting elders with the ceasefire, in return for increased influence with the el-Keib regime. This individual also believes that the al Senussi are being supported in secret by the Egyptian military, acting under orders from Field Marshall Mohammed Tantawi and the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed forces (SCAF). In the opinion of this source, Tantawi may have used his influence with the al Senussi at the request el-Keib.

7. According to very sensitive sources in both Libya and Egypt, the leaders of the SCAF and the Libyan NTC have been in secret negotiation for some time, with the knowledge of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. All of these parties believe that the post revolutionary governments in Libya and Egypt must work together in areas of common interest. These areas include security, relations with Israel; counter terrorism activities, health care, and the best strategies for dealing with the foreign firms who will move in to both countries as the regional security situation comes under control.

8. At the same time, this sensitive source added that Haftar is reporting to el-Keib that al Kufra remained tense as of the weekend of March 2, and at least half of the

town's population has sought refuge elsewhere. In addition, 200 foreign migrants are waiting to be moved out of the area. This group includes Sudanese, Chadian, and Egyptian citizens. The United Nations personnel in the area are attempting to provide medicine, mattresses, blankets and hygiene kits to vulnerable neighborhoods where basic services have been interrupted by fighting. This source adds that members of the Tibu are attempting to return to their area of origin in Chad. At the same time, Haftar reports that the leaders of the Zwai stated that former Qaddafi mercenaries from Chad are supporting the Tibu in this fighting.

H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
Mar 8 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

March 8, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: France & UK behind Libya breakup

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the period between mid-January 2012 to March 2012 officers of the a French General Directorate for External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure -- DGSE), and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS--MI-6) activated long standing contacts with tribal and civic leaders in Eastern Libya, in an effort to encourage them to establish a semi-autonomous zone in the historic province of Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic). According to extremely knowledgeable sources, this effort was initiated by advisors to French President Nicholas Sarkozy after complaints from concerned French business leaders that the new Libyan Government was not rewarding appropriately French firms for the leading role France played in supporting the 2011 revolution against former Dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. SIS joined in this effort at the instruction of the office of Prime Minister David Cameron. This highly confidential effort comes in response to the inability of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government in Tripoli to organize the country effectively and deal with Western business interests in an effective and efficient manner.

2. The French and British business and intelligence officials believe that a semi-autonomous regime in the Eastern city of Benghazi will be able to organize business opportunities in that region. This in turn will allow these Western firms to initiate new business projects. These same officials believe that there is also reduced threat from Islamist militias in the East. According to a knowledgeable source, French officials believe that this situation is the natural result of el-Keib's failure to organize the country and disarm the ethnic and regional militias who did the majority of the fighting against Qaddafi's forces during the revolution.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, the French Government and business leaders actually expected to receive thirty five (35) per cent of new economic development in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi. Like many Western businessmen, these French officials made informal agreements with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril and his advisors, only to see these agreements ignored or delayed when Abdurrahim el-Keib became head of government in October 2011. In their opinion, once el-Keib moved the government from the Eastern city of Benghazi to the national capital at Tripoli, the government became inefficient and inaccessible. These individuals also believe that the appointment of Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, who was a long time official of the Italian Oil Company (ENI), was a factor. According to these sources, the bulk of ENI's oil fields are in the Western part of Libya, and Ben Yezza focused his attentions on that region, while failing to effectively organize new business East of Benghazi. These same officials state that the influences of the Western militias, particularly those from the Zintan region, have weakened the influence of the Eastern Elders.)

4. An extremely sensitive source stated that the DGSE and SIS intend to control the move toward a semi-autonomous state under a federal system. However, they have been surprised by el-Keib's intention, expressed both in public and in secret meetings with Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwali, a native of Zintan, to use force to hold the country together. El-Keib is also committed to Ben Yezza, although he is frustrated by the chaotic situation in Tripoli. This atmosphere affects new business for the most part and has been extremely irritating for businessmen from France and other Western countries.

5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a well placed source with access to the former royal family (al Senussi), while these Western officials are focused on working around the chaotic business situation, they are risking a civil war, failing to recognize the longstanding and complicated relationship between the Eastern and Western parts of the country. Qaddafi, as an absolute dictator, suppressed these differences, which have reemerged with his defeat and death. In addition, el-Keib is talking to old acquaintances in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in an effort to apply their influence to the Eastern tribal Elders, and help hold the country together.)

Re: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid

H to youshow details

Mar 9 2012

This strains credulity based on what I know. Any other info about it?

Re: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid

Fr sbwhoeop sbwhoeop@aol.comhide details

o

m

T H HDR22@clintonemail.com

o

Mar 9, 2012

Will seek more intel

H: Libya latest. Sid
Apr 2 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

April 2, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya latest

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) regime in Libya discussed the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) in preparation for the national parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012. According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated in very direct terms that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by the Federalist movement for the semi-autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic). Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwali and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB, which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement in Eastern Libya. According to al Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who fear that the Federalist movement in Barqa will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves. For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza that if matters are not resolved by the July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or reactivate existing agreements.

2. According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj. In the opinion of

this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of their regime. Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party (JCP). As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support in the event military force is needed to hold the country together. Belhaj represented the most effective of the Western militias.

3. According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP. El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is under the influence of the United States and Western Europe. The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view. Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel.

4. (Source Comment: In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the concerns of the international business community. The President is concerned that the appointment of Ben Yezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections. After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm ENI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth. That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth.)

5. According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to Badie and his advisors for support. This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalil's position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the EMB during their student days in Egypt. The Supreme Guide will, according to Jalil, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC. Badie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force (SCAF), as well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high levels of violence.

6. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to develop a plan to deal with the LMB. According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing

in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own revolution in 2011. Jalil emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt. He warned that an LMB/JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could wash over into Egypt.)

7. According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections. The NTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, whose goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones.

8. According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the 2011 revolution. However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kitef was a leading figure in the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu Selim. Under Abu Kitef and leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood established itself as a unique group within the Jalil/el Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012.

9. In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the LMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a political party; the JCP. Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB leader Soliman Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the LMB.

10. (Source comment: According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to compete as a candidate for JCP leadership. That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries. Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc, including the LMB/JCP.

H: Libya intel: President v. Prime Minister. Sid
Apr 18 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

April 18, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya: President v. Prime Minister

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On April 17, 2012 Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated to a close advisor that he is considering when, or even if, to hold a vote of no confidence in the NTC regarding support for the government of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman al-Keib. According to a source with access to the NTC leadership, Jalil realizes that a majority of the Council members no longer support el-Keib and his cabinet of Western educated technical experts. Jalil continues to believe that, for the moment, the most important issue facing the NTC is the federalist movement toward a semi-autonomous state in the Eastern region of Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic). This situation continues to complicate the NTC efforts to stabilize the country. With this in mind, Jalil expressed concern that a dramatic vote of no confidence for el-Keib will weaken the entire NTC by association. Instead, according to this source, Jalil is considering delaying a decision, possibly putting it off until an elected legislature is in place in the late summer or early fall of 2012.

2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, the NTC has been able to reach a temporary understanding with the eastern federalists, allowing the separatists to administer their local regions, while deferring to the NTC for national and international issues. The complicating factor at this point lies in reaching a determination regarding who has authority over new contracts with oil companies and other international firms. As of the week of April 16, 2012, no decision has been reached on this point. The bulk of the NTC leadership is drawn from Barqa, and Jalil now believes they can control the situation if they can establish an organized central government. In particular, Jalil, according to a sensitive source, is increasingly

confident that the eastern roots of the NTC will allow him to balance the federalist movement against the need for a sense of national unity. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib's future depends on Jalil's opinion of his capacity to deal with this complex situation.)

3. Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwali is viewed by Jalil as the most important western Libyan in el-Keib's cabinet, and the President and the leaders of the NTC had hoped that he would be able to deal with the confused security situation in Tripoli. However, while he did receive assurances from General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj regarding possible assistance from his Islamist troops if fighting broke out between the National Army and the militia's loyal to the eastern federalists. Unfortunately, from Jalil's point of view, this effort seems to have emboldened Belhaj and heightened tension between the eastern and western portions of the country. According to this source, after reviewing the federalist problem, Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management for the NTC, believes that el-Keib, al Juwali, Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, and the bulk of the cabinet should be replaced by people drawn from within the NTC, individuals who are in touch with the concerns of the Libyan people of all tribes and political groups. In the opinion of this source Jalil is factoring this position into his decision on el-Keib.

4. Regarding the existing relationships with international oil firms, Shamata told Jalil that for the most part the existing fields are continuing to produce and the owners have worked out security arrangements with local political and tribal leaders. However, since el-Keib and Ben Yezza have been unable to bring order to the national administration, it is difficult for firms to initiate new projects, since it is not clear who has the authority or the desire to sign such agreements. Shamata stated forcefully that the Prime Minister, whoever he is, must establish an orderly administration before full advantage can be gained from the oil fields. In the meantime, Shamata warns that his office has found evidence of corruption between local officials and international firms. In this regard, he stated that local representatives of the Italian national oil firm (ENI) have made problematic arrangements with local officials in the western part of the country, where their oil fields are located. He added that most of these ENI employees are Libyans, but he believes ENI management in Italy is aware of this situation. Shamata pointed out, without additional comment, that Ben Yezza is a long time senior official of ENI.

5. In the opinion this source, Shamata and Jalil are not planning to publicize these charges regarding ENI, at least until they decide how best to move forward on el-Keib, whether to allow the Prime Minister more time to address his problems, proceed with the vote of no confidence or quietly ask him to step down on his own.

6. (Source Comment: According to this source, el-Keib is under fire primarily as a result of his failure to bring order to the National Army, disarm independent militias, and establish security throughout the country. The leading opposition to el-Keib is based in the Political Issues committee of the NTC, and as many as 42 of the 73 active NTC members will vote against el-Keib if Jalil brings this matter to a vote. The

source warns that these numbers are provided by members of this Political committee, who may have their own agenda. A two thirds majority is required for the no confidence vote, however; several senior members of the NTC are reluctant to take such a step until a constituent assembly has been elected. They do not want this to look like the decision of a small group of people.)

H: Death in Vienna. Sid
Apr 30 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

April 30, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Suspicious death of former Libyan PM

1. On the afternoon of April 29, 2012, a knowledgeable source with direct access to the information stated under condition of secrecy that the Austrian State Police are concerned over the death of former Libyan prime minister and oil minister Shokri Ghanem, an early, important defector from Muammar al Qaddafi's regime during the 2011 Libyan revolution. According to this source, the Austrians believe that it is most likely that Ghanem committed suicide as a result of a prolonged illness; however, they have received sensitive reporting from their sources in Vienna's Libyan community indicating that he may have been murdered by supporters of the Qaddafi family living in exile. One source in particular reported that the Qaddafis continue to exercise a great deal of influence in the tribal regions of Southwestern and harbor the belief that they can return to power in Libya. At present, according to these sources, the Qaddafi loyalists have been encouraged by the failure of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government to control the political/security situation in the country, and they believe this situation will become more complicated as the national elections approach in June 2012.

2. According to this European source, the Austrian Security Police suspect that Ghanem may have been killed by Qaddafi loyalists in an effort to further confuse the situation in Libya, while demonstrating that they can settle old scores with former defectors and dissidents. The Austrian officials are waiting for the results of the autopsy and associated forensic analyses before making a final determination on this information. In the meantime they intend to continue to state that they have no evidence of foul play

3. The authorities found Ghanem's body in the Danube River, fully-clothed, near a series of island recreation centers in Vienna on the morning of Sunday April 29. Ghanem lived in the neighborhood and was extremely familiar with Vienna, where he served as the Libyan representative to OPEC in the 1990s. According to this source, Ghanem regularly walked along this portion of the Danube.

4. According to sensitive sources, Ghanem is the target of particular animosity from the Qaddafi loyalists, who see him as one of the most important defectors from the former regime. He was also a confidant of Qaddafi's son and heir designate, Saif al-Islam, who is awaiting trial for war crimes and corruption in Libya. The Austrian authorities noted that Ghanem would have been one of the major witnesses against Saif al-Islam, particularly regarding corruption in the Libyan oil industry. They did not speculate as to whether this fact might have played a role in his death. Ghanem served in some of the most sensitive positions in the Qaddafi regime, including Prime Minister, Minister of Oil, Chairman of the National Oil Company, and ambassador to OPEC. Since his defection, Ghanem has been working as an energy consultant in Vienna.

5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, Ghanem had a problematic relationship with the current NTC government of Libya, this despite the fact that he was seen as one of the individuals who attempted to moderate Qaddafi's policies. The NTC continues to believe that, after a lifetime of serving Qaddafi, he cannot be trusted in the new government.)

H: Libya latest, esp if you like unsolved crimes. Sid
Jun 6 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

June 6, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya latest

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During mid-June 2012 senior Libyan intelligence and security officials received confidential information from INTERPOL and the Austrian State Police indicating that both organizations believe that the drowning death of former Libyan Prime Minister and Oil Minister Shokri Ghanem in Vienna during late April 2012 remains highly suspicious, and their discreet investigations will continue. According to a very sensitive source, until the investigation is complete, the Austrian authorities will continue to state publicly that they believe that it is most likely Ghanem committed suicide by throwing himself into the Danube River as a result of a prolonged, serious illness.

2. According to this source, INTERPOL provided the Austrians with sensitive evidence indicating that when Ghanem headed the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC), he authorized the delivery of crude oil shipments to overseas oil companies, prior to the completion of proper sales agreements. The firms included PetroChina and Sinopec's trading company, Unipet. In March 2012 the National Transitional Council (NTC) interim Government of Libya requested that Interpol detain Ghanem for questioning in this matter. At the same time sensitive sources in Libya and Austria indicate that the NTC planned to use Ghanem as a prosecution witness in the trial of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the former heir apparent to the late dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, who, among many other things, is accused of corruption in administering the oil industry during his father's rule. The trades in question took place between June 2008 and 2010,

and were first raised with the NTC by NOC's former head of marketing Najwa el-Beshti.

3. According to this individual, el-Beshti first raised the matter during the Qaddafi regime. After a cursory investigation, Qaddafi's investigators declared that there had been no sale of oil without prior contracts, as is now alleged. The investigators, whom the NTC officials believe were protecting Ghanem and Saif al-Islam, did admit that, despite repeated warnings from NOC's contracts section, the firm's trading arm was regularly selling oil at less than the market price. The Qaddafi investigators concluded that the traders' understanding of oil pricing was poor but not criminal. Again, NTC officials now say that this investigation was designed to divert attention from Saif al-Islam's activities. The Qaddafi-era investigation focused on the supply of two cargos of crude oil to ExxonMobil in 2008 made below the contracted quality, leading to a loss of almost \$4 million. At that time the U.S. firm demanded compensation from the NOC.

4. In the opinion of these sources, the NTC authorities believe that in fact there is a different, more problematic situation at play regarding oil trades that involved the sale of Libyan crude oil at less than the market price. They believe that part of the difference may have been paid by the oil companies into bank accounts other than those controlled by the NOC.

5. These same sources note that unlike the Government of Russia, China indicated earlier this year that it was not prepared to return to Libya to pursue some of its 50 planned projects worth \$19 billion. The Chinese authorities stated that they were concerned by the security situation and difficulty in obtaining valid visas for their workers. However, NTC sources in Tripoli indicate that before returning to Libya, Beijing is actually demanding compensation for losses suffered during the revolution. One of the most important Chinese projects was the \$12 billion 3,170 mile national rail network. According to sensitive sources, Chinese firms were contracted to build most of the project, with Russian firms supporting the effort. As the 2011 revolution against Qaddafi developed, the rail network was put on hold last March, through a combination of budgetary constraints and lingering NTC antipathy for the Russian and Chinese support of Qaddafi during the revolution. These individuals note that despite these complications, Unipet and PetroChina have continued to buy Libyan crude oil.

6. (Source Comment: These dealings with large foreign firms have also served to alarm Libyan businessmen, as they attempt to step up operations in the wake of the revolution. According to a very sensitive source, Tripoli's Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture is continuing to protest to the NTC Government regarding the new ministerial decree that enables foreign companies to more easily establish Libyan joint ventures, branches and representative offices in most sectors, including oil and gas. In the opinion of this individual, these businessmen are telling Jalil that their principle concern is Article 9 of the Ministry of Economy decree number 103, which permits outside companies to establish branches in a range of industries, including the oil sector. The Chamber's president Khalil Mahfouz told Jalil that member businesses

fear for the future of Libyan oil service companies, if foreign firms are permitted to compete on a level playing field. Mahfouz also stated that senior members of the chamber met with Industry Minister Dr. Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Fteissi and further meetings were expected prior to the national election in late June.)

7. In the opinion of these sources, the open nature of Decree 103 surprised both the local and foreign business communities, who were expecting a continuation, with a few amendments, of the conservative and protectionist legislation put in place under the old regime. These Libyan businessmen admit that there are still a dozen sectors where foreign partnerships are proscribed, including retail and wholesaling, import, catering, agencies and distributorships, auditing and legal practices, quarrying and contracting and construction for contracts worth less than LD 30 million. However, the Chamber of Commerce fears that the government may open up these areas as well. These individuals are concerned that they will lose out, now that foreign firms will no longer going to be obliged to have local agents. The leaders of the Chamber believe that overseas competition is likely to damage the business of less efficient Libya companies. In response, the NTC points out that firms that can form successful partnerships with outside concerns are likely to benefit in terms of management know-how and technology transfer.

8. (Source Comment: Jalil discussed this matter with is senior advisors, and according to a sensitive source, expressed concern that many of these local businesses will support conservative Islamist candidates in the coming elections, if they fear losing business to foreign firms.)

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Sat, Jul 7, 2012 8:14 am

Subject: Re: H: Three (3) intel reports. Sid

Greetings from Kabul! And thanks for keeping this stuff coming!

From: sbwhoeop@aol.com [<mailto:sbwhoeop@aol.com>]

Sent: Friday, July 06, 2012 11:30 PM

To: H

Subject: H: Three (3) intel reports. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

July 6, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libya election

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. As of the morning of July 6, an individual with access to the information stated in confidence that Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil remains committed to a transfer of power to a popularly elected government; however, he is prepared to extend the life of the NTC as a guarantor of stability for the Libyan people following the July 7, 2012 election for seats in a 200-member General National Congress (GNC). Jalil realizes that 2.7 million Libyans have registered to vote and are generally anxious to replace the increasingly unpopular NTC. That said, Jalil expects the voting to lead to a period of confusion and he will not abandon his authority until the results are fixed.

2. Jalil is also frustrated by the fact that during its eight-month tenure of the administration of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib - who was appointed by the NTC - was unable to provide solutions for Libya's long list of needs: a functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration,

the disarming of militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas, and delivering basic services such as healthcare.

3. At the same time, outside of the oil sector, much of Libya's economy is stagnant, and in the opinion of Western security officials, lacks the government's go-ahead to restart public sector infrastructure contracts. In addition, international advisers and foreign investors are reluctant to return to an environment where the government will not sign long term agreements and cannot guarantee security.

4. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil continues to believe that this chaotic situation should not be surprising. He regularly points out that eight months is not a sufficient amount of time to build functioning institutions from the remnants of the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. The old regime featured a dysfunctional bureaucracy, idiosyncratic rule, and anti-institutionalism. Additionally, Jalil now realizes that due to pronounced incompetence and a lack of will to take unpopular decisions the el-Keib government also failed to make progress in the few areas where it could have achieved meaningful change. The towns of Sirte and Tawargha are representative of the situation in the countryside where people lost their homes in the conflict and have been living in temporary camps with limited ability to register and vote in their home district. Jalil has been urged by contacts in the French and Italian Governments to guarantee the rights of people across the country. In particular, he has serious concerns as to whether or not supporters of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in his hometown of Sirte will be included in the future political processes of the new Libya; if they are not allowed to vote by local militiamen. At the same time, the fighting between Libyan Arabs and Tebu tribesmen in the Kufra area threatens to prevent any voting there. Jalil has been warned that the NTC regulations now state that members of the National Army are not allowed to vote or run for office, which is a disincentive for armed militia brigade members to become legitimate soldiers.)

5. This well informed individual believes that despite these flaws, the new government created by the July 7 election will eventually have the mandate to take the difficult decisions that can create a reconciliation process. Jalil will work to maintain order in this transition period, and finally reach his goal of creating a situation where the government can rebuild homes and restore sufficient law and order; allowing those in Sirte, Tawargha, Kufra, and throughout the rest of the country to live in their hometowns, establishing a situation where a true civil society can develop.

6. Jalil, in conversations with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and separately with liberal leader Ali Tarhouni, has acknowledged that the central government's top priority must be security and that the NTC has been unable to provide it. That said, Jalil and Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali have pledged to provide 30,000 to 40,000 security personnel for election day to prevent similar incidents to the July 1 attack on Benghazi's election headquarters. In that case eastern federalists entered the building, where ballot papers were burned and ballot boxes destroyed. Similarly, these federalist forces are suspected of the attack on July 5 that burned down Ajdabiya's main storage centre for election materials.

7. In the opinion of this individual, although those responsible for the Benghazi attack were pro-federalist, it has not been proven that they were members of the self-appointed Cyrenaican National Council (CNC), whose military arm set up a roadblock in Wadi al-Ahmar on Libya's major east-west highway to demand that Cyrenaica get as many seats in the GNC as Tripolitania. Thus far, neither the CNC nor any other group has publicly stated that they intend to use violence to disrupt the elections. (Note: Under the current system Tripolitania will have 120 seats in the GNC, Cyrenaica (Barqa) 62, and Fezzan in the South 18.)

8. At the same time, this source added that 120 seats will be contested by individual candidates, while the other 80 seats will go to the closed party lists. Libya's new political parties - a mix of Islamists, nationalists, technocrats, and parties headed by former militia leaders with Islamist leanings - are yet untested in a democratic system. Both Islamists and non-Islamists seem to agree that Libya is to be governed as a moderate democratic civil state with a legislative system founded on Sharia and a governing process based upon freedom, justice, democracy, development and national unity. Jalil stated in privately that the Libyan MB is receiving assistance from their Brothers in Egypt, who recently won the Presidential election, and will form that country's first civilian government. This assistance is primarily organizational and administrative in nature.

9. (Source Comment: According to this individual, Jalil realizes that simply completing the election for the General National Congress and fulfilling a list of proper democratic milestones may not create a true democracy. The GNC's primary task is to appoint the Constitutional Convention, and it is unclear if this will happen according to the current template. At the same time, the NTC leader believes that the new government will face the same challenges as its predecessors in trying to work with the legislature while demonstrating the ability to make decisions rather than postpone them. Jalil is convinced that he cannot begin to phase out the NTC as a body until the new GNC regime is able to deliver on expectations for quick, positive results through improved communication and delivery of services. In the opinion of this individual there is no guarantee that the General National Congress and the new government will be any better at rapid action and coherent decision-making than their predecessors, but the public perception is that the July 7 election can create that chance.)

10. This well placed source stated that under Jalil the 2011 Libyan uprising created a temporary government whose limited revolutionary mandate is rapidly expiring. While the General National Congress election will bring new top level leadership, it will not itself change the balance of power between the central government and local militias. At the same time, mid-level bureaucrats serving since the time of Qaddafi are expected to remain in place in most government agencies and ministries. For Jalil and those contesting the elections, these realities raise a number of questions. Will the election mark the start of a new era of government efficiency? Will militia be more likely to heed the commands of the central government once they acknowledge that it has been democratically elected?

11. At the same time, the NTC leaders fear that regional bickering will continue, and may involve the most powerful armed groups - those of Zintan and Misrata - again using the threat of force to secure important posts in the

new government. This source also fears that enough of the framers of Libya's new constitution will favor eastern federalism to derail the national unity process. In the end, Jalil noted that it is not clear whether the constitutional convention will chose a presidential or parliamentary system. With all of this in mind he believes it is his duty try to guide the process to success before ending the work of the NTC.

Re: H: Libyan leaders' plans. Sid

H to youshow details

Jul 30 2012

Thanks, again.

From: sbwhoeop@aol.com [mailto:sbwhoeop@aol.com]

Sent: Saturday, July 28, 2012 09:54 AM

To: H

Subject: H: Libyan leaders' plans. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

July 28, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libyan leaders' plans

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the week of July 24, 2012 Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil met privately with former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril to discuss the results of the early July elections for the 200-member General National Congress (GNC). Jibril, as the leader of the moderate/liberal National Forces Alliance (NFA), controls 39 seats in the GNC and is currently involved in an aggressive effort to recruit allies from among the 120 newly elected individual Members of Parliament (MP), who in the end hold the key to forming a new government by the mid-August 2012 date outlined in the 2011 national election law. According to a sensitive source with access to the NTC, Jibril is aware of the fact that Jalil intends to relinquish full power to a new government by the end of the year, and he hopes they can work together to help form an elected National Government that carries on the goals of the NTC, unifying the country while creating a secure business environment that allows the Libyan people to gain the greatest benefit from the activities of foreign businessmen seeking access to the country's mineral wealth.

2. In the opinion of this individual the personal relationship between Jalil and Jibril remains strained following the events that led to Jalil forcing out Jibril as interim Prime Minister in October 2011. That said, they do know each other well, and are

pragmatic enough to work together at this important time. At this point they agree that Jibril, who did not stand for the GNC, should serve as the power behind the throne in the new administration, and they have tentatively agreed that he and Jalil will work together in this regard, particularly in dealing with foreign firms and banks. They have also agreed that most of the cabinet of the current interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib, whose administration has become, in Jibril's opinion, dangerously isolated and ineffective must be replaced. One exception to this move may be Minister of Defense Ousama al-Jouwali, who has important ties in the Misrata region, where the new government, no matter who they are, will need to deal with heavily armed regional militias left over from the 2012 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.

3. The contact between Jalil and Jibril is also complicated by Jalil's plans to call for the election of a 60 member Constitutional Commission to draft the new constitution; a change from the original agreement to have the GNC carry out this task. This matter is under debate, and in the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, Jalil expects Jibril to compromise and accept the plan for the separate Constitutional Commission. For his part Jalil intends to compromise and support Jibril's plans to reach out to Mohamed el Magariaf, the leader of the National Front Party (NFP), and Ali Tarhouni, the former interim Minister of Oil and Finance under Jibril, who leads the National Centrist Part (NCP). Between them these two liberal parties control five (5) seats in the GNC, and although the leaders both have problematic histories with Jalil and the NTC, they are respected in the academic and professional community. El Magariaf and Ali Tarhouni also have excellent connections to the international business community, as well as long experience with the United States, which will be valuable for the new regime, no matter the makeup.

4. Jalil and Jibril were surprised that the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction Party (JCP) did not come up with a better result in the election, winning only seventeen (17) seats in the GNC. The JCP received considerable support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Jibril believes their poor showing relates primarily to regional issues in Libya and poor leadership from Mohamed Sowan. At the same time, the Islamist Homeland Party (HP), led by Ali al-Sallabi and Western Militia Commander General Abdelhakim Belhaj, carried only 2 seats in the GNC, but won those with large majorities in the important Misrata district. Jibril still fears, as he did while serving as interim Prime Minister, that Belhaj may be looking for an opportunity to seize power. Jalil does not share this opinion, pointing out that the situation in Tripoli and Western Libya has stabilized to a certain degree, and Belhaj's support is much narrower than it was when Jibril left office.

5. (Source Comment: In private conversation Jibril stated that he is also reaching out to Sowan and the JCP, drawing on the fact that he was a member of the MB in his student days, however, he has had little success to date. According to a very sensitive source, Jibril and Jalil realize that in the wake of the election, the next government of Libya will be a complex coalition, which may well include the JCP as well as the NCP and NFP. However, the deciding factor will lie with whichever party or individual has the ability to draw together a group of the 120 independent MPs to gain enough seats to elect a Prime Minister and form a new administration. Many of these independents were elected based on local rather than national issues and the governing process will be new to them. At the same time, while certain portions of the Eastern part of the country

boycotted the election, Jibril believes a significant number of Eastern MPs are at least sympathetic to the federalist/separatist movement in that region. Their specific issues will have to be addressed as the coalition is formed. At the same time, Jalil is concerned by reports that certain members of the independent bloc have begun to surface the idea of these MPs forming a new, loosely unified movement to improve their negotiating position in forming the new governing coalition.)

6. Jibril and Jalil will continue to work through late July and early August to form a coalition that will establish a moderate Islamic regime, one capable of disarming the revolutionary militias, while meeting their demands for medical and economic support. At the same time they want to insure that the regime is led by liberal forces, and can work effectively with foreign business and banking interests. In the opinion of a sensitive source, both men realize that this will be a difficult and complicated process, with no guarantee of success. There will now be a period of roughly two week for appeal of specific election results and then another two to three weeks of negotiation in an effort to form a new National Government by mid-August. At the same time, these negotiations will include a final decision on the election of a Constitutional Committee to draft a new governing document.

H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
Aug 23 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

August 23, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: New president of Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During early August, 2012, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil held discreet meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, the then leader of the newly elected General National Congress (GNC), who Jalil learned was to be named interim President of Libya when the NTC stepped down. During these sessions the two leaders worked out the transition to a new, elected interim Government for Libya; focusing on the need to restore stability and security by disarming the militia units which fought in the 2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source with excellent access to both parties, Jalil came away from the meeting convinced that Magariaf is intent on becoming Libya's first elected president following the overthrow of Qaddafi. Jalil was pleased to learn that Magariaf strongly supports the three-party Cairo Declaration negotiated between the NTC and the Governments of Tunisia and Egypt in late July allowing for increased trade and a relaxation of existing travel restrictions.

2. According to this individual, Jalil and Magariaf agree that Tunisia and Egypt hold the key to Libya's future economic success, with Libya providing the funding for new projects, while Egypt and Tunisia provide technical expertise. Magariaf stated privately that this relationship marks a departure from the Qaddafi years when Libya's natural resources fell under the control of foreign firms and governments. Jalil added that Magariaf will welcome investment and cooperation from American and Western European banks and corporations, but believes Libya, supported by the new governments rising out of the Arab Spring, must maintain control over all aspects of the industries involved in exploiting its natural resources. In this regard, with the support of both Jalil and Magariaf, the Libyan Ministry of Finance is increasing the level of Libyan

investment in the Cairo stock exchange. In turn, Magariaf and Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi discussed increased Tunisian and Egyptian investment in the Benghazi stock exchange as the economic situation in Libya becomes more orderly.

3. In commenting on the new Interim President, Jalil added that Magariaf's current position is bolstered by the fact that he is not tied to any particular faction. At the same time he has maintained the respect that is attached to his role as the first Libyan leader to direct an armed revolt against Qaddafi. This fighting was carried out by the rebel Libyan National Army in 1981. Magariaf is an academic and diplomat with well established Islamist credentials and good relationships with business and government leaders in the United States and Western Europe. A separate sensitive source noted that one interesting issue to watch is Magariaf's relationship with General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the commander of one sections of the new Libyan Army. Haftar has been at odds with many of the militia commanders and is currently leading Libyan forces in the Kufra region, attempting to end local tribal fighting and block the smuggling of arms and supplies to pro-Qaddafi militias by supporters based in South Sudan. In the years between 1981 and 1990 Haftar (then Colonel Haftar) commanded the rebel Libyan National Army, under Magariaf's National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL). One source notes that Magariaf's opposition to Qaddafi was based on the dictator's betrayal of Islamic principles, a position that, at that time, was supported by the Western Allies.

4. According to this individual, Jalil also spoke with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who indicated that he and Magariaf agree on many issues, including the belief that they can build an Islamic state in Libya that can function in the world economy and the international diplomatic community. He did note that he believes Magariaf's view of the role of Islam in the day to day function of the government is more conservative than his, but these are differences that can be sorted out in the GNC. In the opinion of this individual Jabril is well aware of the fact that, while his National Force Alliance (NFA) controls a solid bloc of thirty nine (39) seats in the GNC and Magariaf's National Front Party (NFP) holds no seats in its own right, the interim President has established good working relationships with at least 100 of the 120 independent members of the GNC. Magariaf received 113 votes in his election as Interim President. Again these independent deputies respect Magariaf's role in fighting the Qaddafi regime.

5. (Source Comment: This particularly sensitive individual stated in strict confidence that Magariaf sees his role as establishing an efficient interim government, while overseeing the drafting of a new constitution and election law. This individual believes that Magariaf is very interested in winning the presidency under this new law. Besides meeting with Jalil and Jibril, Magariaf is talking to liberal politicians including former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni, and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction Party (JCP), including Mohamad Sowani.)

6. This individual adds that Jalil believes Magariaf will face a very difficult period as he addresses the many issues left unresolved by the NTC and the interim

regime of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib. Jalil has been highly frustrated by el-Keib's inability to disarm the many militia units left over from the 2011 revolution against Qaddafi. At the same time he has advised Magariaf to move quickly in replacing el-Keib's cabinet while deciding which ministers to retain. The new interim government is facing a problem of lawlessness and attacks against foreigners, including representatives of the Egyptian Government; this at a time when the new Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt is reaching out to increase business and diplomatic contacts between the two countries. According to a sensitive source, Libyan military intelligence officers believe these attacks are the work of Qaddafi loyalists, while former NTC officials fear that they may be carried out by dissident Islamist groups, frustrated with the results of the national elections, which many of them boycotted.

7. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source stated in confidence that Libyan Military Intelligence officers reported to Jalil and later Magariaf that a series of bombings in Tripoli and Benghazi appear to be the work of Qaddafi loyalists looking to create tension between the Libyan and Egyptian Governments. These attacks included the car of an Egyptian diplomat, which was blown up near his home in Benghazi, a day after several deadly bomb attacks in the capital Tripoli. At the same time, a homemade bomb exploded under the vehicle of the Egyptian consulate's first secretary Abdelhamid Rifai in one of the Tripoli's most affluent neighborhoods. No one was hurt during this attack. Earlier in August, three car bombs exploded near the Ministry of Interior in Tripoli, killing two people and wounding three others. This sensitive source added that security officers arrested 32 members of what they describe as an organized network of Qaddafi loyalists linked to the attacks. During this period, the Red Cross suspended its activities in Benghazi and Misrata after one of its compounds in Misrata was attacked with grenades and rockets. In late July seven Iranian relief workers associated with the Libyan Red Crescent were kidnapped by tribal troops still loyal to the Qaddafi family. Security officials have no word on the whereabouts of these relief workers.)

8. According to this source, while the Cairo Declaration received a positive reception among Libyan political and business leaders, it also created a drastic increase in the number of Libyans applying for Egyptian visas under the new, simplified process. This workload has created a backlog of applications, and in mid-August, a group of Libyan nationals frustrated with the Egyptian visa process attacked the interior of the Egyptian consulate in Tripoli. These Libyan applicants were angry about the time it was taking to receive visas to enter Egypt and were demanding that the staff work past their stated hours of operation. A sensitive source noted that a number of Libyans destroyed the furniture in the main waiting room and attacked the consulate. The Magariaf Government has assured the Egyptian ambassador that additional security personnel will be assigned to guard the Embassy, at least until the visa backlog is reduced.

Re: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid

Aug 24 2012

H to youshow details

Another keeper---thanks and please keep 'em coming.

Re: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid
Aug 28 2012

H to youshow details

Fascinating. I had a very good call w him.

From: Sidney Blumenthal [<mailto:sbwhoeop@aol.com>]

Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 06:35 PM

To: H

Subject: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

August 27, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: New President of Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. (Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Youssef el Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire life's work. Having first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that Qaddafi was building for himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist movement. Magariaf was member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit one who believes that Islam can coexist and even work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the United States and Western Europe. This source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya, with its great natural wealth, can become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the Islamic world. Magariaf is particularly well disposed toward the governments of the United States and France, based on past experiences with each during his struggle with Qaddafi. This source also

believes that he remains hostile to the government of Omar al Bashir in Sudan. In 1989 Bashir overthrew Magariaf's ally, then Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and expelled Magariaf and his followers from Khartoum.)

2. According to the same sensitive source, Magariaf will also seek a discreet relationship with Israel. Political realities in Libya at present will dictate that this relationship be handled in a low key manner, but the new President of Libya shares many common friends and associates with the leaders of Israel and intends to take advantage of this situation to improve the lot of the Libyan people. Magariaf may, at times, be forced to make statements critical of Israel for his own political purposes, but believes he and his associates have the experience and sophistication to manage this issue. At the same time Magariaf intends to pursue aggressively the regional political initiatives begun by National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil. Magariaf will pursue the economic and security cooperation set out in the Cairo Declaration of July 29, 2012 establishing a regional bond between the new revolutionary governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This same individual notes that Magariaf is aware of the fact that Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi sees Libya as a key factor in Egypt's economic development; and the Libyan leader believes he can manipulate this situation to the advantage of the Libyan people.

3. A separate sensitive source stated on condition of strict secrecy that Magariaf intends to work with his security advisors to develop a plan for disarming the Islamist militias who fought against Qaddafi, without arousing their suspicion. He believes that the most important step in this matter will be providing the medical and economic services demanded by these militias in return for disarming. Magariaf also believes that he can manage the political ambitions of Islamist leaders like General Abdelhakim Belhaj, while preventing the growth of radical groups who might see Libya as a base of operations and support. Magariaf and his supporters believe that his Islamist/anti-Qaddafi credentials will allow him to manage these challenges, and if he can do so he will be able to win the presidency outright in the first full scale national presidential election in the spring of 2013.

4. This source adds that, while avoiding direct involvement in the Syrian crisis, the Magariaf government will support Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the nations calling for the end of the regime of Basher al Assad. Magariaf harbors a particular sense of hostility toward Assad, who was a longtime ally of Qaddafi, supporting him with equipment, intelligence, and advisors throughout the revolution of 2011. Magariaf realizes that this stance will also bring him into conflict with Syria's ally Iran, but does not believe Iran has a role to play in Libya, or the rest of North Africa.

5. According to an extremely sensitive source, in 1979 Magariaf, having become increasingly disenchanted with Qaddafi, fled Libya for Khartoum in Sudan, where in 1981, with the help of the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Chadian leader Hissene Habre, Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein, and several Western states, he established The National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), dedicated to

overthrowing Qaddafi and establishing an Islamic democracy in Libya. Under the auspices of the NFSL, Magariaf also organized the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in Ndjamena, Chad. The LNA was commanded by the Colonel Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who is now one of the commanding generals of the new Libyan Army. Under Magariaf's authority the Haftar force, which numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 troops, fought several battles with Qaddafi's troops, with mixed results. These attacks included a raid on Qaddafi's compound at Bab al-Aziza in 1986. The LNA also maintained a 50,000 watt radio station in Ndjamena, broadcasting anti-Qaddafi material into Libya. This radio station was supported by Western governments and Iraqi Military Intelligence.

6. The LNA's greatest success came in support of the Chadian Army under General Idriss Deby, in their overwhelming victory over Libyan troops at the battle Ouadi Doum in 1987. This victory forced the Libyan Army and Air Force out of Chad, and was supported by the French Air Force and other Western personnel. Following the battle Deby became a national hero in Chad. In 1990, with the support of Libyan intelligence officers, Deby, who had undergone military training in Libya and France, rebelled against and overthrew the Habre Government. At that time Deby, under Qaddafi's influence, forced the LNA to abandon Chad for Zaire, and eventually the United States. Magariaf and Haftar both settled in the United States, and while the LNA no longer existed as an effective force, Magariaf continued to maintain the NFSL as a political organization. In 2004 Magariaf and the NFSL joined the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), eventually returning to support the 2011 revolution.

7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source speaking on condition of strict secrecy, Magariaf views himself as an Islamist politician who can work with both Islamic and non-Islamic states, including Israel, if the relationships are properly managed. The Libyan President also sees the current situation as vindication for all of the problematic experiences he encountered in his long struggle against the Qaddafi regime. This individual believes that Magariaf intends to use his reputation for integrity, commitment to Islam, and his ability to work with divergent groups to establish himself as an effective interim President, and eventually the first elected Libyan Head of State in mid-2013. Magariaf plans to draw on all political, religious, and ethnic groups to form his cabinet, using his stature to form a representative government under the General National Council.)

H: Magariaf on attack on US in Libya. Sid
Sep 12 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Magariaf and the attack on US in Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U.S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the crowds in an effort to break up mobs attacking the missions. During this session, a senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America. The Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the U.S. mission in Egypt on the same day. At the same time, el Magariaf noted in strong terms that the atmosphere that made fostered these incidents in Libya is the product of widespread publicity regarding the security situation in the country between 2004 and 2010 and the cooperation that developed between a number of Western Intelligence services and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.

2. This source added that el Magariaf's advisors believe that this situation adds to the President's growing concern over the unpredictable effects that will follow current covert efforts by his political opponents to link him directly to foreign intelligence services. According to a separate sensitive source, el Magariaf noted that his opponents had often tried to connect him to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the

National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a group established in opposition to former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, which el Magariaf led in the 1980s. In the opinion of this individual el Magariaf believes that he can survive potential negative publicity in this regard, but if this situation continues to develop in this manner it will complicate his efforts to establish an orderly administration in the country. Again, he stated that the attacks on the U.S. missions were as much a result of the atmosphere created by this campaign, as the controversial internet video.

3. At the same time, this individual noted that several of el Magariaf's advisors share his concerns in this matter, pointing out that the return of Qaddafi's intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senoussi for trial in Libya has heightened public interest in the liaison relationships conducted by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with Qaddafi's intelligence and security services. These same individuals note that they believe Islamist militia forces under the command of General Abdelhakim Belhaj captured files and documents describing this relationship from Qaddafi's offices in Tripoli. This fascination with Western intelligence operations in Qaddafi's Libya is also driven by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and its efforts to tie Western governments to human rights violations committed under Qaddafi. In this regard HRW has interviewed at least fourteen (14) individuals claiming that they were turned over to Qaddafi's forces by the Western powers. Belhaj is included in this group.

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el Magariaf's enemies are working to take advantage of his suspected links to the CIA at a time when Western intelligence services are under scrutiny in Libya. They also fear that this situation will only grow more complex as Qaddafi's son Saif al Islam Qaddafi and al Senousi are brought before Libyan courts to answer for their crimes under the old regime, particularly during the 2011 revolution. These individuals believe both men will be linked to Western Intelligence during their trials.)

5. According to this individual, el Magariaf is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to defuse this situation. He is particularly concerned by the level of violence between Sufi Muslims and Salafists, and believes he must maintain his reputation for impartiality if he is to defuse this growing problem. As he works to organize the government, and disarm the militias, he cannot afford to lose the respect and trust of the Libyan people, especially at a time when cultural clashes between followers of the mystical Sufi tradition and ultra-conservative Salafis have taken central stage in the new Libya. This source adds that these religious conflicts were largely unknown during Qaddafi's rule.

6. (Source Comment: This source added that the individuals interviewed for the HRW report were former members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), an Islamist group formed in opposition to Gaddafi's controversial interpretations of Islam. These LIFG fighters fled the country in the late 1980s and went to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviet Union while also gaining training and experience for their own struggle. A separate source adds that messages to Libya from the CIA and SIS were found among the Tripoli Documents published by HRW, indicating that the

United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders, Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi.)

7. As Libyan authorities struggle to control the armed rings that refuse to surrender weapons following last year's civil war, Salafis, who say Islam should return to the simple ways followed by Mohammed, have established their own armed gangs in post-Gaddafi Libya. They view Sufi practices as idolatrous. Since the start of the Arab Spring uprising across the region, a number of Sufi sites have been attacked in Egypt, Mali and Libya. Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. This individual adds that Magariaf remains dedicated to the idea of building a tolerant Islamic state in Libya. El Magariaf's opinions continue to be shaped by his experience with Qaddafi, whom he felt built a cult of personality in violation of all of the basic ideas of Islam.

H: More Magariaf privat reax (sent now as memo). Sid
Sep 13 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

September 13, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: More Magariaf private reax

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On September 12, 2012 Libyan President Mohammed Youssef el Magariaf told senior advisors that the death of the U.S. Ambassador at the hands of Islamist militia forces represents a threat to the future of the newly elected General National Congress (GNC) Government. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf believes that the primary goal of this and other attacks on Western facilities is to demonstrate that the GNC cannot protect its non-Islamic friends. Libyan security officials believe that the attack was carried out by forces of the Islamist militia group calling itself the Ansar al Sharia brigade; working out of camps in the Eastern suburbs of Benghazi. These officials added that their sources indicate that this group is led by former members of the old Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), some of whom are loyal to Islamist General Abdelhakim Belhaj. The same officials were quick to point out that they have no evidence that Belhaj had any direct involvement in this attack. They also have no direct information as to whether this assault has anything to do with the death of Libyan born al Qai'da leader Abu Yahya al- Libi, but they are pursuing this theme. These officials do believe that the attackers having prepared to launch their assault took advantage of the cover provided by the demonstrations in Benghazi protesting an internet production seen as disrespectful to the prophet Mohammed.

2. According to this source, the immediate events were set in motion by a statement made by a Muslim Cleric in Egypt saying that the internet film was going to be shown across the United States on September 11 in an effort to insult Muslims on the

anniversary of the attacks on the New York World Trade Center in 2001. This statement inspired increasingly hostile demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, and at diplomatic facilities in Libya. In Benghazi, reporting from security sources states, approximately twenty one (21) Ansar al Sharia fighters left their base in East Benghazi just after sundown infiltrated the crowd of about 2,000 demonstrators at the U.S. Consulate. These forces, operating under cover of darkness, opened fire on the consulate, eventually setting it on fire with rocket propelled grenades. These fighters then withdrew to their camp. El Magariaf ordered security officials to identify and arrest the attackers, adding that he had been in touch with Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, and the two agreed that their intelligence and security personnel will cooperate in this matter. (Note: Some of the Libyan officials believe that the entire demonstration was organized as cover for the attack, however; they point out that there is no evidence of such a complex operation at this time.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Libyan security officers also informed el Magariaf that the attacks had been planned for approximately one month, based on casing information obtained during an early demonstration at the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. The attackers were, in the opinion of these individuals, looking for an opportunity to approach the consulate under cover in a crowd. These officials add that government security officers admitted to el Magariaf that they do not have the physical capacity to locate, attack, and destroy the Ansar al-Sharia brigade, among others. They describe these forces as well-trained, hardened killers; many of whom have spent time in Afghanistan and Yemen. These fighters are located in camps in Eastern Libya; and Libyan officials doubt they can penetrate these camps because the militia's are better armed than the forces of the new National Army.

4. In the opinion of a separate source El Magariaf continues to believe that the attacks were planned and carried out in a political atmosphere where a portion of the Libyan population is focused on past cooperation between Western intelligence and security services, and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to this source, el Magariaf realizes that the death of the U.S. Ambassador dictates that he must find tangible solutions to the problems tied to disarming the militias, dealing Salafist violence against the followers of Sufi beliefs, and efforts to discredit his government through linking him to Western intelligence services. El Magariaf instructed his security officials to cooperate with their U.S. counterparts. He also warned all of his advisors to be prepared for U.S. retaliation against the suspected perpetrators of this attack, and the angry public reaction that is sure to follow.

5. (Source Comment: A separate, particularly sensitive source added that in private conversation el Magariaf stated that if his government cannot protect a senior diplomatic official, foreign businesses will not be willing to risk opening up new operations in Libya. According to this sensitive source, el Magariaf believes that a number of the Islamist militias are now being influenced al Qai'da and other radical groups; working out of camps in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country. These groups are receiving aid and weapons from supporters in Sudan. In the end, el Magariaf added that while he does not expect U.S. officials to focus on this point,

he believes the attacks against the interests and citizens of the U.S. and other Western states are aimed first at overthrowing his government, and replacing it with a strict Islamic Republic dominated by Salafist leaders. Magariaf also warned that tribal militias loyal to the Qaddafi family continue to present an equally dangerous threat to the new Government.)

From: sbwhoeop@aol.com [mailto:sbwhoeop@aol.com]

Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 07:57 PM

To: H

Subject: m.guardian.co.uk

<http://m.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/13/egypt-libya-hollywood-film?cat=commentisfree&type=article>

14-Sep-12
CONFIDENTIAL

September 14, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Morsi's private conversations & coordination with Magariaf

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. Late in the day on September 14, 2012, Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi told senior European diplomats that he is increasingly concerned the current anti-U.S. and anti-Western violence spreading through Cairo and into the rest of Egypt may be part of an effort by his Salafist political rivals to destabilize his government, which many of them believe is too moderate in its positions regarding Islam, Israel, and the non-Muslim world. According to this source, Morsi, who is in Brussels for meetings with the European Union (EU), was particularly concerned over a message from Army commander General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, that Islamist guerrillas, believed to be drawn primarily from the Sawarki Bedouin tribe, had launched an attack on a base of the International Peacekeeping Force (IPF) in the Sinai. The General reported that the 1500 United Nations troops at the base, including some U.S. forces, were under heavy attack and casualty figures were not yet known. Morsi stated that this fight was an example of radical anti-government forces and Salafist Islamist dissidents taking advantage of the current situation to carry out attacks that demonstrate his government is unable to protect Western personnel and facilities in Egypt. Morsi stated that the success or failure of his regime is directly tied to his ability to establish a moderate Islamic state that can work with western business interests.

2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, the current wave of violence is related to an ongoing struggle between Salafist and Sufi Muslims throughout Egypt. What makes it more frustrating for Morsi is that much of the violence appears to be inspired by members of the Salafist al Nour Party, the coalition partner of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in the new Egyptian Parliament. According to this individual, Morsi delayed condemning the initial attacks on the U.S. Embassy out of concern that his opponents would use such a statement to move against his government. Late on the evening of September 13, 2012, Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), sent a message to Morsi warning that he and the Supreme Guidance Council were concerned that the situation

around the U.S. Embassy was getting out of control and that, difficult as it might seem, he had to take tough measures against the demonstrators, and protect the interests of the U.S. and other Western Governments. In a telephone discussion with Saad al-Katany, the MB/Freedom and Justice Party (MB/FJP) Speaker of the lower house of parliament, Morsi admitted that he had felt constrained from acting, given his past history of poor personal relations with the leaders of al Nour. Al-Katany urged him to gain control of the situation.)

3. On September 14, Morsi also stated to an EU official that he had received extremely forceful messages from both the U.S. State Department and the Office of the U.S. President, leaving no doubt in his mind that the U.S. -Egyptian relations and more than \$1 billion in U.S. aid were at stake in this matter. Morsi added that since much of this aid goes to the Egyptian Army, he and al-Katany agreed that actions that put it in jeopardy would also damage the new Egyptian administration's current good relationship with the Army. Accordingly, Morsi instructed the military and security forces to use all necessary force short of lethal measures to protect U.S. and Western facilities. In a private conversation, Morsi stated that he felt he is losing control of the political situation and fears that if the current fighting results in deaths, either of demonstrators, U.S. diplomats, Egyptian security personnel, or UN peacekeepers, the situation may spin out of control and his government could fall. Al-Katany agreed, but said that taking no action would guarantee disaster. They agreed that when the situation calms down they will have to deal with the al Nour party, which they fear will, in the future, take advantage of circumstances to try to destabilize Morsi's administration. With this in mind, Morsi ordered al-Sissi to direct the commanders of Military Intelligence (MI -Mukhabarat el-Khabeya) to step up operations collecting information on the activities of the al Nour leadership, focusing on any contacts with potentially violent Salafist dissidents.

4. (Source Comment: A separate sensitive source also noted that General al-Sissi is warning Morsi about press reports that the person who made the controversial internet film at the heart of this situation is an Egyptian Coptic Christian. The General cautioned that as this report gains wider circulation, the government and the Army must prepare for violent attacks by Islamists against that community, which makes up ten (10) percent of the Egyptian population.)

5. A separate sensitive source noted that for his part, al-Sissi is prepared to have his troops take harsh measures against any demonstrators who attack Western personnel and facilities. The General is also concerned that the al Nour leaders are even more dangerous than Morsi realizes, and he has ordered the MI to increase technical and physical surveillance of these individuals. In addition, he stated in private that Morsi and al-Katany spoke with Libyan President Mohammed Youssef el Magariaf, and they had all agreed that military and security officials in Egypt and Libya will cooperate in an effort to track links between the violence in Cairo and Benghazi. Al-Sissi has ordered Special Forces units to step up patrols in the Egypt-Libya border region, while the MI will monitor communications between dissidents; primarily Salafists, in both

countries. According to this source the General is convinced that these dissidents are seizing the opportunity presented by the current unrest to move against the governments of Morsi and al-Magariaf. He also received permission from Morsi to step up cooperation with his counterparts in the U.S. and Western Europe to deal with this situation and al-Sissi believes al-Magariaf has given similar instructions to Libyan military and security officials.

6. (Source Comment: According to a separate sensitive source, al-Sissi believes that, given his new orders from Morsi, the Army can, for the most part, protect Western facilities and personnel in Egypt. But the General is concerned that the security services can never completely eliminate the threat from small well organized bands looking to carry out terrorist attacks. Following discussion with Libyan security officials he believes they have the same concerns.)

1-Oct-12

H: Romney's last gambit. Got done and published. Sid

http://www.salon.com/2012/10/01/gops_october_surprise/

Monday, Oct 1, 2012 09:30 AM EDT

GOP's October surprise?

They're calling it the "Jimmy Carter Strategy": Exploit Libya attack to paint Obama as weak on terrorism



By Craig Unger

(Credit: AP/Al Behrman/Salon)

According to a highly reliable source, as Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama prepare for the first presidential debate Wednesday night, top Republican operatives are primed to unleash a new two-pronged offensive that will attack Obama as weak on national security, and will be based, in part, on new intelligence information regarding the attacks in Libya that killed U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens on September 11.

The source, who has first-hand knowledge of private, high-level conversations in the Romney camp that took place in Washington, DC last week, said that at various times the GOP strategists referred to their new operation as the Jimmy Carter Strategy or the October Surprise.

He added that they planned to release what they hoped would be "a bombshell" that would make Libya and Obama's foreign policy a major issue in the campaign. "My understanding is that they have come up with evidence that the Obama administration had positive intelligence that there was going to be a terrorist attack on the intelligence." The source described the Republicans as chortling with glee that the Obama administration "definitely had intel" about the attack before it happened. "Intelligence can be graded in different ways," he added, "and sometimes A and B don't get

connected. But [the Romney campaign] will try to paint it to look like Obama had advance knowledge of the attack and is weak on terrorism.”

He said they were jubilant about their new strategy and said they intended to portray Obama as a helpless, Jimmy Carter-like president and to equate the tragedy in Libya with President Carter’s failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980.

“They are so excited about it,” he said. “Over and over again they talked about how it would be just like Jimmy Carter’s failed raid. They feel it is going to give them a last-minute landslide in the election.”

The source, however, said he was dubious about the tactic. “To me, it is indicative that they have lost touch with a huge portion of the electorate,” he said.

The source declined to reveal the names of the GOP operatives who were present. But he said, “These were the top guys in the party. It was a private, unguarded planning conversation.” He further described participants in the meeting as consisting of well-known names tied to the big Republican super PACs and people who had access to high-level national security intelligence.

“As usual, Karl Rove wasn’t present,” he said, “but some were close to Rove.”

The source said that “there was quite a bit more” to the operation than simply revealing the intelligence regarding Libya. He declined to discuss what he described as the second phase of the operation.

However, already there is evidence that the first phase of the operation is underway. On Wednesday, September 26, on Fox News, Karl Rove called Obama’s reaction to what happened in Libya “inexplicable” and added that Obama is “more intent on campaigning than meeting his responsibilities as commander-in-chief.” He went on to warn that Obama’s policies in Libya endangered the U.S. with regard to Iran. “I am astonished,” Rove said. “We are projecting weakness when we need to be projecting strength.” Similarly, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, a one-time GOP presidential hopeful who became known as the mayor of 9/11, followed Rove in criticizing Obama on the attack in Libya. “This is a deliberate attempt to cover up the truth, from an administration that claimed it wanted to be the most transparent in history,” he told Fox News. “And it’s the worst kind of cover-up: the kind of cover-up that involves our national security. This is a cover-up that involves the slaughter of four Americans.” Giuliani added that the Obama White House wanted to dismiss the role played by al-Qaeda because it seemed to diminish the triumph of having killed Osama bin Laden. “I think it’s because they have this narrative that they defeated al-Qaeda,” he said. “They never say the words ‘Islamic fundamentalist terrorism’. They want to wish it away. The president was moving on to Asia – he was going to declare this a great victory for himself and unfortunately, this terrible act of terror intervened in their very convenient narrative.”

Likewise, Bob Corker, Republican senator from Tennessee, described the administration’s response to “the terrorist attack” in Libya as “bizarre.” And on Sunday, September 30, both Mitt Romney and vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan joined in the attacks. “I think they want to do their very best to keep the people of America from understanding exactly what happened. We expect candor, we expect transparency, particularly as it relates to terrorism,” Romney said.

Added Ryan, "Why is he (Obama) not on the same page with his own administration officials who are saying that this is a terrorist attack? We'll leave it up to you to decide whether it's a cover-up or not."

In an apparently related development, a Politico article posted last night said Romney advisers were divided over how aggressively to attack President Obama over his handling of the events in Libya. One unnamed Romney adviser described them as "a huge gift" to the campaign. "Across the board – domestic, economic and foreign-policy issues – President Obama has been outmatched by events," he said. "He's an observer of events, not a shaper of events. Everywhere you look, he's been outmatched."

But other Romney advisers, led by media strategist Stuart Stevens, wanted to stick to the economy as the central issue. "They'll tell you that you've got to focus people on the fact that their economic prospects are not very good and all that," the aide told Politico. "Well, Romney's been trying to do that now since he clinched the nomination at the end of April — and he's failed. The president is better at deflecting attention from the bad news than Romney is at driving home the impact of the bad news on individual voters."

Craig Unger is the New York Times bestselling author of "House of Bush, House of Saud," and a frequent analyst on CNN, ABC Radio, Air America, The Charlie Rose Show, NBC's Today Show and other broadcast outlets. He has written for The New Yorker, Esquire and many other publications and is currently a contributing editor at Vanity Fair.

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Mon, Oct 1, 2012 3:34 pm

Subject: Re: H: Romney's last gambit. Got done and published. Sid

Thanks. I'm pushing to WH.

1-oct-12

Re: H: Romney's last gambit. Got done and published. Sid

Romney has an op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal playing off Stevens' murder to say Obama has put "security at risk," etc.

According to Politico yesterday, there was an internal argument within the Romney campaign over Libya. Obviously, the neocons and the Rove oriented faction (Ed Gillespie, Rove's surrogate is now a Romney campaign adviser) beat Stuart Stevens. Romney is careening from tactic to tactic, hoping something will catch.

I wouldn't be surprised to see Romney raise the specter of the Muslim Brotherhood in charge of Egypt & Libya as a bogeyman. I have heard him do this within the last week.

H: Rove out with Libya ad. Watch this asap. Sid

Oct 1 2012

<http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-republicans-american-crossroads-libya-ad-2012-10>

H: Great to see you. Drop in again. Here's Libya. Sid

Oct 6 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

October 6, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libya cabinet politics

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. As of October 5, 2012 Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf, the new interim President of Libya told senior advisors that the abortive efforts to form a cabinet under new Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur represent the first step in the next phase of the struggle for control of the new Libyan Government. According to a sensitive source Magariaf is concerned that Abushagur, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction Party (JCP), as well as certain of the other more traditional Islamist groups, is looking to establish day to day administrative control the new government while defining Magariaf as a ceremonial Head of State.

2. According to this individual, the President, who is not affiliated with a particular party holding seats in the General National Council (GNC), spoke with the new Prime Minister immediately after Abushagur was elected by the GNC on September 12. At that time Magariaf advised him to include in his government members of former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril's National Forces Alliance (NFA), Abushagur having only narrowly defeated Jibril in the GNC vote. At that time Magariaf was not aware of the fact that Jibril had already demanded 9 cabinet seats for the NFA; however, he did point out that even Jibril's more moderate followers were committed to the idea of a modern Islamic state and would fit into the new cabinet. The President came away from this discussion with the impression that Abushagur and his supporters intend to marginalize Jibril and the 39 Members of Parliament (MP) controlled by the NFA, concentrating instead on working with the 120 independent MPs in the GNC, looking to establish a more conservative administration. This individual added that Abushagur made it clear that while the President was free to choose his Vice President and staff, the Prime Minister would choose the national cabinet, supported by the GNC.

3. (Source Comment: According to this individual, Magariaf is allowing the current crisis in the Abushagur administration to play out without direct interference. He is convinced that the desire of the Libyan people for peace and stability, which brought him to power, added to the need to balance the regional and political rivalries throughout

the country, will lead to the formation of a cabinet that is acceptable to all parties. Magariaf also believes that these developments will eventually leave him as the dominant figure in the government.)

4. In addition, this individual added that Magariaf is seized with the national security situation, the ongoing effort to disarm militia units, and the investigation of the murder of the United States Ambassador. All of these efforts are related to what he sees as his most important role, rebuilding the confidence of the international business community in its ability to operate in Libya safely and efficiently. To this end he does agree with Abushagur that it is important to replace the cabinet of former Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib, particularly Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yazza, whose connections to the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, and the Italian Oil firm ENI made him unacceptable to the JCP and other conservative parties. That said, this individual notes that Magariaf was surprised and not pleased with the appointment to the ministry of Mabrouk Issa Abu Harroua, another technical expert, who previously worked for Libya's Zueitina Oil Company as well as in the oil sector abroad. Magariaf feels that Abu Harroua does not have the standing among the foreign oil companies that Ben Yezza enjoyed, although he was more acceptable to a number of the conservative members of the GNC.

5. Magariaf was pleased that the Prime Minister, after dramatic confrontations with MPs and demonstrators who entered the GNC chamber, withdrew his cabinet nominations. The President again advised Abushagur to name former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni to the Oil Ministry post; however, he fears that that Ali Tarhouni is seen as too close to Western governments to gain acceptance in the GNC. Magariaf is concerned that, while the new cabinet Abushagur plans to put forward on October 7 may contain some members of the NFA and other moderate groups, it will still be dominated by the JCP and conservative elements, and will again fail to gain acceptance, leading to a real government crisis.

6. According to this individual Magariaf and his advisors knew in advance that more than 100 protesters planned to enter the GNC session on October 4, in an effort to prevent MPs from convening to vote on the new cabinet. While Magariaf did not directly influence these protesters he did nothing to warn or advise Abushagur on the developing situation. In particular, the protestors objected to the failure of the Prime Minister to name any minister from the Zawiya region. Although the demonstrators eventually left the hall, a number of the independent MPs, who had said they would support the new cabinet, were shaken by the incident and changed their positions. In the end, according to this individual, Abushagur's efforts to rally their support failed, and he was forced to withdraw all of the nominees, promising to submit a new list on October 7, one that would take into account regional and political considerations.

7. In the opinion of a particularly sensitive source, the failure of Abushagur to name any NFA ministers to the new cabinet will continue to complicate the matter. For his part Magariaf is concerned over international perceptions regarding the nature of the new Libyan government. In this regard, he fears that the Western press is too sharply focused on the fact that the NFA holds the largest single bloc of votes in the GNC (38), missing the fact that the real power in the parliament lies with the 120 independent

deputies, who tend to be somewhat conservative on religious and social matters, while focusing primarily on local political issues. Magariaf believes that the appointment of Ali Tarhouni, or another liberal not associated with the NFA, would serve to reassure Western business and government leaders while demonstrating political balance to the Libyan people. Although he continues to make this point, the President has no indication that Abushagur will follow his advice. He does expect Abushagur to again select a majority of cabinet ministers associated with the MB and the JCP.

8. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf will remain focused on the security situation, particularly as he is having some success disarming the militias following the death of the U.S. Ambassador. According to this individual, Magariaf believes he must end the power of the regional militia forces before the Libyan economy can improve. The President knows that foreign companies are the key to Libyan oil production, but he fears that they will not increase their commitment to Libya until the government can insure the security of their personnel and facilities. In a final note, this individual added that the Italian government is stepping up its activities in Libya, and the President expects them to pressure Abushagur to appoint an individual like Ben Yezza to the Oil Ministry, where he can favor ENI and other Italian firms.)

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Sun, Oct 7, 2012 11:03 am

Subject: Re: H: Great to see you. Drop in again. Here's Libya. Sid

Very useful.

Re: H: Great to see you. Drop in again. Here's Libya. Sid

Post-election, we'd like to have you over for dinner. Bill can come, too, if he's in town. Whatever works.

H: Got all this done. Complete refutation on Libya smear. Philippe can circulate these links. Sid

Oct 10, 2012

<http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/10/10/right-wing-medias-libya-consulate-security-myth/190508>

<http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/10/10/fox-favorite-jason-chaffetz-and-the-right-wing/190517>

<http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/09/26/myths-and-facts-about-the-benghazi-attack-and-p/190150>

<http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/10/09/will-the-media-help-romney-surrogate-catapult-b/190480>

16-Oct-12

H: New intel, Libyan PM's plans. Sid
CONFIDENTIAL

October 16, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Plans of new Libyan PM

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On October 15, 2012, new Libya Prime Minister Ali Zidan discussed the future structure of his cabinet and administration with senior advisors to interim President Youssef el Magariaf. According to a sensitive source, Zidan stated that he intends to draw on all sectors of the Libyan political world to form his cabinet. He also advised that while he must proceed with caution he will have at least one and possibly as many as three members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its Justice and Construction Party (JCP) included in the cabinet. Zidan believes that he can find members of the JCP and other Islamist groups who support his plan for establishing a moderate Islamic state, while maintaining good working relations with the United States and Western Europe. Zidan also plans to reach out to the supporters of Islamist General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj, who he believes can be used as a balance against al Qai'da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al Sharia as they attempt to undermine the new administration.

2. In the opinion of this individual Zidan is committed to Magariaf's policy of seeking constructive relationships with international oil companies. In this regard, Zidan is looking for an individual to serve as Minister of Oil who has the appropriate experience and reputation in the International Oil industry, while maintaining Islamic credentials that will allow the Minister to work with the JCP and conservative independent members of the General National Congress (GNC). Zidan believes this will be among his greatest challenges. At the same time, this individual notes that Zidan has complained that he and Magariaf are under pressure from the Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Government of Egypt to use Egyptian oil service firms to replace Western firms in supporting the Libyan oil industry. Zidan is skeptical about this idea, fearing that Libya could become too dependent on Egypt for technical expertise. He believes that Western firms provide the opportunity to maintain independence and balance in the oil sector.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this source, Zidan, who served at the

Libyan Mission to India for two years before defecting to the West in 1980, joining Magariaf and his anti- Qaddafi National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), plans to work with all of the parties and groups in the GNC. At the same time his history gives the Prime Minister a relationship with the President and a degree of credibility that will be helpful as he forms his cabinet. According to this source, Zidan wants to move quickly to name a cabinet. His position is also strengthened by the fact that he worked on behalf of the National Transitional Council (NTC) during the 2011 Civil War, organizing international support for the rebels. According to this sensitive source, Zidan's immediate concerns include organizing the investigation of the September 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, and the resulting assassination of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. Zidan is already under pressure from the U.S. Government to move the investigation along as quickly as possible.)

4. In the opinion of this individual Zidan realizes that the attack on the U.S. consulate is now an international symbol of the security issues at play in Libya, and that the use of pro-government militias to provide security is not a long term solution to the problem. Zidan believes that the idea that the government must ask for support from the powerful militias from Misrata and Zintan undermines his efforts to bring order and centralized authority to the country. Zidan believes that he can address this problem in part by developing a working majority in the GNC drawing on moderates and independents, who will support his efforts to establish a modern Islamic regime that can work with the West, particularly International Oil Companies. That said, he cautions his advisors that he does not anticipate real success in this regard until the latter part of 2013.

10-Dec-12

H: Libya, latest Benghazi intel. Sid
CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Libya, Benghazi, Oil

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During early December 2012 Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan and President Mohamed Magariaf concluded a series of discreet meetings with selected tribal leaders from Eastern Cyrenaica region (Barqa in Arabic), after which they agreed that the problem of the growing Barqa federalist movement is gaining strength and will again become a major issue in early 2013. At the same time National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush warned Zidan that the Eastern tribes have rearmed and reequipped in the past three months and are preparing to reassert their desire for a degree of autonomy in early 2013. Mangoush also advised that the situation in the region between Benghazi and the Egyptian border may become increasingly complicated as Salafist fighters from Egypt continue to arrive in Benghazi. Mangoush reported that his staff officers have been advised in secret by aids to Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, General Mohammed al-Sissi, that, acting under instructions from Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, military and security forces are taking steps to detain or neutralize extreme Salafist para-military groups and that a number of these fighters are fleeing to Libya. According to the Libyan commander, these Salafist fighters are comfortable in Benghazi, where many of them served with Libyan revolutionary forces during the rebellion against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.

2. In the opinion of this individual, Zidan and Magariaf, after consulting with Minister of Oil Abdulbari al-Arusi, decided to move forward with a plan dating back to the administration of former Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza dividing the National Oil Corporation's (NOC) production and exploration divisions into two separate firms. With this in mind, al-Arusi began discussing the matter with concerned parties in late November and early December. Included in these discussions were meetings with members of the local federalist council in Benghazi and tribal officials from Barqa. In these sessions Al-Arusi described a new structure managing all existing oil-related firms, while building new operations and raising funds from investors outside of the

country. This firm will be divided into two branches, one in Benghazi and one in Tripoli. Al-Arusi added that the cost of this project will range between fifty (50) and sixty (60) billion dinars.

3. (Source Comment: According to a separate sensitive source, this concept came as a surprise to most of the local officials in Tripoli and Benghazi. This individual added that while the Western officials continue to have some questions about the matter, the Benghazi/Barqa leaders were, in al-Arusi's opinion, positive, if not enthusiastic about the new initiative. According to al-Arusi, doubts on either side relate to the mistrust that remains between the two regions, but he is determined to move ahead in this matter and is supported by Zidan and Magariaf. According to this source, the president and prime minister are convinced that they must deal with this internal East-West issue before they can bring a stable security environment to the country, and disarm the remaining independent militias in each part of the country. This individual added that in private discussions al-Arusi stated that the tentative name for this new oil entity will be the National Corporation for Oil Refining and Petrochemicals Industry, with its headquarters in Tripoli, and substantive offices in Benghazi. Like the NOC, the new firm will fall under the Ministry of Oil and Gas.)

4. In addition, this sensitive source noted that Al-Arusi is also discussing the creation of a company specializing in mechanical construction related to the oil and gas industry. This firm would be based in Benghazi. The minister stated in private that he believes such a company can be developed to compete with international firms in this very complex field. He also believes that such a firm must be managed by experienced, scientifically-qualified Libyans, with reputations for honesty. He noted that until as such a cadre is developed it may be desirable to use experts from Egypt to fill the immediate needs of the firm. Al-Arusi believes this firm should have offices in all of the oil fields and loading facilities. The minister also plans to establish an office in Benghazi, similar to Tripoli's oil institute, a facility that will train students looking to pursue oil-related studies. In addition, al-Arusi is making plans to reopen the Higher Petroleum Institute in Tobruk, which was closed by Qaddafi at the beginning of the revolution. He told a sensitive source that he expects the Tobruk institute to produce thousands of skilled engineers to provide Libyan managers for the future operation of the oil sector. Once the final details are set the Zidan regime will submit the entire package for parliamentary approval and financing

6. (Source Comment: Advisors to Magariaf state in confidence that, in their opinion this comprehensive plan for the oil industry will face opposition from individuals with links to foreign oil firms, primarily foreign trained engineers who hope to see greater privatization in the oil and oil services industries in the wake of the revolution. According to a particularly sensitive source, Zidan is particularly concerned about this possibility, noting that these individuals see this issue in strictly business terms, not considering the political issues, and the East - West situation, that are all part of the overall picture in Libya. At present al-Arusi believes that foreign oil firms remain concerned about the unsettled security situation throughout Libya, however; he is convinced that this new plan will help address this situation. At present, he noted that the large Italian oil firm ENI is stepping up its operations throughout Libya, and, with

the support of the Italian Government, will continue to increase its investment in Libya in an effort to get ahead of the other foreign firms concerned in Libya.)

10-Dec-12

H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid

<http://www.juancole.com/2012/12/benghazis-criticizes-consular.html>

Benghazi's Deep Throat fingers Islamist Leaders for Attacks as State Dept Criticized on Consular Security

Posted on 12/19/2012 by Juan

The report saying that security was inadequate at the compound that the US had adopted as its ad hoc consulate in Benghazi, Libya, dominates today's headlines. That conclusion is obvious. The "consulate" was just a private residence taken over for this purpose by the US in the city. It was not constructed to be a US government building in a potentially hostile city.

I met a person who worked there when I was in Benghazi in June, and she told me that it wasn't even clear if the consulate would be retained after the first of this year. It was possibly temporary, depending on Congressional funding. (The Tea Party House hasn't been good on meeting requests for embassy security funds).

The more interesting question than why ad hoc arrangements should have been made for a consulate during and after the Libyan revolution (the answer to which seems fairly obvious) is, who is responsible for the string of assassinations and acts of violence in the city, of which the RPG attack on the consulate on September 11 was only one? Benghazi, with a population of over one million in a country of 6.5 million, is Libya's second largest city and was the epicenter of the revolution against the government of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.

On November 22, Benghazi police chief Farej Darssi was assassinated. In October a police colonel barely avoided death—his car was wired to explode. A Libyan intelligence officer was killed in September. A general was assassinated in August. Some of these figures had worked for Qaddafi but had defected to the revolution. Qaddafi's security forces were responsible for the 1996 massacre of hardline fundamentalists at Abu Salim prison, and for making others just disappear. Likely the same shadowy cells that attacked the US consulate are behind the attacks on Benghazi police and army officers. There may have been a break in the case. Last Saturday, Benghazi security forces loyal to the elected government in Tripoli, captured a man they suspected of being involved with the groups behind the violence. And, he appears to have been willing to spill the beans. So let's call him the Libyan Deep Throat.

Deep Throat is so knowledgeable about the conspiracies facing the city and so dangerous to those hatching them that the latter immediately attempted to spring him from jail.

On Sunday morning, militants attacked the police facility next to the holding cell where the man is being detained. A policeman at that station died in a hail of bullets from the attackers, and they called for back-up. The police car that sped to the scene was ambushed and three policemen in it were killed.

Still, the police stood their ground and fought off the assault, and they kept their valuable suspect in custody, with all his valuable testimony.

Shortly after midnight, on Monday morning, small explosives were set off at the Garyounis police station in Benghazi, damaging a couple of automobiles but otherwise doing little damage. Then explosives were set off at al-Uruba police station, which also took sniper fire, but neither resulted in casualties.

The police became vigilant, and they apprehended a shady-looking man skulking around near the al-Hadaeq police station, finding him to have two rocket propelled grenades in his possession, which he was apparently intending to fire at the station.

In other words, the capture of Libyan Deep Throat has set off a gang war on the police, who are being informed by bombings and shootings that they must let their informant go or risk their

So what is Deep Throat saying? According to local journalist Mohamed Bujenah of the Libyan Herald, a senior figure in the Benghazi police told him that the informant had fingered as many as 7 prominent Muslim fundamentalist leaders in connection with these attacks, of whom the police named 6 explicitly:

1. Sufyan Ben Qumu, from the notoriously radical town of Derna, and a former prisoner at Guantanamo

2. Ahmad Bukatela, leader of the Ubaida Militia

3. Muhammad al-Zahawi, head of the Ansar al-Sharia militia

4. Muhammad al-Gharabi, a leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Militia

5. Ismail Sallabi, another leader of Rafallah al-Sahati

6. Salim Nabous, head of the Zawiya Martyrs' Brigade

It is just a newspaper article. We don't know if the informant actually named these individuals or if he did so to escape torture, in which case we can't trust what he said.

But if the allegations are true, there is collusion among several hardline militias in the city to create instability in hopes of taking it over.

The new, elected, prime minister Ali Zeidan, has started asserting himself militarily. He closed the country's southern borders against instability in the Sahel. He may well have some risky house cleaning to do in Benghazi.